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POPULATION-ENVIRONMENT LINKAGES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
DIANA D.M. BABOR*
INTRODUCTION
I wish the McCaugheys the best of everything for their
family. Unfortunately, their children may face adult-
hood in a world fraught with ecological disaster because
of overpopulation. There are so many humans that we
are crowding out other species and changing the bio-
sphere of the planet. It is time we all lived responsibly,
with our children's future in mind. Otherwise, there
may not be much of a world for our children or the sep-
tuplets to enjoy.'
Since the 1970's, the incidence of artificially-induced multiple
births has tripled in North America. Regulations to govern assisted-
reproductive technology and the provision of fertility treatments have
yet to be adequately articulated in the United States even though half
of all multiples born are burdened with life-long health problems.2
While many recipients of fertility treatment have indeed been "trying
for years" to conceive a child, and while ethical concerns over using se-
lective reduction abound, it is rare to hear mention of the greater re-
sponsibility needed to limit growth and reduce excessive consumption
within developed societies, so as to maintain a viable biosphere.
This article explores population-environment linkages both within
developed and developing nations, and considers the consequences of a
population growth rate which, as one hectare of arable land is simulta-
neously lost or destroyed, currently results in eight live births every
three seconds. 3 In order to better comprehend the forces governing our
* LL.M. (1997) in International Environmental Law and International Human Rights,
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, LL.B. (1992) University of Windsor, Windsor,
Ontario, B.A. (1988) University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario. The author expresses grati-
tude and appreciation to Professor Hugh Kindred, Dr. David VanderZwaag and Dr. Moira
McConnell at Dalhousie Law School for their insightful contributions.
1. Letter from Larry Murphy of Provincetown, Mass. to TIME, Dec. 22, 1997, at 4,
available in 1997 WL 16251406.
2. The Journal: Medical Misadventures (CBC television broadcast, Nov. 19, 1997).
According to Dr. John Barrett, forty to forty-five doctors were involved, or on duty, to as-
sist the McCaughey septuplets into life. Id.
3. For a cyber-view of this rate of growth (after the death rate is accounted for) and
loss (due to deforestation and erosion) see The Resource Clock (visited Nov. 3, 1998)
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perceptions, Part I of this article will discuss eight interactive variables
which inform decision-making. Part II will examine the existence of le-
gal duties under international law to limit or constrain our level of con-
sumption and our right to freely reproduce, particularly as applicable in
states considered free of a population "problem."
PART I
A. Anthropogenic Repercussions
[W]e are deeply concerned that the overall trends for
sustainable development are worse today than they
were in 1992 .... Conditions in natural habitats and
fragile ecosystems, including mountain ecosystems, are
still deteriorating in all regions of the world, resulting in
diminishing biological diversity. At the global level, re-
newable resources, in particular freshwater, forests,
topsoil and marine fish stocks, continue to be used at
rates beyond their viable rates of regeneration. 4
As the human family continues to increase in size, a greater output
of basic resources and services is required. The fact that every child
born has a need for, and a human right to, food, water, shelter, cloth-
ing, an education and an ecologically-balanced environment places ad-
ditional demands on existing infrastructures responsible for providing
these services, as well as for sewage, sanitation and pollution control.
In developing countries, slowing the population growth offers time for
the state to develop services for its inhabitants and to prepare for the
needs of future generations, whose options would otherwise be even
more constrained.
When slower population growth permits increased economic
growth, it can also result in higher consumption. Consumption must be
efficient if sustainable goals are to be achieved. Yet at any level of de-
velopment, expanding populations increase energy use, resource con-
sumption and environmental stress, 5 albeit to different degrees. Stabi-
lization of population growth and levels of consumption must be
pursued so as to maintain an ecologically-balanced environment and to
keep the environment's carrying capacity within limits.
<http://www.idrc.ca>.
4. Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, U.N. GAOR, 19th Spec.
Sess.at paras. 4, 9, U.N. Doc. AIRESS-192, (Sept. 1997) (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <go-
pher:Hgopher.un.orgOO/ga/recs/RES-S19.2>.
5. UNFPA, POPULATION ISSUES BRIEFING KIT 6 (1994). Current literature on popu-
lation growth and resource use is often focused on whether or not enough food can be pro-
duced. As this is critical for survival, there is an insufficient amount of emphasis placed
on how the ecosystem itself can be sustained, which includes innumerable species de-
pendent on habitat for survival, each of which contributes an intrinsically significant
function in maintaining ecosystem vitality.
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Unsustainable levels of overconsumption and production are pri-
marily found in affluent societies in the North where population growth
is not perceived to be a problem. The wealth and status enjoyed by the
North has also led to the "indiscriminate pursuit of economic growth in
nearly all countries" which "is threatening and undermining the basis
for progress by future generations."6 These wide-scale activities have
resulted in indisputable signs of anthropogenic ecosystem damage in,
among others, the form of climate change, 7 ecosimplification8 and fresh-
water constraints. 9 Although forest preservation is a mitigating force
in containing the speed of damage in these foregoing realms, reaction to
a proposed global forestry treaty 0 demonstrates that precaution has
yet to become the norm.
1. Climate Change
Climate change is considered one of the most serious threats to
6. Id.
7. Global warming is almost completely attributable to resource use and waste pro-
duction by developed nations as well as fossil fuel pollution and ozone-depleting chloro-
fluorocarbons. See Judith E. Jacobsen, Population, Consumption, and Environmental
Degradation: Problems and Solutions, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 255, 258 (1995);
UNFPA, POPULATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: FIVE YEARS AFTER RIO 27 (1997)
[hereinafter AFTER RIO] (noting that while emissions per person have been on a down-
ward trend, population growth has caused total carbon dioxide emissions to rise). "Re-
markably, the IPCC does not mention action to slow population growth as a possible
strategy to mitigate global warming." Id. See also Donald M. Goldberg, Negotiating the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 4 TOURO J. TRANSNAT'L L. 149 (1993).
8. Ecosimplification results from lost biodiversity. As noted in AFTER Rio, the Earth
is believed to have between 7 to 20 million species of which only 1.75 million have been
catalogued. AFTER RIO, supra note 7, at 23. Current extinction rates are fifty to a hun-
dred times faster than the natural background rate of extinction and loss estimates over
the next 25 years range from 2 to 25 percent of species. Id. Destruction comes from
poaching and loss of habitat. Africa and Asia have lost two thirds of their original wildlife
habitat and losses of 80 percent or more have occurred in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Gam-
bia, Ghana, Liberia, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Bangladesh, India, Sri
Lanka and Vietnam. Id. Rapid deforestation in the "commons" of countries where women
have the burden of seeking fuelwood is frequently attributed to their lack of control over
the land and their non-consultation over its use. Id. at 22. "Women could be powerful
agents of conservation since they directly suffer the consequences of resource manage-
ment failure." Id. at 23.
9. See id. at 18-19 (stating that for poor women, water shortages mean extreme
hardship as the extra time and energy needed to obtain water increases their risk of mal-
nutrition and subsequent pregnancy-related health concerns for themselves and their off-
spring). Responsibility for water means women have a profound interest in its supply, as
well as the knowledge to make their involvement in community decision-making on land
and water issues, crucial. Id.
10. World Notes: Saving the Earth - Later, MACLEAN'S, July 7, 1997, at 47. This ar-
ticle describes how the week-long UN Rio Plus Five Conference in New York in June 1997
"designed to rekindle the spirit of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro--largely
avoided concrete commitments." Id. "Delegates shelved a bid by Canada to start negotia-
tions on a global forestry treaty; talks are now unlikely before 2000." Id.
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planetary life.1 Global warming is a consequence of the build-up of
greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide pollution from the burning of
fossil fuels. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
believes that human-induced climate change has caused a rise in global
mean temperatures by 0.5 degrees Celsius since the end of the 19th
century and that a further rise of 1 to 3.5 degrees Celsius will occur be-
fore the end of the next century.12
This will result in shifting climate zones, the death of mountain
and boreal species, and a 14 to 17 percent loss of tropical rainforest and
boreal forest. 13 Sea levels will rise anywhere from 15 to 95 centimeters
and will have catastrophic consequences for some countries and island
states.14 Exposure to heat extremes will affect human health, as will
the increased range of tropical diseases, parasites and insect vectors. 15
The recent convention in Kyoto, Japan, where a new Protocol for
emissions reduction was negotiated, received mixed reviews as to its ef-
fectiveness. Developing nations undergoing rapid industrialization "re-
buffed all attempts to bring them into the accord, even on a voluntary
basis" and defeated "even a gently worded article that would have per-
mitted developing countries to join the protocol at an unspecified future
date."'16 That affluent nations have agreed to effectuate the trade-offs
required to meet their commitments heralds an "end to using the lack
of scientific certainty as an excuse to do nothing"'17 and a promotion for
developing and using new technologies.' 8 Indisputably, converting
words to action is now compulsory.
2. Ecosimplification
Deforestation is a militating factor affecting the rate of climate
change, as trees which absorb carbon dioxide and release oxygen are
removed. Commercial logging has been identified as an important
cause of world-wide deforestation, and illegal logging, particularly in
the Amazon, remains highly problematic. Furthermore, in contrast to a
natural forest fire, clear-cutting removes the life-generating biomass
trees contribute to the food chain, while the "slash and burn" approach
11. AFTER Rio, supra note 7, at 26.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Inside the Kyoto Deal, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 22, 1997, at 22, 24.
17. Id. at 25.
18. See Danylo Hawaleshka, Cashing in on Cleaner Air, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 22, 1997,
at 25. Hawaleshka notes how a study for the Canadian Institute for Environmental Law
and Policy reported that only ten landfills in Canada capture methane from decaying or-
ganic material for combustion into electricity, and that by converting 60 percent of its
landfill methane "the country could cut a significant portion of its emissions." Id.
VOL. 27:2208
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to forests releases more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.' 9
In addition, tropical deforestation is "probably the greatest single
threat to the world's biodiversity."20 Removal of forest cover results in
ecosimplification meaning that "[s]pecies are losing their habitat in the
unequal competition with humans. We are commandeering wildlife
habitat for agriculture, cities, roads, factories, leisure and tourism." 21
Future population growth will only compound this sprawl to the utter
detriment of the world's non-human inhabitants.
3. Water Constraints
Another non-renewable component of the ecosystem is usable
freshwater, the availability of which has rarely been examined in the
context of population growth. "Analysts fail to recognize the critical
impacts that increased population pressures on the world's freshwater
supply can have on human health, the environment, and international
security."22 Water is an "absolutely limited resource" so that "any in-
crease in population leads automatically to lower availability per per-
son."23 Current unsustainable water use by urban centers, industries
and agriculture result in the discharge of water contaminated with
chemicals and heavy metals into the water cycle. 24 Pressures from
19. See The Nature of Things: The Great Northern Forest (CBC television broadcast,
Apr. 10, 1997).
20. AFTER RIo, supra note 7, at 23. See also United Nations Population Division for
Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, Population and Deforestation in
Developing Countries POPULATION NEWSLETTER, No. 56, Dec. 1992, at 6 ("[Tropical defor-
estation has provoked the largest body of current research in the field of population and
environment.').
21. AFTER RIO, supra note 7, at 22-23. Habitat loss and the rate of deforestation tend
to be highest where human population density is highest. Id.
22. Pamela LeRoy, Troubled Waters: Population and Water Scarcity, 6 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 299, 302 (1995). Between 1940 and 1990, the world's population more
than doubled, resulting in a simultaneous doubling of per capita water use. The practical
result was that the global use of water increased over four times in 50 years, and that
given its finite nature, such a quadrupling of use cannot occur again. Id. Population
growth not only increases water needs, but helps accelerate the environmental distur-
bances of the water cycle due to greater food and fuel production. Id. at 305. Among
these disturbances are "deforestation and other destructive land-use practices, the dis-
posal of waste, the use of pesticides and fertilizers, and the release of greenhouse gases
that could warm the global climate. These activities limit the amount of water that can
be captured and pollute what water is available." Id. That water constraints will be com-
pounded by climate change is acknowledged by Malin Falkenmark in the essay, Land-
scape as Life Support Provider: Water-Related Limitations. Malin Falkenmark, Land-
scape as Life Support Provider: Water-Related Limitations in POPULATION - THE COMPLEX
REALITY: A REPORT OF THE POPULATION SUMMIT OF THE WORLD'S SCIENTIFIC ACADEMIES
103, 110 (Sir. F. Graham-Smith, F.R.S., ed., 1994) [hereinafter COMPLEX REALITY].
23. AFTER RIO, supra note 7, at 17.
24. See LeRoy, supra note 22, at 303, 313. The overexploitation of groundwater in
Bangkok is causing parts of the city to sink at a rate of 14 centimeters a year, leading to
cracked pavements, broken sewer and water pipes, seawater intrusion and flooding.
Treatment of contaminated groundwater can be prohibitively expensive and time-
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growing populations are increasing dependence on underground aqui-
fers as water tables and river levels fall. 25
Water scarcity begins with supplies falling below 1,000 cubic me-
ters per person per year, and water stress is found in those countries
with annual supplies of less than 1700 cubic meters per person. In
1990, 28 countries were in a state of water stress or scarcity, and by
2025, the number "will soar to 50 countries with 3.32 billion inhabi-
tants" affected. 26 Significantly, deforestation reduces the freshwater
supply as it results in less local rainfall. In addition, erosion resulting
from deforestation reduces the amount of rainwater absorbed and
thereby lowers groundwater levels.27
If "sustainable development ultimately implies a stationary popu-
lation,"28 then current unsustainable environments along with the fore-
going changes already in evidence will lead to very mobile populations.
Human-induced environmental disasters have already given rise to at
least 10 million environmental refugees, composed primarily of women
with their children, and "if current trends continue unbroken, there
could be major population shifts."29 Under these circumstances, sus-
tainable development may well come to be appraised as political rheto-
ric which, so as not to hinder industry, proffered "too little, too late."
B. Inefficient Per Capita Consumption
In order to achieve sustainability, several United Nations Declara-
tions have called for a reduction in overconsumption. Chapter 4, Para-
graph 3 of Agenda 21 explicitly recognizes that "the major cause of the
continued deterioration of the global environment is the unsustainable
pattern of consumption and production, particularly in industrialized
countries, which is a matter of grave concern, aggravating poverty and
consuming. Id.
25. AFTER RIO, supra note 7, at 18.
26. This is according to UNFPA medium projections for population growth as cited
in AFTER RIO, where it also states that a shift from the 1990 abundance of 3200 cubic me-
ters per person to acute scarcity is expected in Nigeria by 2050, when "they will be down
to 910 each, on the medium population projection." Id. Somalia, Kenya, Rwanda, Bu-
rundi and Malawi will face extreme scarcity, by 2050, when supplies will be 'less than
300 cubic metres per person." Id.
27. Id. at 22.
28. Herman E. Daly, Sustainable Development: From Concept and Theory to Opera-
tional Principle, in RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT, AND POPULATION: PRESENT KNOWLEDGE,
FUTURE OPTIONS 25, 37 (Kingsley Davis and Mikhail S. Bernstam eds., 1991) [hereinafter
FUTURE OPTIONS]. Daly states that "[s]ustainability is compatible with a large popula-
tion living at a low level of per capita resource use, or with a small population living at
high levels of resource use per capita. For many countries resource consumption levels
are below sufficiency, yet ecological carrying capacity has already been exceeded. In such
cases population control is a precondition rather than an ultimate consequence of sus-
tainable development." Id. at 37.
29. UNFPA, POPULATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 21
(1991).
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imbalances."30 As Chapter 4 of Agenda 21 is concerned with consump-
tion, the lack of study given to this source of ecological imbalance is ac-
knowledged in Paragraph 6 which states that "[g]rowing recognition of
the importance of addressing consumption has also not yet been
matched by an understanding of its implications" and "[m]ore needs to
be known about the role of consumption in relation to economic growth
and population dynamics in order to formulate coherent international
and national policies."31
To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for
all people, Principle 8 of the Rio Declaration suggests that States
should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and
consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies.32 In addi-
tion, Paragraph 1.2 of the Preamble and Principle 6 in the second chap-
ter of the ICPD make reference to "unsustainable patterns of produc-
tion and consumption."33 The Report of the Fourth World Conference
on Women also carries a reference to the deleterious consequences of
such activities. 34
30. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN
Doc.A/CONF.151/26 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 814 [hereinafter Agenda 21]. Paragraph 4.4 states
"[m]easures to be undertaken at the international level for the protection and enhance-
ment of the environment must take fully into account the current imbalances in the global
patterns of consumption and production." Paragraph 4.5 states:
Special attention should be paid to the demand for natural resources
generated by unsustainable consumption and to the efficient use of
those resources consistent with the goal of minimizing depletion and
reducing pollution. Although consumption patterns are very high in
certain parts of the world, the basic consumer needs of a large section
of humanity are not being met. This results in excessive demands and
unsustainable lifestyles among the richer segments, which place im-
mense stress on the environment. The poorer segments, meanwhile,
are unable to meet food, health care, shelter and educational needs.
Changing consumption patterns will require a multipronged strategy
focusing on demand, meeting the basic needs of the poor, and reducing
wastage and the use of finite resources in the production process.
Id. at 4.5.
31. Id. at para. 4.6. Following the Earth Summit, the belief was expressed that a
Consumption Summit should be convened in the form of an International Conference on
Population, Consumption and the Environment. Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 56.
32. Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26fRev.1, princ. 8 (1992), 31 I.L.M.
874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
33. International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994), UN Doc.
A/CONF.171/13, Ch. 1, Preamble [hereinafter ICPD]. The relevant sentence in Para-
graph 1.2 states in full: "Around the world many of the basic resources on which future
generations will depend for their survival and well-being are being depleted and environ-
mental degradation is intensifying, driven by unsustainable patterns of production and
consumption, unprecedented growth in population, widespread and persistent poverty,
and social and economic inequality." Id. at para. 1.2.
34. The Fourth World Conference on Women, UN Doc.A./CONF.177/20, at para. 246
(1995), 35 I.L.M. 401 [hereinafter Beijing]. This paragraph reiterates and expands on
Paragraph 4.3 of Agenda 21.
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The conference provisions on consumption have been described as
both clear and direct. However, it is argued that they are so straight-
forward "in part from a lack of substantive programs and recommenda-
tions to give the statements teeth and in part from the varied and
vague meanings of 'unsustainable.' 35 The premise of this analysis is
that since nations would protect "their sovereign rights to produce and
consume as they wish" the provisions would be somehow less than clear
and direct if there were substantive recommendations to pursue.36 In
effect, this contention provides affluent nations with an excuse to ob-
fuscate and avoid their obligations to limit their activities.
1. Overconsumption
"Overconsumption by the world's fortunate is an environmental
problem unmatched in severity by anything but perhaps population
growth."37
On the basis of consumption alone, the United States is the most
overpopulated nation in the world. The average person in the U.S. con-
sumes almost 20 times as much as a person in India or China and 60 to
70 times more than a person in Bangladesh. 38 Using energy consump-
tion as an indicator of sustainability, a child born in the United States
represents twice the environmental impact on life-support systems as
one born in Sweden, three times one in Italy, thirteen times one in Bra-
zil, thirty-five times one in India and 140 times one in Bangladesh. 39
35. Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 258 n.10. "[Clonsumption" is defined as everything
populations do to feed, house and clothe themselves including the industrial and commer-
cial activities required to produce the products and services used. Id. at 256 n.3. See also
Digby J. McLaren, Population Growth - Should We Be Worried? 17 POPULATION & ENV'T
243, 249 (1996). McLaren defines "sustainability" as the availability of life-supporting
resources and a capacity to absorb waste, not only now, but in the immediate and long
range future, while absorbing another 1 billion consumers every 11 years or so, for the
next 20 or 30 years. Id. I would suggest that at the present rate of environmental de-
cline, "unsustainable" could be defined by the pejorative meaning of "consumer," as some
of its synonyms portend: deplete, dissipate, drain, exhaust, expend, finish up, fritter
away, lessen, squander, use up, vanish, waste, wear out, annihiliate, decay, demolish, de-
stroy, lay waste, devastate and ravage. See THE NEW COLLINS THESAURUS 123 (10th
ed.1984).
36. Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 256 n.1O.
37. DONALD G. KAUFMAN & CECILIA M. FRANZ, BIOSPHERE 2000: PROTECTING OUR
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 129 (1993) [hereinafter BIOSPHERE 2000].
38. G.H. Brundtland, Population, Environment and Development, Address at The
Rafael M. Salas Memorial Lecture (1993) [hereinafter Brundtland]. In calculating per
capita waste, wealthy people generate far more pollution, with the exception of untreated
sewage, than do the poor. The 25 million richest Americans generate 11 tons of carbon
per capita each year from the burning of fossil fuels, while the world's poorest 500 million
release about 0.1 ton per capita. ALAN THEIN DURNING, HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? THE
CONSUMER SOCIETY AND THE FUTURE OF THE EARTH 49-50 (1992), cited in Lamont C.
Hempel, Population in Context: A Typology of Environmental Driving Forces, 18
POPULATION & ENV'T 439, 450 (1997).
39. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON POPULATION AND QUALITY OF LIFE,
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Overall, the United States consumes more than 4.5 billion metric
tons of materials annually. With only 5 percent of the world popula-
tion, the United States nevertheless accounts for approximately 25 per-
cent of global energy use on an annual basis. In 1994, the U.S. used
19.9 million barrels of oil per day while the remaining OECD countries
collectively used 23.8 million barrels per day.40 Based on per capita en-
ergy use alone, an increase in the American population of 125 million is
the equivalent of increasing the population of a developing country by
1.25 billion people.4 1 The most fundamental indicator of overconsump-
tion by the affluent is also the most conspicuous in history. Any aspira-
tion to consume a diet of the western world is being foreclosed by world
population growth. 42
2. Underconsumption
Defining unsustainable as "inefficient resource use" suggests that
overconsumption is only one side of the equation. Underconsumption
by the "victims of multiple deprivation" also leads to environmental
degradation and is primarily a result of poverty and a lack of technol-
ogy.43 The nexus between consumption, poverty and population are
considered in Chapter 3 of the ICPD in Paragraph 14. It states, in part
"[e]fforts to slow down population growth, to reduce poverty, to achieve
economic progress, to improve environmental protection, and to reduce
unsustainable consumption and production patterns are mutually rein-
forcing."44 The role of the international economic system 45 in main-
CARING FOR THE FUTURE - MAKING THE NEXT DECADES PROVIDE A LIFE WORTH LIVING 52
(1996).
40. U.S. Population and Sustainable Development, 22 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 391,
392 (emphasis added) [hereinafter U.S. Population].
41. Elizabeth Rohrbough, On Our Way to Ten Billion Human Beings: A Comment on
Sustainability and Population, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 237 (1994), cited in Jill
Bracken, Respecting Human Rights in Population Policies: An International Customary
Right to Reproductive Choice 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 197, 204 (1995).
42. See Bracken, supra note 41, at 204 n.49. She indicates that most American grain
is consumed indirectly through meat (as well as soft drinks) and that at United States
consumption levels, the "world grain output could only sustain 2.75 billion people, half as
many as are alive today." Id. At Italian consumption levels (half that of the US) 5.5 bil-
lion people could be supported, whereas "at the Indian level, world grain output could sus-
tain 11 billion people." Id. Short of harvesting kelp from the sea, or advanced technologi-
cal breakthroughs, the most favourable short-term solution would be that "the affluence of
the world's diet must be reduced" Id. (actually it is the diet of the affluent of the world
which must be reduced) (emphasis added). Bio-tech grain patents are beyond the scope of
this article as is a discussion of the technology which brought about the "green revolution"
of the 60's and 70's.
43. PAUL HARRISON, THE THIRD REVOLUTION - ENVIRONMENT, POPULATION AND A
SUSTAINABLE WORLD 83, 274 (1992). See also Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 266-67 (stating
that environmental damage stems directly from poverty, the options that poverty excludes
and the low productivity that flows from it).
44. ICPD, supra note 33, at para. 3.14. See also Dr. Nais Sadik, Reflections on the
International Conference on Population and Development and the Efficacy of UN Confer.
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taining "a low technological level" amongst the world's poor, directs at-
tention back to the North as the controlling influence behind both un-
derconsumption and overconsumption.
The desire by non-industrialized countries to mimic the consump-
tion patterns of the world's greatest polluters is a matter for concern.46
Furthermore, the rapidly growing worldwide gap between rich and poor
increases the risks posed to environmental systems by these two ex-
tremities of the economic spectrum. "Extreme differences in consump-
tion are inevitable in a world that contains 358 known billionaires
whose combined net worth equals the combined annual incomes of the
poorest 2.5 billion people."47
[T]he dominant perspective that informs policymakers
and citizens alike is that of economics where insatiabil-
ity is taken as axiomatic, analytically and normatively.
In fact, the very notion of progress and the belief in un-
ending growth is premised on the inevitability and de-
sirability of increasing consumption.4 8
As buyer preferences transform yesterday's luxuries into today's
social expectations, 49 the environmental externalities which would at-
tach to these products remain unaccounted for, underscoring how such
costs are viewed as non-profitable to the production process and to the
final sale.50 Goals to reduce consumption have been mainly rhetorical,
ences, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 249, 250 (1995).
45. HARRISON, supra note 43, at 84-85. A more comprehensive overview of the eco-
nomic factors which bolster the industrialized north is beyond the scope of this article.
46. See DURNING, supra note 38, at 117-35. This can also lead to traditional societies
abandoning their cultures in favor of adopting materialistic values, usually disseminated
in mass advertising by global producers.
47. Hempel, supra note 38, at 449.
48. See Thomas Princen, Toward a Theory of Restraint, 18 POPULATION & ENV'T 233,
234 (1997). See also McLaren, supra note 35, at 248. He describes how most'economists
ignore the limitations of population growth and consumption because they ignore the ecoz
sphere "[t]hey think in terms of an infinite world."
49. See HARRISON, supra note 43, at 275.
50. Since conventional economic accounting does not incorporate the depletion of
natural resources or the deleterious emissions generated by any given process or activity,
a nation's GNP is not an accurate reflection of economic growth. PAUL R. EHRLICH ET AL,
THE STORK AND THE PLOW: THE EQUITY ANSWER TO THE HUMAN DILEMMA 241 (1995).
The final price paid by consumers for a product will not include the price of pollution re-
duction or clean-up charges if the cost of polluting is not accounted for. This has effec-
tively allowed industrialized nations to develop their markets at the expense of the bio-
sphere since these costs are diffuse, spread over time and difficult to calculate. PAUL
EHRLICH & ANNE EHRLICH, POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT: ISSUES IN HUMAN
ECOLOGY 285 (1970). The application of the "polluter pays principle" ensures that pollu-
tion costs, or externalities, are internalized. See Rio Declaration, supra note 32, at princ.
16 (stating that "[n]ational authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the ap-
proach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to
the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment.").
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reflecting how such objectives directly contradict "commercial and em-
ployment policies aimed at economic growth for which increased con-
sumption is integral."51 Far less attention has been paid to the forces
which impel overconsumption than to the factors leading to overpopula-
tion,52 particularly since the pollution from this form of inefficient con-
sumption is transboundary and, therefore, less conspicuous.
"It is easier to force an Indian woman to have fewer babies than it
is to force Americans to drive fewer cars."5 3
C. The Forces that Drive Us
One study on the "driving forces" involved in environmental de-
struction identified the eight interactive variables of a causal frame-
work, as: 1) Anthropocentrism: a core value which refers to the preoc-
cupation with human progress and domination at the expense of other
species. It also encompasses the widespread domination of women by
men, and the ecological consequences that such domination produces; 2)
51. Princen, supra note 48, at 252 (suggesting that in the many societies which
equate progress with material consumption, the distance created between production and
consumption decisions makes it virtually impossible to relate one's individual decisions to
collective and environmental impacts). But see Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 256 n.3 (listing
"consumption policies" such as: "changing technologies used to produce goods so that re-
sources are used more efficiently or not needed at all; economic and regulatory policies to
encourage efficiency.., reduction in the use of primary materials, and reuse, recycling
and improving durability of goods; efforts to change cultural and psychological beliefs so
that individuals use less; economic, political, and technological changes that improve the
material condition of people who live lives of material dearth; and political changes that
improve equity of access to resources").
52. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 259. She notes that "[tihis argument, often made
by analysts from the South, is echoed by Northern communities of faith, people with con-
cerns for the Third World, and environmentalists, who urge the inclusion of consumption
in industrialized countries in the international debate over sustainable development." Id.
See generally POPULATION, CONSUMPTION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT - RELIGIOUS AND
SECULAR RESPONSES (Harold Coward ed., 1995) [hereinafter POPULATION, CONSUMPTION
AND THE ENVIRONMENT]; LOURDES ARIZPE ET AL., POPULATION & ENVIRONMENT -
RETHINKING THE DEBATE 5 (1994).
53. John Stackhouse, Quantity of Life, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Sept. 3, 1994, at D1;
John Stackhouse, Is the Problem Overconsumption or Overpopulation?, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL, Sept. 1994 at D-3. See Nathan Keyfitz & Kerstin Lindahl-Kiessling, The World
Population Debate: Urgency of the Problem, in COMPLEX REALITY, supra note 22, at 43
[hereinafter Population Debate]. They discuss how in 1994, approximately 500 million
automobiles were being used worldwide, by about 1/5th of the world's population, or 1.1
billion drivers. Id. If full development means that 1/5th of the projected 10 billion global
inhabitants, or 2.5 billion people, become drivers of fossil fuel burning and terrestrial
warming vehicles, the environmental consequences will be inconceivable. Id. See also
BIOSPHERE 2000, supra note 37, at 207 (quoting the Gaia Peace Atlas "Since the Indus-
trial Age the world has increasingly depended on fossil fuels. Modern civilization is actu-
ally based on non-renewable resources. This puts a finite limit on the length of time our
civilization can exist). But emission-free vehicles are being tested for mass production,
including hydrogen-cell buses and electric cars. Public demand for these vehicles would
compel the market to respond to, rather than set, consumer trends.
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Contempocentrism: also a core value which involves the human preoc-
cupation with the present, often at the expense of future generations,
both human and non-human; 3) Population Growth and Migration: an
amplifier, or a principal means by which core values are extended. It
involves the rate and magnitude of changes in fertility, mortality and
migration; 4) Technology: can be either beneficial or detrimental but is
another amplifier of core values which has an enormous impact on the
environment; 5) Poverty: a consumptive behavior variable that is a
major creator of ecological poverty; 6) Affluence: also a behavior vari-
able, it encourages environmental destruction through overconsump-
tion, a lack of concern for natural resource depletion and "throw away"
consumer lifestyles; 7) Market Failures: represent environmental ex-
ternalities and unpriced opportunity costs, such as acid rain pollution;
and the 8) Failure to Have Markets: results in an unacceptable level of
environmental damage due to an absence of assigned property rights or
a failure to recognize economic value in vital ecological resources and
services. 54
Linkages between behavioral choices and the perception of how
these choices will benefit the self can be understood from a more com-
prehensive review of these concepts. Contempocentrism, defined as
"the elevation of individualism over the human community, just as
anthropocentrism,55 represents the elevation of the human community
over the rest of nature," results in "net present value maximization"
being the "most widely accepted rationale for placing individual self-
interest above that of the collective human and biospheric commu-
nity."56 A further force considered to impel the consumptive behaviors
of the world's middle-class is "the tension between poverty and afflu-
ence." This tension is also considered a source for "the political paraly-
sis in environmental policy making."5 7
54. Hempel, supra note 38, at 443. Additionally, Hempel states that the "model re-
veals the folly of basing environmental improvement strategies on unicausal theories and
linear solutions-even demographic ones. It also helps explain why thinking in terms of
tradeoffs rather than solutions may be more productive." Id. at 459.
55. See id. at 445. He indicates the irony that, while self-centered behavior, both in-
dividual and as a species, is now the "ultimate threat to our planet" due to amplification
by rapid population growth and new technologies, human aggrandizement had important
evolutionary survival value. He also discusses how such anthropocentric thinking is also
manifest in gender-based differences, often "symbolized in the way nature--"she"-is de-
fined and treated." Id. at 446. I would suggest that disparaging the feminine has often
been accomplished by equating it with emotion and irrationality. An example of how this
approach has been legitimized by modern science is the emphasis on (linear) instinct over
any more complex depth of feeling in non-human species. Acknowledgment of such feel-
ings would require accepting not only emotional but also rational thought processes in
other mammals, as intelligence in the form of rational thinking, has its foundation in
emotive capacities. Having to incorporate "the feminine" is avoided so as not to have to
abandon the utterly anthropocentric warning against anthropomorphism, and so as to
maintain a reasoning which justifies a strictly utilitarian view of non-human species.
56. Id. at 447.
57. Id. at 449. An example of political ambivalence given is environmental protection
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To correct market failures, consideration has to be given to those
most directly affected by today's decisions. "Since future generations
are logically denied representation in the market," the economist must
achieve "an efficient allocation of resources for present generations,
while correcting pricing distortions."58 Many economists believe that
reliance on a free market, despite its premise of continuous growth, is
the best mechanism to account for all externalities. 59
The "missing market" problem is analogized to the "tragedy of the
commons" where collectively-used property ends up destroyed. 60 Critics
of this analogy indicate that communal property can be sustainably
managed and that when land in developing countries becomes privat-
ized it is most often women who are adversely impacted. 61 Neverthe-
less, the trend now is for economists in the North to use the absence of
market structures to account for everything from the decline of local
fisheries, due to a lack of private oceanic property rights, to the growing
threat to biodiversity, where nature's amenities are seen as "jointly
supplied and non-exclusive." 62
measures through higher gasoline taxes, which were rejected due to their regressive im-
pact on income distribution. For a specific example on attempts to ensure political ac-
countability in environmental policy-making, see Diana D.M. Babor, Environmental
Rights in Ontario: Are Participatory Mechanisms Working?, COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 1998 Y.B. 121 (forthcoming in 1999).
58. Id. at 452.
59. As Edward Abbey noted "[g]rowth for the sake of growth is the ideology of the
cancer cell." BIOSPHERE 2000, supra note 37, at 565.
60. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). It
states, "Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best
interest in a society which believes in the freedom of the commons." But see Ronald D.
Lee, Comment: The Second Tragedy of the Commons in FUTURE OPTIONS, supra note 28,
at 321 n.4 (noting that historically, common property resources were not free-access, but
rather, were communally managed).
61. See Hempel, supra note 38, at 453-54. He notes that studies from anthropology
and archaeology show communal property has often been sustainably managed for many
centuries on the basis of cultural practices and institutions for self-regulation. Even the
medieval commons used in Hardin's analogy "have been found to be far more stable, ecol-
ogically, than the rift between individual and collective rationality would seem to sug-
gest... [n]evertheless, Hardin's allegory may have increasing relevance in the modern era.
The cultural practices and community-based institutions that in the past served to protect
common resources are now in decline as a result of population growth, cultural erosion,
and external development pressures." Id. at 453-54. But see Antonio G.M. La Vina, The
Right to a Sound Environment in the Philippines: The Significance of the Minors Oposa
Case, 3 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY INT'L ENVTL L. 246, 250-51 (1994). See also Policy State-
ment on Population and Environment, in WOMEN AND THE ENVIRONMENT 22 (G. Reardon,
ed., 1993) (commenting how people, primarily women, have traditionally adapted to and
shaped the natural environment through the accumulation of local knowledge, the de-
valuation of which has increased environmental degradation). See generally UN Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa, African Training and Research Centre for Women, Update
No. 17, Nov. 1991, at 10-11; and Recommendations of the Expert Group Meeting on
Population and Women, Report of the Secretary-General of the Conference, Substantive
Preparations, Dec. 16, 1992, EICONF.841PC/6 at 20-21.
62. Hempel, supra note 38, at 453, 455-56. The environmental destruction of the
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
However, the process of assigning market values to the greater bio-
sphere signifies a complete and all-encompassing entrenchment of an-
thropocentric values. Making animals and plants subject to the laws of
the marketplace obviates the need to care for the rest of the ecosystem,
because their assigned values would have no connection with their role
in a forest or marine ecosystem. 63 The numerous unknown species
which are presently disappearing would not be computed as having
value to humans. "The real value of the ecosystem is without limit, as
it uniquely enables us to stay alive on the planet."64
In light of the fact that private ownership is also no guarantee that
an ecosystem will not be subject to unsustainable abuse, a substantive
right to an ecologically-balanced environment would provide recogni-
tion for the life-giving value of the ecosystem. In addition, this right
would serve to attenuate anthropocentric and contempocentric motiva-
tions by providing for a balance between that of the self and the other,
the present and the future, and our rate of consumption and fertility.
D. Affluence and Population
The Rio Declaration acknowledges that industrialized countries are
largely responsible for unsustainable activities, as differentiated re-
sponsibilities reflect the level of a state's industrial development. Prin-
ciple 7 sets forth that:
states shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to
eastern command economies can be explained by the absence of market forces, which "is
particularly true in the case of ecosimplification, where the absence of market incentives
for protecting habitat or common property appears to have its greatest impact." Id. at
456.
63. McLaren, supra note 35, at 250. In the border areas of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam
and Thailand, biologists have spent decades, in a region plagued by thirty years of war-
fare, seeking the elusive kouprey, a wild forest ox of which an estimated few dozen sur-
vive today. The kouprey is probably the most endangered big mammal in the world, yet
six decades of international effort to study it or even capture it on film has only resulted
in the loss of lives due to land mines and armed attacks. Since the likelihood of finding
the kouprey remains slight, the World Wildlife's Fund Hanoi office has not allocated its
limited funds to prioritize this mystery bovid. Steven Hendrix, Quest for the Kouprey,
READER'S DIG., Sept. 1996, at 105, as condensed from International Wildlife. More illu-
minating, is the "other priority" given to capturing live koupreys. According to Noel
Vietmeyer of the U.S.-based National Academy of Sciences and a specialist in the eco-
nomic evaluation of tropical species, the kouprey is "probably the most genetically valu-
able species on Earth" since kouprey cross-breeding could offer a "billion-dollar genetic
boost - in terms of disease resistance and general fortitude - to domestic cattle stock" Id.
at 106. This perception of a species which has been barely seen, in terms of its economic
utility to service a minority of human livelihoods, is indicative of how the intrinsic value
of nature is continuously coopted by the profit its purely physical properties yield. This is
the crux of the problem which we have allowed to develop: the value of nature as a dimen-
sion for reverence has been displaced by the belief that it is strictly for our limitless use
and exploitation.
64. McLaren, supra note 35, at 250.
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conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of
the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contribu-
tions to global environmental degradation, States have
common but differentiated responsibilities. 'The devel-
oped countries acknowledge the responsibility that they
bear in the international pursuit of sustainable devel-
opment in view of the pressures their societies place on
the global environment and of the technologies and fi-
nancial resources they command.' 65
In 1993, the U.S. government formed an advisory body on sustain-
able development which acknowledged that stabilizing the population
without changing consumption patterns and waste production would
not be enough. However, it would "make an immensely challenging
task more manageable. In the United States, each is necessary; neither
alone is sufficient. ' 66
Indeed, it is clear that if a reduction in consumption in the North is
critical, then "any population growth in a country with high levels of
consumption is as severe a crisis as the environmental problems that it
intensifies." 67 At present, the United States is the only major industri-
alized country "experiencing population growth on a significant scale."68
Fertility in the United States has been rising in recent years and in
1989, the average number of children per woman exceeded 2.0 for the
first time in seventeen years.69
Despite the recommendations of the ICPD, no industrial nation,
other than Japan, concedes to having a stated population "policy." This
is particularly true in the United States where population control is as-
65. Rio Declaration, supra note 32, at princ. 7.
66. U.S. Population, supra note 40, at 391. The advisory body, named the "Presi-
dent's Council on Sustainable Development," is comprised of about thirty members drawn
from "senior levels of the Clinton administration, CEOs of major corporations and heads
of environmental groups." Id.
67. Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 269.
68. Id. Jacobsen indicates that, on the basis of data from June 1994, "the United
States annually adds nearly two million people to the world's population from natural in-
crease alone." Id. Births to unmarried women ... reached a record high of more than 1.2
million in 1991, up 4 percent from 1990 and 82 percent from 1980... The most dramatic
increase in non-marital childbearing occurred among relatively older women. One-third
of unmarried mothers in 1988 were aged 25 and older, compared with about one-fourth in
1980. Unmarried teens also account for one-third of unmarried births. UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, U.S. NATIONAL REPORT ON POPULATION 21 (1994). See also U.S. Population,
supra note 40, at 391 (stating that 60 percent of all pregnancies in the US are unin-
tended).
69. See Jacobsen, supra note 40, at 279. "This recent increase (in fertility], coupled
with a rise in immigration, makes the likelihood of population stabilization in the U.S.
remote." Id. According to the US Census Bureau, the most recent medium range projec-
tion estimates a population of 350 million by 2030 and of nearly 400 million by 2050. Id.
"Based on current trends, efficiency in the use of all resources would have to increase by
more than 50% over the next four or five decades [in the United States], just to keep pace
with population growth." U.S. Population, supra note 40, at 393 (emphasis added).
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sociated with negative or racist immigration policies.7 0 Consequently,
the United States has "no legislation that limits or manages population
growth, advocates attempts to determine ideal population size or cul-
tural carrying capacity, supports family planning programs, or pro-
motes education about population issues or human sexuality. 71
In fact, most industrialized countries, faced with aging populations,
"are trying to halt the decline in their fertility rates and some have
even decided to actively encourage higher fertility... Family policies are
the principal means of addressing these objectives." 72 As such policies
are aimed specifically at women in the labor market, the procedures by
which governments are attempting "to reconcile professional and family
life"73 are not specified, although pro-natalist financial incentives have
been offered in some jurisdictions in Europe.
The greater. capacity of the affluent to access the legal system to
advance and protect their interests and rights further differentiates the
scope and manner by which a population policy is formulated and im-
plemented, as between North and South. When a state policy in an in-
dustrialized country attempts to limit a freedom or right, it will likely
be challenged on constitutional grounds. For example, the "special
leave" granted for teachers employed by the South African government
upon a birth or adoption is being challenged. That maternity benefits
are limited to "the birth or adoption of two children," with only unpaid
leave available for the birth or adoption of further children, is being
70. See Rohrbough, supra note 41, at 239. She writes "[a]lthough migration does not
change world population figures, it does affect the overall consumption of resources and
ignores the real problem of overconsumption." Id. Comprehensive arguments surround-
ing immigration policies held by industrialized nations are beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. For further information, see U.S. Population, supra note 40, at 397 (noting that one
'undervalued strategy" to address immigration into the United States would involve for-
mulating policies in international trade, economics and the environment to redress the
economic, political and social conditions which influence an individual's decision to emi-
grate). However, choice as to when, where and why one ends up migrating does not al-
ways enter into the equation. See any and all of the most recent United Nations Declara-
tions and Conventions pertaining to development and/or human rights for similar
recommendations.
71. BIOSPHERE 2000, supra note 37, at 157. This book asserts that the stance of the
United States government is one constituting an unofficial pronatalist policy on the basis
of the following: "an income tax structure that provides deductions for all children in a
family; a strong movement to limit legal abortions in the United States and to limit or
stop funds to international family planning groups in countries with legalized abortion;
increased benefits for each child born into a welfare family; a strong belief that the econ-
omy is based on continued population growth; and a strong belief that family size should
be decided on by the family." Id.
72. ICPD, NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SYNTHESIS
OF 168 NATIONAL REPORTS PREPARED FOR THE ICPD, 65 (1994) [hereinafter NATIONAL
REPORTS]. "The majority of industrialized countries do not perceive immigration as a
long-term solution to address demographic imbalances caused by fertility decline and
population aging. The socio-cultural difficulties of integrating large numbers of immi-
grants is cited as the main reason for this." Id.
73. Id.
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challenged as a violation of the South African Bill of Rights.74 If a vio-
lation is found, the onus will be on the government to justify the right's
limitation as to the importance of its purpose.
E. Summary - Part 1
Were the manifestation of anthropogenic environmental damage
solely attributable to emission-producing technologies, a solution would
have undoubtedly already been found. Yet, reliance on these technolo-
gies extends beyond their function as cornerstones of modern economies
and in providing for affluent lifestyles. They act as principal amplifiers
of the core values upon which modern economies are founded. Any re-
duction of their externalities needs to factor in the current and antici-
pated damage generated by increasing numbers of consumers as a con-
sequence of population growth.
Generally speaking, efforts to change the anthropocentric and con-
tempocentric attitudes in countries "addicted to economic growth"75 re-
quire the creation of a new culture of sustainable consumption. A con-
sideration of how anthropocentrism, in particular, has been made both
culturally acceptable and unquestionable could begin with a review of
how both legal and non-legal language is used to describe the position
of humans in the biosphere. 76
As well as encouraging the elimination of wasteful lifestyle prac-
tices, family planning services engender greater opportunities for
women in the industrialized world.77 However, a decision to legally
challenge a limit on the number of children for which the state should
provide financial benefits, overlooks both the need for short and long-
term fiscal restraint, as well as the accepted "neutrality" of the two-
child family as neither pro- nor anti-natalist, since it is the replacement
value. Such a concern with "rights" conforms with the belief that there
is no population "problem" in developed nations. In turn, such a per-
74. The "special leave" is also being challenged as only available to female employees;
it consists of twelve weeks leave on full pay. Extracted from letter from the Canadian Bar
Association, Canada-South Africa Constitutional Litigation and Legal Development Proj-
ect, dated July 31, 1997.
75. Rohrbough, supra note 41, at 238.
76. The Rio Declaration emphasizes that "[h]uman beings are at the centre of con-
cerns for sustainable development." Vol.1, Principal U.N. Doc. AICONF.151/26 (1992).
For the affluent nations, it is a given that humans (as opposed to anything else) would be
at the centre of development, whether or not it is sustainable, as it is profitable and hu-
mans are the principal beneficiaries. However, were the externalities produced by devel-
opment incompatible with our core values, then the maintenance of an ecologically-
balanced environment would be the centre of concern, and the excesses of development
and overconsumption would not be at issue. Clearly, however, where anthropogenic dam-
age is caused by underconsumption, the desperation of poverty requires that humans be
the centre of concern, both for the sake of sustainable development and for promoting a
non-existent core value of wealth re-distribution.
77. See U.S. Population, supra note 40, at 391.
1999
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ception has facilitated a measure of personal freedom on all counts that
has yet to be accounted for.
PART II
A. Legal Duties to Govern Rights
The prevailing definition of the responsible manner in which indi-
viduals and couples are to exercise their family planning rights is by
taking into account the needs of their living and future children and
their responsibility towards the community. This responsibility or duty
to the community is set forth in Article 29, Paragraph 1 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights: "[e]veryone has duties to the commu-
nity in which alone the free and full development of his personality is
possible."78
Additionally, Article 2 of the 1987 Declaration on the Right to De-
velopment emphasizes that "[a]ll human beings have a responsibility
for development, individually and collectively" and that individuals
must consider "their duties to the community" when exercising their
human rights. 79 The inherent conflict between meeting the needs of the
collective and the potential infringement on reproductive rights in-
spires consideration of the duties attached to the rights.
Since individual and collective rights will conflict, it may be prefer-
able to view the "right" and the "duty" as complementary, or two sides
of the same coin.80 In consequence, the "flip side" of the coin, being the
fulfillment of the duty and the denial of the right, or adherence to a
constraint on its exercise, is not easily agreed to because it can be dras-
tic in its scope.
If a personal duty of constraint in the exercise of a freedom is to
gain widespread support, both the individual and the community as a
whole need to take active steps to further the rights of successors to an
ecologically-balanced environment. Reducing consumption and de-
creasing the number of future inhabitants (than there otherwise could
be) would facilitate the preservation of the environment for the benefit
of forthcoming generations.
78. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(111), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess.,
Supp. No. 13, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
79. The Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1987).
80. UNESCO, HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF POPULATION PROGRAMMES WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 17 (1977). See also Luke T. Lee, Population: The
Human Rights Approach, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL L. & POL'Y 327, 339 (1995).
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1. The Duty to Limit Succession
"We have only to imagine how Europeans and North Americans
would respond if they were suddenly asked to have only one child per
couple because the birth rate in Africa is higher than in other re-
gions."8 1
It has only been within the last forty years that individual and
collective rights regarding population growth began to diverge. Previ-
ously, these rights "coincided in the direction of pro-natalism, advanc-
ing both the individuals' and society's interest in an increasing popula-
tion."8 2 Given that there is both an individual and societal interest in
securing and benefiting from the right to an ecologically-balanced envi-
ronment, both interests have to again coincide in the direction of de-
creasing, or at a minimum, stabilizing, population growth.
In this regard, it is necessary to review how the duty which at-
taches to the right to freely choose family size has been defined. The
World Population Plan of Action, formulated in 1974 in Bucharest,
stipulated that couples and individuals "take into account the needs of
their living and future children, and their responsibilities to the com-
munity."83 Recommendation 30 of the Mexico City Report reiterated
this principle, in 1984,84 as did Paragraph 7.3 of the ICPD, in 1994,
which adds that the "promotion and responsible exercise of these rights
for all people should be the fundamental basis for government- and
community-supported policies and programmes in the area of reproduc-
81. Stackhouse, supra note 53 at D-1, D-3 (citing the writing of Marge Berer, a Brit-
ish specialist in reproductive rights, who was "mocking the pressure that the rest of the
world is sure to put on developing countries to limit their growth.").
82. Luke T. Lee, supra note 80 at 339. See S. JOHNSON, WORLD POPULATION -
TURNING THE TIDE: THREE DECADES OF PROGRESS 1 (1994). See also REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH: A STRATEGY FOR THE 1990'S, 11-12 (1991) (noting that the tension between "in-
dividual good" and "common good" "is strikingly apparent in discussions of optimal family
size," particularly since these decisions may involve moral judgments and ethical values).
In the ICPD, Report of the Nordic Women Parliamentarians Meeting, Copenhagen, 3-4
March 1994, [hereinafter Nordic Women] it was observed, at 11-12, that "[alithough the
individual right of each woman to decide on her fertility was considered a laudable goal, it
was also suggested that... there was a contradiction between this fundamental right and
social responsibility." As the Report mainly focused on countries with rapid population
growth, the balance between individual rights and social responsibilities was to be made
by the state and the apparent contradiction between "promoting individual reproductive
rights while at the same time fostering a reduction in the world's population growth rate"
was stated to imply "that women want to have large numbers of children, whereas sur-
veys... reveal that most of these women would prefer fewer children."
83. United Nations World Population Conference, Bucharest, UN Doc.EICONF.60/19
(1974), Report of the United Nations World Population Conference, Bucharest, 19-30
August 1974, Para. 14(f).
84. International Conference on Population, Mexico City, UN Doc.EICONF.76119
(1984). Report of the International Conference on Population, 1984, Mexico City, 6-14
August 1984.
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tive health, including family planning."85
The degree to which this duty is actively undertaken depends not
only on whether the knowledge and means to control reproduction are
available, but also on how entrenched pro-natalist forces or biases exist
within any given culture. Some of these pressures persist in developed
societies and include, among others, encouraging women to marry
young, to "try for a boy next time," to equating a sizeable family with
masculinity8 6 and to having a child to obtain or maintain a marital un-
ion. "The effect of this pressure can amount to coercion, even or per-
haps especially when it comes from within the family" which, in effect,
"can coerce women to make reproductive choices which they know to be
counter to their interests."8 7
Within developed nations a propensity also exists among young
women, as well as their partners, to view the birth of a child as their
primary life accomplishment, and as a way to indirectly- gain much-
needed attention. They may also view the baby as the one being they
can love and that will love them in return. Although these factors may
be completely beneficial for all involved and may provide the parent
with a sense of self-assurance, they have also been partially responsible
for a proliferation of single mothers and the perpetuation of an inordi-
nate focus on women's reproductive functions, both in how these moth-
ers view their own personhood and in the gendered values which are
subsequently transmitted to the next generation.8 8 For the full respon-
sibility of parenthood to be achieved, along with the requisite emotional
maturity, a measure of stability and security must begin from within
with empowerment.
2. A Right Informed by Responsibility
In considering the motivations which go into reproductive decision-
making, some individuals may believe the reasons "are deeply private,
and cannot be easily overridden on grounds of their adverse effects on,
say, the utility of others."8 9 That "unrestricted birthrates may cause
85. ICPD, supra note 29. Paragraph 7.3 continues, in part with: "As part of their
commitment, full attention should be given to the promotion of mutually respectful and
equitable gender relations and particularly to meeting the educational and service needs
of adolescents to enable them to deal in a positive and responsible way with their sexual-
ity." See also Diana D.M. Babor, Population Growth and Reproductive Rights in Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 83 (1999).
86. The foregoing are listed in UNFPA, THE STATE OF WORLD POPULATION 1997, THE
RIGHT TO CHOOSE: REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 43 (1997) [herein-
after POPULATION 1997].
87. Id.
88. See Rebecca J. Cook, Human Rights and Reproductive Self-Determination, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 975, 984 (1995) (noting that "[an exclusive focus on motherhood is dysfunc-
tional to women in that, if the value of women is perceived to arise solely through moth-
erhood, women acquire status only through pregnancy and childbirth").
89. Sudhir Anand, Population, Well-being, and Freedom, in POPULATION POLICIES
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adverse effects on the well-being and freedom of others-for example, of
present and future generations, through environmental degradation" is
premised on the view that a large population imposes "externalities" on
others.90 However, others argue that these externalities depend "on a
tenuous distinction between two groups of people: those whose well-
being is the object of our concern, and those whose presence is assessed
purely in terms of what it does for the first group."9 1
Inasmuch as reproductive decision-making is personal, it can only
be held to be "deeply personal" when the decision involves the termina-
tion of a pregnancy. Otherwise, the decision to have a child cannot be
construed as entirely personal, as it is quite social in its consequences. 92
Furthermore, and as is well noted by many feminists, the concept of
"freely choosing" is an anomaly for many women, who, subject to any
range of social and familial "externalities" in terms of the choices they
make, may have a distorted impression as to how "personal" their deci-
sions actually are.93
Finally, the suggestion that only one of two groups of people has its
well-being impacted by population growth ignores not only the global-
ized effects of ecosystem degradation, but those "non-people" species at
risk of extinction. The group choosing to freely reproduce without re-
gard for any adverse effects and "whose presence is assessed purely in
terms of what it does for the first group" has chosen to be so assessed.
Furthermore, its presence has little relevance in terms of what it is not
doing for any group, including those that pre-date homo sapiens.
Another analysis of the duty attached to the right to freely repro-
duce argues that the use of the phrase "freely and responsibly" is con-
fusing, as "[o]ne is left to wonder just what responsibly means, in par-
ticular when yoked with the word freely."94 On the basis of the relevant
1974 and 1984 Conference [WPPA provisions, the right to decide on
RECONSIDERED - HEALTH, EMPOWERMENT, AND RIGHTS 75, 81 (Gita Sen et al. eds., 1994)
[hereinafter POLICIES RECONSIDERED].
90. Id. at 82.
91. Id.
92. See Rita M. Gross, Buddhist Resources for Issues of Population, Consumption and
the Environment, in POPULATION, CONSERVATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 52,
at 157. She writes that "pro-natalists regard reproduction as a private right not subject to
public policy, even though they usually insist that the results of their reproduction are a
public, even a global, responsibility." Id. Given that children involve a great deal of per-
sonal sacrifice, particularly for women, it is beneficial if the couple or individual know in
advance not only what it takes to have a child, but also why they are choosing to have
one.
93. But see RUTH DIXON-MUELLER, POPULATION POLICY & WOMEN'S RIGHTS:
TRANSFORMING REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 26 (1993) (writing that "[g]irls and women in
every society have devised means, subtle or otherwise, to try to influence the outcome of
decisions that concern them or to circumvent the authority of men and elders while ap-
pearing to acquiese").
94. Reed Boland et al, Honoring Human Rights in Population Policies: From Declara-
tion to Action, in POLICIES RECONSIDERED, supra note 89, at 93.
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the number of children is "a limited right, balanced by significant re-
sponsibilities to others," and while "the sentiments behind the theory of
responsibility" are considered important, the analysis asks: "[wiho is to
decide whether persons are acting responsibly?"95
The WPPA's reply to this query is that the human right to freely
reproduce should be consistent with "national goals and values," which,
"in effect, undermines the concept of universal reproductive freedom...
by making individual human rights subordinate to national objectives
and values, and thereby insulating national policy from outside scru-
tiny."96 Further, although the pre-Cairo conferences "purport to take a
neutral stance with respect to overpopulation, most of their specific rec-
ommendations are directed toward lowering rates of population growth,
not toward ensuring that individuals are free to determine their own
fertility."97
As to whether there is "a fundamental right to procreate," recogni-
tion "that childbearing has consequences for others" is granted, but this
does not encompass "the claim that women have a duty to society (or
the planet!) to abstain from reproducing."98 The assertion then made is
that "[s]uch a duty could begin to exist only when all women are pro-
vided sufficient resources for their well-being, viable work alternatives,
and a cultural climate of affirmation outside of childbearing so that
they no longer depend on children for survival and dignity."99
While the foregoing has indisputable significance in developing
countries where traditional stereotypical roles of women remain en-
trenched, and while it can certainly be recognized that a "cultural cli-
mate of affirmation" does not fully exist in the developed world, the
empowerment process does not stop with the freedom to make choices
under conducive conditions. Once made, empowerment decisions be-
come truly established when responsibility rooted in the greater conse-
quences of each choice is taken.
However, as many single mothers in both Canada and the United
States can attest, the consequences of their choices differ significantly
from those not similarly situated. Often living in hardship, with poor
nutrition and poor employment and wage prospects, disincentives to
bearing more children have little to do with simply surviving. As few
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Sonia Correa & Rosalind Petchesky, Reproductive and Sexual Rights: A Feminist
Perspective, in POLICIES RECONSIDERED, supra note 89, at 114.
99. Id. (emphasis added). In the rest of the section which follows this paragraph, I
have removed certain "all-encompassing" statements from the overall context in which
they have been expressed in order to highlight certain underlying themes. The authors of
this current citation indicate that "[Mge are suggesting not that reproductive and sexual
rights are absolute or that women have the right to reproduce under any circumstances,
but that policies to enforce those rights must address existing social conditions and begin
to change them." Id. at 108.
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single fathers have yet to discover, it has everything to do with per-
ceived social roles.
That the duty can only come to exist when all women [italics are
mine] are in a position of well-being, fails to account for the fact that
"well-being" is socially constructed and will vary in its substance and
scope to a significant degree. Taken together, the expectation is that
states are to provide any possible range of benefits to improve the con-
dition of those who are freely reproducing and to also uphold the right
to freely reproduce by refusing to set national goals to accommodate
both current and future needs. Realistically, however, such a vision
belongs to a world where the "purest" forms of coercion are never un-
leashed in a war waged over resources, because they are never scarce
and the ecosystem never degrades.
As much as the foregoing arguments concerned with women's
needs are important for ensuring that the women who shoulder tre-
mendous responsibilities in many impoverished nations are not subject
to further indignities, a qualification is in order and a distinction is to
be drawn when discussing the many who comprise the developed world
and who may have many of their most significant needs met.
3. A Norm of Restraint
There is little dispute that many citizens born in developed nations
believe that the larger problems facing the planet originate elsewhere.
The very notion that constraints could exist on their freedom, or right,
to live at a level of material and social well-being to which they have
grown accustomed, is met with fear that their world could disappear.
When the prospect of increased immigration to the North is raised,
many unflinchingly retort that the borders should simply be closed.100
100. I am basing these assertions on conversations with a number of people from a
cross-section of occupations and levels of education. The idea that there could be islands
of affluence amidst an ocean of poverty alarms them less than the prospect of "losing"
their world as they know it. Implicit in this is the thought that the nation they live in
could be "overrun by the rest of the world's masses." Little credence would therefore be
given to the following message
[Tihere is simply no way for affluent denizens of the North, whose life-
style preys upon just those beleagured resources and populations of
the South, to make any credible case for world-population control, in
isolation from the larger context of our own resource use and environ-
mental impact. This discrepancy between the theory and practice of
population pundits makes one wonder if the conspiracy of progressive
silences on population may not represent the more ethical posture.
Indeed, only as we in the North begin in greater numbers to practice
our own forms of eco-asceticism, thus reducing our disproportionate
dependency upon resources and technology-and continuing to reduce
our own populations to make space for the needs of the poor forced by
Northern policies to migrate Northward-may we engage the popula-
tion issue in good faith.
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The unwillingness to extend reciprocity evokes a racist and classist
view of the world. The "legitimacy" of this view could be said to be
grounded in a form of self-centredness that was once the reserve of a
scattering of royalty, rather than an entire nation-state. 10 1 In essence,
the universality of human rights, in practice, depends on what side of
the border is at issue.
The fact that for each person who has wealth there are several who
are impoverished will only be redressed with the acknowledgement that
we have made the planet a metaphorical Titanic, our faith premised on
the belief that science will solve everything. This global ship we have
appropriated may not be able to avert an impending collapse if the
speed of our "progress" is not reduced and if the number of future pas-
sengers is not stabilized and "brought up" to first class. While reducing
consumption is the best immediate solution, the long-term strategy of
population stabilization must also be pursued by the affluent, particu-
larly in those states in which a pro-natalist agenda continues to be es-
poused.
B. The Right to an Ecologically-Balanced Environment as a Basis for
Restraint
"[Human] nature.. .is what we were put in this world to rise
above."102
Population growth clearly has never been the sole cause of envi-
ronmental degradation anywhere. 0 3 Yet, in light of the scope and
speed of environmental decline, the right to an ecologically-balanced
environment has much in common with reproductive rights, since both
are concerned with ensuring a life of quality.
Within the framework of reproductive rights lies a potential ten-
sion between the individual and the common good. Not only can this
duty to the community imply that the individual or couple must exer-
cise restraint in determining family size, but this communal element
Catherine Keller, A Christian Response to the Population Apocalypse, in POPULATION,
CONSUMPTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 52, at 118.
101. A proclamation frequently made regarding any form of a duty to exercise re-
straint, being: "why should I reduce my consumption just so those people (referring to the
South) can keep having children?" is hopefully an attitude that will die with the most
over-consumption-self-oriented group of people ever to pass across the planet at once. I
am referring to the baby-boomers of the developed world, whose legacy may not only be all
the new and exciting technology, but more significantly, will consist of a blank cheque
they have drawn on the state of the planet's ecosystem, which will be passed on to future
generations to pay (as Jacques Cousteau himself described it) since taking responsibility
now could mean having to forego "a material world" and could involve trade-offs over the
provision of jobs, or possible affluence.
102. Katherine Hepburn, in AFRICAN QUEEN (Romulus-Horizon 1951) (based on the
novel by C.S. Forester).
103. See AFTER RIO, supra note 7, at 5.
228 VOL. 27:2
POPULATION-ENVIRONMENT LINKAGES
can also be reinforced by utilizing the duties construed within the right
to an ecologically-balanced environment. The community to which the
individual owes a duty to limit reproduction can be expanded to encom-
pass the greater ecosphere in which the (global) community resides, as
the right to an ecologically-balanced environment carries an implicit
duty that each person, corporation and government ensure that an
ecologically-balanced environment be maintained. Given that a flour-
ishing biosphere is beneficial for all who reside within it, it is incum-
bent on the planet's not-so-benign predators to exercise the necessary
duties to ensure the right will be not only upheld, but also available, for
both present and future generations.
Towards this objective, the right to an ecologically-balanced envi-
ronment provides a window through which to argue that the state must
set and meet goals to reduce its own overconsumption. An environ-
mental right is ultimately concerned with both the quality of life and
the right to life itself, so there are compelling arguments to be made
that our anthropocentric and contempocentric approaches to the eco-
sphere, by which excess and arrogance prevail over a precautionary ap-
proach, require legal constraints. This is particularly significant in af-
fluent states where each additional human amplifies the speed of
environmental harm and resource use.
The right can also support the argument that a state must provide
the knowledge and means for all of its citizens to control their own fer-
tility. The provision of knowledge must extend beyond the means to ac-
cess and utilize the reproductive health care system. There must be an
emphasis on providing information, within an educational context, on
the full range of options available for "creating" a family. Societal
services and support must be fully extended to those who opt to adopt,
or have only one child, or choose not to have children, or choose pets in
lieu of children, or choose to be sterilized without having children, or
decide not to have children when a partner has children from a previ-
ous marriage.
The state must also direct fertility control towards its male popula-
tion, particularly as developed nations witness a trend, which has been
analogized with polygamy, of children being fathered across multiple
marriages and relationships. Masculine responsibility has often been
left outside of the discourse on reproduction and needs to be substan-
tively addressed in the form of male contraceptive research and educa-
tion. Given that every fertile male always has the potential to impreg-
nate a female, but that the potential for females to become pregnant is
less certain, the responsibility must also be assumed by the male, who
has otherwise been quite free from any such considerations. 10 4
Towards the further fulfillment of its duty, the state must also im-
104. See NORDIC WOMEN, supra note 82, at 12-13; POPULATION 1997, supra note 86, at
48-50.
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plement a policy which informs people about population-environment
linkages, so that the significance for undertaking responsible decision-
making becomes apparent. 10 5 Towards this objective, the state itself
must first acknowledge and analyze both the current and future impli-
cations of these linkages, as well as those between environment and
consumption. Of the national reports on population and development
received prior to the ICPD, only 25% of industrialized countries indi-
cated interrelationships between the environment and population size,
and between the environment and consumption. 106 The state has a
duty not only to recognize the linkage, but to also engage in research to
determine local and national carrying-capacities, in which community
participation and awareness is emphasized.
105. In a study on the extent to which these links are expressed by the popular media,
a random sample of 150 stories about urban sprawl, endangered species and water short-
ages found that only one story in ten framed population growth as a source of the prob-
lem, and only one story out of the entire sample mentioned population stability among the
realm of possible solutions. The study further uncovers that "journalists are aware of the
controversial nature of the population issue, and prefer to avoid it if possible. Most inter-
viewees said that a national phenomenon like population growth was beyond the scope of
what they could write as local reporters." T. Michael Maher, How and Why Journalists
Avoid the Population-Environment Connection 18 POPULATION & ENV'T 339, 339 (1997).
Maher cites Interpreting Public Issues, a public affairs reporting textbook, which, admon-
ishes journalists by noting that, "[a] common journalistic mistake is simply to cover
events-real or staged-and ignore underlying issues" and then proceeds to identify
population trends as one of the "big trouble spots" and lists world population as the first
of its "forefront issues in the '90's." Id at 356. citing INTERPRETING PUBLIC ISSUES 320
(1991). See also J. MAYONE STYCOS, POPULATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT: POLLS,
POLICIES, AND PUBLIC OPINION (1994) (evaluating how surveys sent by the UN to mem-
ber states on their official position on population issues are structured and answered).
For example, the 1988 inquiry was 42 pages long without a single question on the envi-
ronment. In the 1990 survey, "not one of 38 industrial countries considered its growth too
rapid, and as many as seven considered it to be too low." Id. Of the 169 government re-
ports to the Earth Summit, the data confirmed "industrial nations' lack of concern about
their population growth." Id. at 8. A 1994 American national survey indicates that 42%
of respondents opposed the US sponsoring programs overseas to help other countries slow
population growth and 48% disagreed that it is important to lower birth rates in the US to
help save the environment. Id. at 13-14. Finally, 68% agreed that people everywhere
should feel free to have as many children as they can properly raise. Id. In his conclu-
sion, the writer suggests that the "general publics of most nations do not understand
population-environment linkages" and that governments "also often ignore them, indi-
cating the need for more research on, and perhaps education of, decisionmakers." Id. at
21. As was noted in the Report of the ESCAP/UNDP Expert Group Meeting on Popula-
tion, Environment and Sustainable Development, Jomtien, Thailand, there is a need for
more emphasis on community participation, the electronic and print media and formal
and non-formal education to inform the public on a regular basis as to the linkage, jour-
nalists need to be more proactive, investigative and more involved in agenda setting and
in assisting NGOs in problem-solving and that all media should also incorporate educa-
tional messages in the dissemination of population and environment issues. Report of the
ESCAP/UNDP Expert Group Meeting on Population, Environment, and Sustainable De-
velopment, U.N. Doc ST/ESCAP/1033, Jomtien, Thailand, May 13-18, 1991., at 24-25.
106. See NATIONAL REPORTS, supra note 72, at 19.
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1. Responses to Reductions in Fertility
The considerations which shape a population policy may not be di-
rectly related to the rate of population growth, as much as they may be
a secondary outcome of gender-based discriminatory state measures. 107
Among industrialized states with declining fertility rates, concern that
social security be garnered for the elderly and that at least some of its
population self-perpetuates continues to contribute to pro-natalist ini-
tiatives. The steps which a state may take to address these concerns
tend to be in direct opposition to its duty to limit growth.
The approach by some states in adopting "egalitarian" family poli-
cies which are "aimed at helping women combine working careers with
raising families, and distributing the burden of housekeeping and child-
raising more equitably between the genders"10 8 has been a vital and
beneficial social undertaking. However, while the international com-
munity acknowledges that "some countries need to make greater ef-
forts, at the work place and at home, to enable women to both manage a
career and raise a family," a potentially harmful qualification exists as
to the extent to which such efforts should progress. "[S]ince certain as-
pects of family policy can inadvertently contribute to the breakup of the
traditional family structure, care should be extended to minimize such
adverse incentives."10 9 The provision of sufficient affordable day-care
undoubtedly qualifies in some states as an adverse incentive.
That the traditional family structure is inherently pro-natalist, pa-
triarchal, and focused on female reproductive capacities is not perceived
to be as disconcerting as the rapid deterioration of the "central, cohe-
sive structure" which the traditional family proffered. That "families
used to be the moral and ethical nucleus of societies, with governments
playing a relatively neutral role in this regard"110 fails to consider how
107. An example would be the state agenda to eject women from the work-place fol-
lowing the Second World War, largely through social pressure and an emphasis on their
"familial duties." Their return to the domestic sphere helped usher in the baby boom.
108. NATIONAL REPORTS, supra note 72, at 17. Sweden's national report on population
states as follows:
Sweden's policy is that couples should be able to have children and
combine gainful employment with child-care. In Sweden, about
eighty-five per cent of mothers of underage children are employed out-
side their homes. The number of women that do not bear children at
all is small... One of the corner-stones of Sweden's family policy is the
parental insurance system, which offers both parents the opportunity
of caring for their newborn child at home by compensating them eco-
nomically for their loss of income. The parents themselves decide how
to divide the parental leave between them. Another is that child day
care facilities meet the demand.. .A third component is financial sup-
port for families with children, including relatively generous contribu-
tions to single parents.
Id. at 6-7.
109. Id. at 23.
110. Id.
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frequently human rights were and are abused within what was and can
often be a dysfunctional private sphere.
2. Discouraging Reproduction
Since most developed states are attempting to ensure that a decline
in fertility does not lead to a decline in the size of the population as a
whole, an emphasis on duties has yet to materialize as a state policy in
any industrialized country. Although such an approach would certainly
reduce consumption rates and environmental degradation, this linkage
between population, consumption and the environment has yet to be
fully considered beyond the contempocentric concerns of government
with a rights-oriented polity.
If advocates challenged this pro-natalist positivist agenda by em-
phasizing the right to an ecologically-balanced environment, it would
most likely arise within a nation such as the United States, where in-
creasing population is expected to "exacerbate problems such as air
pollution, landfill capacity, urban boom, overcrowded school systems
and extinction of species." '111 The degree to which the citizenry will
"blame" the nation's immigration policy can best be countered with an
emphasis on the need for restraint by all inhabitants.
If disincentives became necessary to "encourage" a duty-oriented
approach to reproduction, the degree to which such a population policy
would impinge on the exercise of human rights would reflect how re-
sponsibilities to the community are perceived and the extent to which
they are endorsed by individuals. A suggestion that birth quotas be
analogized to laws which restrict the number of spouses, would, it is ar-
gued, make the establishment of a two-child family norm compatible
with human rights. 112 As this raises issues concerned with enforce-
ment, a preferable means may be the use of financial disincentives.
Given the general preoccupation with personal economic security in af-
fluent societies, such a strategy may prove to be the most effective
means of communicating that life is indeed an expensive undertaking.
Another suggestion to ensure that a duty-based approach becomes
the norm is that of an income-based tax on births. This process would
internalize the environmental costs of childbearing, as the affluent
"consume a disproportionate share of the environmental birthright,"' 113
and would provide funds which could be transferred to poor families, or
to poor nations, to facilitate improved reproductive health care or to re-
111. Omar Saleem, Be Fruitful, and Multiply, and Replenish the Earth, and Subdue It:
Third World Population Growth and the Environment, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3
n.7. Even the city of London England is running out of space to bury its dead, and is at-
tempting to "recycle" graves over a century old. See CBC Evening News (CBC television
broadcast, Aug. 24, 1997).
112. See Luke T. Lee, supra note 80, at 333.
113. Ronald D. Lee, supra note 60, at 319.
VOL. 27:2
POPULATION-ENVIRONMENT LINKAGES
habilitate degraded environments. In this way, no particular popula-
tion size or level of fertility would be imposed by central authorities and
the preferences of the people would ultimately be reflected as the sys-
tem evolves.
As well, unlike the current situation, "in which we are ineluctably
driven to an environmental standard lower than we would choose for
our descendants if we were able," the tradeoffs "implicitly chosen be-
tween numbers and environmental quality of life" would belong to those
whose choices have made it.114 A fee on procreation would also reflect a
recognition that just as the species which create an ecologically-
balanced environment are having to pay (literally with their lives) for
existing in "our territory," so too should we pay for the right to encroach
on theirs.
The issue of money for improving standards in service delivery for
reproductive health is well-documented. Although the Amsterdam
Declaration on a Better Life for Future Generations which was adopted
in 1989 at the International Conference on Population in the Twenty-
first Century, called upon governments to double total global expendi-
tures in population programs in order to meet the needs of millions by
the year 2000, in 1997, money still remained an issue. 1 5 The total
worldwide yearly cost of better reproductive health care is approaching
$17 billion, or "less than one week of world expenditure on arma-
ments."116
3. Empowering Individual Duties
Advocates and theorists of human rights have invested their abili-
ties in defending the "claims-to that human rights contain, but have
devoted much less effort to developing accounts of claims-against," as
this "deals with the production rather than the consumption side of
rights, the side where people bear burdens rather than receive liberties,
protections, or benefits."'1 7 Given the power of the driving forces which
underlie environmental destruction, it is valuable to consider that irre-
sponsible reproduction has the potency to place human rights at risk,
particularly, the right to life.
As "human rights are invariably asserted and defended in relation
to power... be it political, economic, social, military, media-based, scien-
tific, technological or even spiritual," it bears remembering that not
only are human rights designed to limit power but they also counter-
balance a utilitarian view with an ethical requirement for limits; "in a
world where power centres are shifting, our concern for human rights
114. Id. at 319-20.
115. See UNFPA, POPULATION ISSUES BRIEFING KIT 20 (1994).
116. POPULATION 1997, supra note 86, at 3.
117. James W. Nickel, How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect and Provide, 15
HuM. RTS Q. 77, 79 (1993).
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should involve us in a constant search for sources of domination."' 18
That the power to reproduce must be constrained within a human
rights framework, on the basis of an ethical requirement towards cur-
rent and future generations, requires a widespread understanding of
population-environment linkages. For the dissemination of this infor-
mation to have any significant influence it must counter the anthropo-
centric forces which undermine the prospects for a sustainable and bal-
anced ecology. The right to an ecologically-balanced environment has
the ability to balance such human-centered ethics, where human beings
"alone have intrinsic worth and dignity," with the very foundation upon
which all rights depend, being the life-support system. 119
"[Tihe concepts presented here are contested by many citizens in
the affluent world and especially among politicians with a mandate at
risk."120 It is nevertheless critical that the political message convey the
necessity for change and limitations. Just as a concerted voluntary ef-
fort which subscribes duties to both the community and the environ-
ment obviates a concern with coercion, so too would a right to an ecol-
ogically-balanced environment be extraneous had this century
witnessed a far more decisive effort to alleviate poverty, improve
women's status and reduce untenable levels of production and con-
sumption. 121
C. Human Rights and Sustainability
Two factors illustrate how the right to an ecologically-balanced en-
vironment can be balanced against the right to freely reproduce. First,
since both rights are concerned with quality of life, the interests of fu-
ture generations are discernible within them. By striving to maintain a
118 Interregional Meeting organized by the Council of Europe in advance of the World
Conference on Human Rights, Human Rights at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 6 Palais de
l'Europe, Strasbourg, Jan. 28-30, 1993 (Council of Europe Press, 1993), as stated by Alexis
de Tocqueville.
119. Herschel Elliott, The Absurdity of a Human-Centred Ethics, 17 POPULATION &
ENV'T 427, 428 (1996).
120. Population Debate, supra, note 53, at 45-46. (quoting K. Boulding 'Those who are
concerned with the future of the planet in its totality have to ask themselves: What are
the sources of power in the human species directed towards... It is not enough to preach
we must do this, we must do that.. .We do need to study very carefully... the structure of
power in human race over the future, which involves not only particular decisions but also
the overall images of the world in the minds of the decision makers... And in the solution
of these problems-if there is one-we will undoubtedly have to make some use of threat
power-taxation, regulations and so on-and some use of economic power. But the major
element unquestionably will be integrative power, based first on widespread knowledge
that we all live on the same fragile planet... to which we owe a common loyalty and affec-
tion. Unless this view is very widespread, legitimacy will not be granted to those fre-
quently painful processes which may be necessary to prevent catastrophe.).
121. See NATIONAL REPORTS, supra note 72, at 19. The Australian national report in-
dicated that "small populations with high consumption patterns actually alter the envi-
ronment more than large populations with low consumption levels." Id.
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balanced ecosystem and by seeing each new life as representing forth-
coming progeny, who will also require an ecologically-balanced envi-
ronment, both current and future interests are encompassed. Second,
since there is no linear solution to what is essentially a multi-faceted
predicament, any balancing to be achieved will require trade-offs and
"new paradigms, not just new policies, technologies or markets." 122 In a
proposal well-suited to industrialized nations, the question posed is
whether "population control is the best starting place for policy action"
or whether it should be viewed as a "desired consequence of other ac-
tions on the road to environmental sustainability." Such actions would
include setting up consumption "speed limits" and development "toll
booths" in the interim.' 23
Furthermore, as much as population "is the headline... the real
story may be hidden in the core values, consumption patterns, tech-
nologies, and market designs that influence and are influenced by
population growth." 124 In light of this, the "greatest need-arguably
more pressing than the need for zero or negative population growth-is
for a compelling vision of sustainability" that helps to promote sustain-
able communities. 125
While recognizing that population growth is "a looming threat to
social and environmental sustainability," the proposal warns that this
driving force is too easily taken out of context and "framed as a problem
for which nationalism, racism, and economic protectionism find expres-
sion as part of the solution." Population policies which encourage such
expression "are far more likely to foster polarization than stabiliza-
tion."126
Whether a human rights based approach may also foster such po-
larization depends upon how its objectives are pursued. Universal re-
productive health care is as important to the maintenance of an ecologi-
cally-balanced environment as is a reduction in affluent consumption.
Persuading a society to observe limits in how it pursues its economic
well-being or chooses to freely reproduce requires a fuller understand-
ing of the interdependence of issues related to such choices. 127 Other-
wise, a regulatory law may or may not be observed, whether or not co-
ercive measures are engaged.
In addition, given that thought-processes, and therefore choices,
are defined by language, the duties which reside "within" human rights
122. Hempel, supra note 38, at 459.
123. Id. at 458.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 458-59.
127. See id. at 459. Population issues are said to be interdependent with those of eth-
ics, biology, politics, economics and community and that further research is needed to un-
derstand how population-environment tradeoffs will operate "under different cultural ori-
entations, forms of governance, levels of education, and standards of living." Id.
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would benefit from a change in terminology, to something such as the
"Responsible Human Right for Ecological Balance" or "Responsible Re-
productive Rights." The duties which complement these rights can be,
and are, easily overlooked, both by policy-makers and rights' advocates.
For an eco-centered vision to evolve, a norm of responsibility must be-
come manifest in a paradigm of stewardship and "ecological economics."
Constraints on the role of women across all societies must be lifted so
as to provide choices beyond one of parenthood. Ultimately, the core
values which have allowed humanity to survive over the millenia must
be re-evaluated in the current context, particularly by those best-
situated to do so, being the affluent "denizens of the north."
"[P]eople without resources do not have choices, and people without
choices cannot be asked to take responsibility." 128
CONCLUSION
The current rate of environmental depletion along with growing
numbers of human beings compels attention to whether there is a re-
sponsibility governing human reproductive choices. While developing
nations advocate a reduction in family size, many industrialized coun-
tries persist in utilizing an informal pro-natalist approach. Faced with
declining fertility and aging populations, many of the more affluent
states indirectly encourage reproduction while failing to take adequate
steps to reduce overconsumption. Given that inefficient per capita con-
sumption in the North causes as much, if not more, environmental deg-
radation than the overpopulation of the South, the Northern nations
must reduce both fertility and consumption levels simultaneously. 129
Towards this objective, the linkage between population, consump-
tion and the environment must be underscored and its unabated conse-
quences for forthcoming generations must be disseminated. Greater
opportunities for women outside the home must continue to be encour-
aged along with the elimination of wasteful lifestyle practices. Core at-
tributes, such as anthropocentrism and contempocentrism, must be
recognized as driving forces which can only be surmounted with a con-
certed and deliberate effort, particularly by the popular media.
As human rights are concerned with ensuring a life of quality, a
128. Jael Silliman, Ethics, Family Planning, Status of Women, and the Environment,
in POPULATION, CONSUMPTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 52, at 257 (quoting
Marge Berer, Population and Family Planning Policies: Women-Centred Perspectives, in
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 10 (May 1993).
129. The goal of reducing population growth as "a problem of global scope" and as one
to be addressed within affluent states was recognized at the outset of concerns with over-
population. See Richard A. Falk, World Population and International Law, 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 514, 520 (1969). This notion has since appeared to receive far less articulation.
See also, Note, Legal Analysis and Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1856, 1857, 1892 (1971) (highlighting the differentiation between the right to pro-
create and the right to decide on family size).
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balance could be struck with a norm which emphasizes duties to soci-
ety, for both the state and the individual.
Remove the metaphysical partitioning of the imaginary
state-frontiers from the face of the Earth and what is to
be seen? The human species multiplying, rapidly. The
human species transforming the whole Earth into an
object of labour... using the energy of the Sun and the
energy contained in the Earth to transform the whole
Earth into an object of use.. .to make the whole Earth
into an object of property. The human spe-
cies.. .transforming the whole Earth, everything on it
and in it, into an object of trade. 130
The interdependence of human rights, like that of all living species,
needs to be respected to surmount trends in current power structures.
A shift from the rights of the individual or corporation to duties to the
larger community will facilitate a balancing process. Without a clear
vision of what constitutes responsible behavior, attitudes will never be
transformed. Without such a transformation, the biosphere itself is
likely to be transformed, with unforeseeable and life-threatening conse-
quences.
Although obligations may not have concomitant "rights," for every
right there is a concomitant duty, both of which can be conceptualized
as being complementary, or, as two sides of the same coin. 131 As a right
is "not merely a claim to some freedom or benefit; it is also a claim
against certain parties to act so as to make that freedom or benefit
available," 132 an equal weight must be placed on the duties which give
rise to the rights.
The reciprocity of rights and duties must be brought into balance, if
balance is to be restored and maintained within ecosystems. The need
to recognize "the emptiness of the gesture of 'guaranteeing' rights which
are physically impossible of fulfillment" without a recognition of con-
comitant duties heralded a call over twenty-five years ago for a Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Responsibilities and Duties.133 Noting an
"historical avalanche of words on rights without duties" the writings of
Mazzini remain pertinent: "... all your rights are summed up in one:
the right to be absolutely unfettered and to be aided within certain lim-
its, in the fulfilment of your duties."134 In light of numerical growth and
130. See PHILLIP ALLoTr, EUNOMIA - NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 365 (1990).
131. See UNESCO, HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF POPULATION PROGRAMMES 16 (1977).
132. James W. Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Per-
spectives on Its Scope and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 281, 286 (1993).
133. JACK PARSONS, POPULATION VERSUS LIBERTY 135 (1971).
134. Id. at 137 (quoting MAZZINI, THE DUTIES OF MAN 68 (1907)). In comparing the
moralities of duty and aspiration, the latter is said to be exemplified by the Good Life, as
set forth in Greek philosophy, which advocates the attainment of excellence and the "full-
est realization of human powers." However, the Greeks "never worked out anything re-
sembling the modern notion of a legal right" as their emphasis tended to be placed on
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exponential ecological decline, action on our duties is now a basic re-
quirement.
proper conduct. Id. at 5, n.3. In consequence, "where the morality of aspiration starts at
the top of human achievement, the morality of duty starts at the bottom. It lays down the
basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or without which an ordered
society directed toward certain specific goals must fail of its mark." As such, the morality
of duty does not condemn humans for "failing to embrace opportunities for the fullest re-
alization of their powers" but rather, "it condemns them for failing to respect the basic
requirements of social living." LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5 (1964).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, the role of United Nations (UN) op-
erations in the area of international peace and security has increasingly
become a topical issue for the different nations of the world. In par-
ticular, the use of force by, and in support of, peacekeeping has raised
questions concerning the future role of UN peacekeeping operations in
the resolution of international and internal conflict. During the Cold
War there were two accepted forms of United Nations operations:
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. Since the end of the Cold War,
however, despite increasing difficulties faced by UN peacekeeping op-
erations, no accepted mode of action beyond these two operations has
emerged. This has become problematic as the UN has consistently cho-
sen to use peacekeeping forces as its primary tool in its effort to restore
peace and security; despite the fact that peacekeeping, in itself, is not
always an effective means to achieve these ends.
Why did peacekeeping come to be used in situations that increas-
ingly necessitated the use of coercive force? Primarily because
peacekeeping provided a legal and 'palatable' form of intervention in in-
trastate conflicts, which have erupted with greater frequency in recent
times. The use of UN peacekeepers to intervene and resolve conflict
was acceptable to Member States and met with their growing demands
and expectations that action be taken to contain State fragmentation
and resolve humanitarian crises. Due to their acceptability, such forces
were authorized and implemented. The circumstances into which the
UN intervened, however, were often volatile and not conducive to effec-
tive peacekeeping: situations where, for example, the consent of the
warring factions could only be obtained conditionally or where there
was no governmental authority in existence with whom the UN could
negotiate and work. The Security Council authorized the use of force by
and in support of some of these UN peacekeeping operations to enable
their mandates to be achieved. Ultimately this has meant that UN
peacekeeping has moved beyond the three main legal principles upon
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which it was originally based, notably the principles of consent, impar-
tiality and non-use of force except in self-defense. Arguably,
peacekeeping has outstripped its original doctrinal justifications and as
a result now flounders without guidelines and with ill-defined purpose.
The use of force by and in support of UN peacekeeping operations
has narrowed the gap that previously existed between peacekeeping
and coercive peace-enforcement. Yet the use of force in such instances
is controversial, primarily because there is no universally accepted
agreement as to how and when force should be used. This gives rise to
many legal issues. For example, how broad is a peacekeeper's inherent
right to self-defense? When does force used in 'self-defense' become an
enforcement measure? When does peacekeeping become coercive peace-
enforcement? One way to address these questions is to clarify the legal
issues that have emerged due to these developments. Their clarifica-
tion is not only of theoretical interest, it is of great practical importance.
Determining the legal basis for the use of force enables a conceptual
framework to be built up regarding its use. A sound legal understand-
ing of this issue would provide the basis for comprehensive policies to be
formulated concerning the way in which force is used by UN peacekeep-
ers. It will help address the current problems facing United Nations
peacekeeping by ensuring that Security Council resolutions are trans-
lated into clear and effective rules of engagement, which will be ad-
hered to by troops in the field.
Not surprisingly, if a peacekeeping operation's mandate is not
clear, its rules of engagement will not be clear. Lack of clarity in a
mandate or its legal basis invariably gives rise to problems in inter-
preting or implementing the objectives of the operation. Thus, the cri-
teria for using force are important to define. Sound reasons are needed
to explain and justify why force may be used in one situation and not in
another. Furthermore, such criteria must be accepted by all the parties
involved in the peacekeeping operation - the parties involved in the
conflict and the countries who have donated troops. By using legal rea-
soning to justify the use of force, a consensus among Member States is
more likely to emerge as to when and how force should be used by the
United Nations. The future credibility of the United Nations depends
on successful peacekeeping operations. Operations that have clearly de-
fined mandates and legally obtainable objectives are more likely to suc-
ceed than those that do not. Clearly therefore, it is most important to
concentrate on resolving the legal difficulties underpinning these opera-
tions.
This paper focuses on the extent to which UN peacekeeping opera-
tions can use force in self-defense. Clearly this is just one of the areas
regarding peacekeeping and the use of force which needs to be clari-
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fied.1 It is an area that warrants particular attention, however, due to
the fact that self-defense is the one 'legitimate' way in which peace-
keepers can use force. 2 The first part of this paper gives an overview of
UN peacekeeping operations and the legal principles governing these
operations. Part two examines the history and development of the use
of force by UN peacekeeping operations. In particular, the idea that
self-defense, in the context of peacekeeping, may include using force 'in
defense of one's mandate' is examined. Part three details some recent
examples of Security Council resolutions which authorized, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, the use of force in a way that arguably expands
this concept of self-defense even further. Finally, I discuss the legal and
practical implications this development has for the future of
peacekeeping.
This paper focuses on the use of force by peacekeeping forces, as
opposed to the use of force in support of peacekeeping forces. The rea-
son for this limitation is not only space constraints, but the fact that the
issues raised by these different uses of force are in fact quite distinct
and are not necessarily ideally dealt with together. The use of force as
an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the Charter is legal
where the Security Council has found a threat to international peace
and security and has authorized the use of force.3 In the context of a
peacekeeping operation the use of force raises different issues. Whilst it
may be argued that it is legal for the Security Council to authorize the
use of force by UN peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII, this
flies in the face of one of the fundamental legal principles governing
peacekeeping operations: the principle of non-use of force. If it is ac-
cepted that peacekeeping operations can only use force in self-defense,
as is generally agreed, one must question whether the concept can be
stretched to include more forceful measures, the likes of which have
been authorized in recent times. This paper seeks to answer some of
these questions.
1. Another area, for example, might be to what degree the use of force by Member
States in support of peacekeeping operations is compatible with the underlying principles
of peacekeeping.
2. As distinguished from a "lawful" use of force authorized under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. This is due to the fact that one of the principles of traditional peacekeeping
was that force only be used in self-defense. U.N. CHARTER arts. 42-43. See discussion be-
low concerning the legal principles governing United Nations peacekeeping operations.
3. Article 42 of the U.N. Charter reads:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace or security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
The purpose of this section is to give a broad overview and some
background to UN peacekeeping operations, their legal underpinnings
and core characteristics. No attempt is made to give a detailed critique
of the subject matter. Indeed, there is a vast array of scholarly writings
available on the topic, which highlight the complex and controversial
nature of these operations. 4 For the purposes of this paper, however, a
few general comments about the nature of peacekeeping operations, are
appropriate.
A. Definition of "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations"
No two UN peacekeeping operations are alike.5 Each operation is
distinguished by the environment in which it operates and the extent to
which it is authorized to carry out various peacekeeping functions. Fur-
thermore, each operation builds upon the experience of past operations.
Thus by definition UN peacekeeping operations are evolutionary in na-
ture. For the purposes of delineating the scope and character of such
operations, however, it is possible to make some general observations
about their distinguishing features and thereby formulate a broad defi-
nition of the concept.
Peacekeeping operations are an invention of the United Nations.
They were developed in response to the political realities of the Cold
War, brought about by the need to address conflicts which occurred af-
ter entry into force of the UN Charter and for which the mechanisms
provided for in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter could not be used.6
4. See, e.g., D.W. BOWETT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY (1964); Dan
Ciobanu, The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peace-Keeping Operations, in
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: LEGAL ESSAYS (A. Cassese ed., 1978); John W. Halder-
man, Legal Basis for United Nations Forces, 56 AMER. J. INT'L L. 971 (1962); Rosalyn
Higgins, A General Assessment of United Nations Peace-Keeping, in UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING: LEGAL ESSAYS (A. Cassese ed., 1978); Georg Schwarzenberger, Problems
of a United Nations Force, in 12 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 247 (George W. Keeton &
Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1959).
5. Indeed, Bowett lists nine different categories of peacekeeping being (1) cease-fire,
truces and armistice functions entrusted to "observer" groups; (2) frontier control; (3) in-
terpositionary functions (undertaken to "secure a cessation of hostilities'); (3) defense and
security of UN zones or areas placed under UN control; (5) the maintenance of law and
order in a State; (6) plebiscite supervision (undertaken in order to "determine the status
of a territory disputed between two sovereign States'); (7) assistance and relief for na-
tional disasters (undertaken in order to provide humanitarian relief); (8) prevention of
international crimes; and (9) disarmament functions: See BOWETT, supra note 4, at 268-
74. Schachter lists eight different categories along similar lines. Oscar Schachter, Author-
ized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in LAW AND FORCE
IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 65, 80 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.,
1991).
6. For a discussion of the development of peacekeeping and the early operations, see:
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The means provided for in Chapter VI, concerning the pacific settle-
ment of disputes, were inadequate. The means provided for in Chapter
VII, concerning the enforcement measures, could not be agreed upon by
Members of the Security Council due essentially to the profound ideo-
logical differences that prevailed during the Cold War. Peacekeeping
emerged as a mode of international intervention other than those pro-
vided for in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter.
Peacekeeping operations have been defined broadly as:
[O]peration[s] involving military personnel, but without enforcement
powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore
international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations
are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they
involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not
by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the 'enforcement action' of
the United Nations under Article 42. 7
Generally speaking, peacekeeping operations consist of either: (1)
unarmed observer missions; or (2) forces which have the function of sus-
taining peacemaking efforts by helping to create conditions in which
negotiation between warring parties can take place.8 The latter type of
operation is typically armed and may use force in limited circumstances
that are discussed below. Given that the theme of this paper concerns
the use of force by peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping operations
are defined here to cover the latter type of operation only.
BOwETT, supra note 4; UNITED NATIONS, BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACE-KEEPING, U.N. Doc. DPI/1800, U.N. Sales No. E.96.I.14 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter
BLUE HELMETS 1]; 1 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, THE MIDDLE
EAST 1946-1967: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY (1969); 2 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, ASIA 1946-1967: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY (1970); 3
ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, AFRICA 1946-1967: DOCUMENTS AND
COMMENTARY (1980); 4 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, EUROPE
1946-1979: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY (1981); Marrack Goulding, The Evolution of
United Nations Peace-Keeping, 69 INT'L AFF. 451 (1993).
7. UNITED NATIONS, THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-
KEEPING at 4, U.N. Sales No. E.90.I.18 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLUE HELMETS iI].
8. See Jon E. Fink, From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Blurring of the
Mandate for the Use of Force in Maintaining International Peace and Security, 19 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 10 (1995); Goulding, supra note 6, at 457. Note, however, that
peacekeeping operations can be divided up into many more categories. For example, both
Bowett and Schachter list many different categories of peacekeeping. See supra note 5.
Given that each peacekeeping operation tends to be designed for the unique situation into
which it must operate, it is not surprising that many different categories exist.
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B. The Legal Principles Governing United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations
As the concept of peacekeeping evolved, UN peacekeeping opera-
tions developed core legal principles that became fundamental to their
operation. These principles are contained in various legal documents
concerning peacekeeping operations, such as the Status of Forces
Agreements (SOFAs) and rules of engagement. 9 They embody the es-
sence of peacekeeping and permeate all aspects of an operation.10 The
three main legal principles underlying peacekeeping are: (1) consent of
all parties concerned and the competent organ of the UN, usually the
Security Council;11 (2) impartiality; and (3) non-use of force except in
self-defense.
These principles developed over time and are based on sound legal
and practical reasoning. For example, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter
prohibits the United Nations from intervening in the domestic affairs of
a Member State except where Chapter VII enforcement measures are
involved. 12 Thus, a UN peacekeeping force can only intervene into the
domestic affairs of a State if the State concerned has consented to that
intervention and to the peacekeeping operation as a whole. 13 Similarly,
9. See infra note 32 and accompanying text discussing rules of engagement.
10. When a peacekeeping operation is set up, various agreements are drawn up be-
tween the United Nations and the Host State (Status-of-Forces Agreement) and between
the United Nations and contributing State(s). Model agreements of this nature have been
approved of by the General Assembly. See Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of
Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their Aspects: Model of Status of Forces Agreement for
Peace-Keeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
Agenda Item 76, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (1990); Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question
of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their Aspects: Model Agreement Between the United
Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United Nations
Peace-Keeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Item
74 of the Preliminary List, U.N. Doc. A/46/185 (1991).
11. Peacekeeping operations, unlike enforcement measures, can be authorized by the
General Assembly (GA), but the GA has only done this on two occasions: UNEF 1 (United
Nations Emergency Force) which was established to secure the withdrawal of troops from
Egyptian territory and to serve as a buffer between Egypt and Israel; and UNSF (United
Nations Security Force) which was created to maintain peace and security in the West
Irian territory, UN Peacekeeping History, 1 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 1, 9 (1994).
12. Article 2, paragraph 7 reads as follows:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic ju-
risdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such mat-
ters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
13. Although it is worth noting that previously the majority of peacekeeping opera-
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if the UN is to effectively "keep the peace," it must be impartial and un-
biased in its operations. It is obvious that it would be extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for the UN to engage in coercive force and still be
regarded as a neutral body. For this reason the use of force by UN
peacekeeping forces has been limited to that used in self-defense.
In more recent times a "second generation" of peacekeeping has
evolved. 14 These operations, occurring principally since the end of the
Cold War, have increasingly involved civilian personnel and have been
given more complex and challenging mandates, such as helping to pro-
mote human rights and national reconciliation and organizing and
monitoring elections.' 5 Whilst the fundamental characteristics of these
peacekeeping operations have not changed from those of earlier opera-
tions as enumerated above, there is no doubt that all three of the main
legal principles underlying peacekeeping have been strained by the new
demands placed upon these operations. For example, it has become in-
creasingly difficult to gain the consent and cooperation of all parties in-
volved in UN peacekeeping operations. This has necessitated, at times,
an increased use of force by peacekeepers in carrying out UN mandates.
The perceived impartiality of operations has similarly become more dif-
ficult to maintain for this reason.
However, the legal principles upon which peacekeeping was
founded and evolved must be taken seriously. In particular (given the
focus of this paper) it is important to emphasize that the UN has been
very unwilling to go "beyond self-defense as the touchstone of the right
to use force" with respect to peacekeeping operations. 6 Indeed, the
Secretary-General and the Members of the United Nations "considered
tions have involved interstate disputes as opposed to intrastate disputes. It is only more
recently that peacekeeping operations have been involved in disputes contained within a
single State. See STEVEN R. RATNER, THE NEW UN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN
LANDS OF CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR 23 (1995).
14. Boutros-Ghali acknowledges this development in his introduction to the United
Nations publication, THE BLUE HELMETS. See BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6, at 5. Ratner
similarly discusses these developments in his book. RATNER, supra note 13. See also NEW
DIMENSIONS OF PEACEKEEPING (Daniel Warner ed., 1995); Mats R. Berdal, The Security
Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict After the Cold War, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 71 (1996); Kelly A. Childers, United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the Balkan Wars
and the Changing Role of Peacekeeping Forces in the Post-Cold War World, 8 TEMP. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 117 (1994); Fink, supra note 8, at 1; Roy S. Lee, United Nations Peacekeep-
ing: Development and Prospects, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 619 (1995); Ruth Wedgwood, The
Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631 (1995).
15. BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6, at 3. Ratner describes the new breadth of respon-
sibility of UN peacekeepers as having fallen into ten categories: (1) military matters, (2)
elections, (3) human rights, (4) national reconciliation, (5) law and order, (6) refugees, (7)
humanitarian relief, (8) governmental administration, (9) economic reconstruction, and
(10) relationships with outside actors. He describes the depth of responsibility as covering
(1) monitoring, (2) supervision, (3) control, (4) conduct, (5) technical assistance, and (6)
public information. RATNER, supra note 13, at 42-43.
16. Schachter, supra note 5, at 84.
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it essential from a political and legal standpoint to distinguish
peacekeeping from enforcement by restricting the use of force to self-
defense."17 This point cannot be over-stressed as it indicates why con-
ceptually and in practice, the UN has been reluctant to move away from
the non-use of force by peacekeeping operations, and towards a more
forceful kind of peace-making operation (as distinguished from peace-
enforcement). A more thorough examination of the use of force by UN
peacekeeping forces is discussed below.' 8
C. The Constitutional Basis of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
The constitutional basis of United Nations peacekeeping operations
is the broad mandate of Article 1 of the Charter, under which one of the
purposes of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and
security. 19 There is considerable debate amongst commentators as to
where the UN gets its more specific mandate within the Charter,20 al-
though there is now little doubt that the UN does have the power to
authorize such operations. 21 This was not always the case. Initially,
some States protested the establishment of such operations. They ar-
gued that because peacekeeping operations were not specifically pro-
vided for in the UN Charter it was beyond the power of the Security
Council to establish them. 22 On these grounds, and due to disputes over
the constitutional basis within the Charter for such actions, certain
States (including the former USSR and France) refused to pay their
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. See discussion below on the use of force in self-defense and the use of force in de-
fense of one's mandate.
19. Article 1(1) reads as follows:
The Purposes of the United Nations are: (1) To maintain international
peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the sup-
pression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes
or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
20. One issue, for example, is whether the legal basis to establish such operations is
found under Chapter VI of the Charter or under the various articles of Chapter VII.
There are numerous articles and books discussing this issue. See, e.g., BOWETT, supra
note 4; Higgins, supra note 4; Halderman, supra note 4; Schwarzenberger, supra note 4;
Finn Seyersted, Can the United Nations Establish Military Forces and Perform Other Acts
Without Specific Basis in the Charter? 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 351 (1961), reprinted in 12
OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FIR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 188 (1962); Louis B. Sohn, The
Authority of the United Nations to Establish and Maintain a Permanent United Nations
Force, 52 AMER. J. INT'L L. 229 (1958).
21. See HILAIRE McCOUBREY & NIGEL WHITE, THE BLUE HELMETS: LEGAL
REGULATIONS OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS 50-55 (1996); RATNER, supra
note 13 at 58; Schachter, supra note 5, at 82.
22. See Schachter, supra note 5, at 80.
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share of the early peacekeeping bills. These States argued that such
actions were not "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of
Article 17(2) of the Charter. 23 The matter went to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Certain Expenses of the United Nations
Case, in which the Court confirmed obiter the constitutionality of the
UN peacekeeping operations UNEF I and ONUC.2 4 The ICJ stated
that: "[W]hen the Organization takes action which warrants the asser-
tion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment [sic] of one of the stated
purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such an action
is not ultra vires the Organisation." 25
The ICJ stressed that although peacekeeping operations were not
to be regarded as "enforcement measures" within the domain of Chapter
VII of the Charter,2 6 there was no doubt that because the Security
Council had those enforcement powers it was within the power of the
Security Council to implement less forceful measures. 27 However,
whilst it was made clear that the Security Council had the legal capac-
ity to establish peacekeeping operations, no opinion was given as to
where the constitutional sources of such operations lay.28
However, insofar as UN peacekeeping forces are entitled to use
force in self-defense they cannot be regarded as purely pacific means of
dispute settlement under Chapter VI. It is for this reason that Chapter
VII is usually thought to provide the general legal basis for UN
peacekeeping operations, although such operations are not Chapter VII
enforcement measures and should not be regarded as such. Consider-
able debate still exists as to which Articles of Chapter VII have actually
been used to authorize the various operations.29 As it is not essential to
determine the exact legal basis for UN peacekeeping operations for the
purpose of this paper, I will not enter into a detailed discussion. It is
enough to say that the legality of UN peacekeeping under Chapter VII
23. Article 17(2) states that "Mhe expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the
Members as apportioned by the General Assembly." U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 2.
24. Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 167. See infra
notes 36, 37, and 40 and accompanying text for background information on UNEF I and
ONUC.
25. Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 168.
26. The I.C.J. stated that the "operations known as UNEF and ONUC were not en-
forcement actions within the compass of Chapter VII .... Id. at 166.
27. Id. at 167. The idea presumably being that the power to implement forceful
measures encompasses the power to implement less forceful measures. This principle,
("qui peut le plus peut le moins" which is loosely translated as the "greater encompasses
the lesser") is acknowledged by Georges Fischer. See Georges Fischer, Article 42, in LA
CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES 705 (Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet eds., 1985).
28. Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 166-67.
29. The five main Articles which have been put forward as providing the possible le-
gal basis for peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII of the Charter are Articles 39,
40, 41, 42 & 48(1) and various combinations thereof. For a discussion on possible constitu-
tional bases for peacekeeping operations, see supra note 20.
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is generally acknowledged, even if the precise source of that legality
cannot be agreed upon. On this point, however, it is worth noting that
peacekeeping operations have been described as falling conceptually be-
tween Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter and, accordingly,
have been referred to as Chapter "Six and a Half' operations.30 This is
due to the fact that peacekeeping operations have traditionally involved
the use of military personnel (i.e. they have gone beyond a purely dip-
lomatic settlement of disputes outlined in Chapter VI of the Charter)
but not Chapter VII enforcement measures. Although this is a symbolic
analysis, it is nonetheless a legal fiction. A peacekeeping operation
cannot find its constitutional basis in a non-existent Article of the Char-
ter.
III. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE USE OF FORCE BY UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
As described above, one of the three main legal principles of
peacekeeping is that force is only to be used in self-defense. Indeed, the
right of UN peacekeeping operations to exercise force in self-defense is
one of the authorized legal categories for the use of force by the United
Nations and may be thought of as an 'inherent right' of the peacekeep-
ers.31 There is considerable practice that supports this view and the
right to self-defense has been consistently provided for in the rules of
engagement established for each peacekeeping operation since their in-
ception. 32 Evidently, under the rules of engagement, instructions on the
use of force in self-defense in a peacekeeping operation may vary con-
siderably from those designed to suit a Chapter VII enforcement opera-
tion. 33 This leads one to ask what constitutes self-defense within the
30. Dag Hammarskjold, former United Nations Secretary-General, described
peacekeeping as being authorized by Chapter "Six and a Half." See BLUE HELMETS II, su-
pra note 7, at 5.
31. Schachter lists six legal categories for the use of force by the United Nations,
which he describes as: (1) Armed force as an enforcement measure taken by the Security
Council under Chapter VII, particularly Article 42; (2) Collective self-defense in accor-
dance with Article 51; (3) Individual self-defense under Article 51; (4) Enforcement meas-
ures under regional arrangements or by regional agencies under Article 53; (5)
Peacekeeping forces of the United Nations authorized by the Security Council or General
Assembly and deployed in agreement with the States concerned; and (6) Joint action by
the five permanent Members pursuant to Article 106 of the Charter. See Schachter, supra
note 5, at 65.
32. When the Security Council authorizes a UN operation to use force, the way in
which force may be exercised is set out in the rules of engagement. The rules of engage-
ment "specify the circumstances in which armed force may be used by a military unit and
its permissible extent and degree." See McCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 21, at 146.
33. Indeed, the importance of the rules of engagement should not be underestimated.
Rowe has stated, "In reality the mandate given by the Security Council is no real indica-
tion of how much force has been authorized by the Council for those engaged in enforcing
it. Rather, it is the rules of engagement which set out the degree of force that may be
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realm of a UN peacekeeping operation? Certainly it differs from its
usual legal meaning.3 4 The concept of self-defense in the context of
peacekeeping evolved over time and in response to the changing needs
of peacekeepers in different operations. Initially, a narrow approach
was taken: force could only be used in defense of the peacekeeping op-
eration itself and strictly in response to an armed attack ('personal self-
defense'). Gradually, a much broader view evolved: force could be used
'in defense of one's mandate.' In other words, force could be used to 'de-
fend' the objects and purposes of the peacekeeping operation. The evo-
lution of self-defense in the context of peacekeeping and the scope of
this broader approach is discussed in more detail below.
A. Use of Force in Self-defense ('Personal Self-Defense)
In the first armed UN peacekeeping operation, UNEF 1,35 peace-
keepers were instructed never to initiate the use of force, although they
could respond to armed attacks with force and could resist attempts to
make them withdraw from their positions. 36 In his report on UNEF I,
Dag Hammarskjold wrote:
[T]he rule is applied that men engaged in the operation may never
take the initiative in the use of armed force, but are entitled to re-
spond with force to an attack with arms, including attempts to use
force to make them withdraw from positions which they occupy un-
der orders from the Commander... The basic element involved is
clearly the prohibition against any initiative in the use of armed
force.37
This definition of self-defense was narrow and yet adequate for the
UNEF I operation because the UN troops involved in UNEF I were
maintaining a cease-fire on a front line between two orderly armed
forces. Furthermore, there was only a small civilian population living
in the area. 38 Thus, the amount of force which UNEF I was authorized
to use was sufficient for the purposes of fulfilling its mandate.
used." Peter Rowe, The United Nations Rules of Engagement and the British Soldier in
Bosnia, INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 946, 947 (1994).
34. Schachter, supra note 5, at 84.
35. United Nations Emergency Force I.
36. UNEF I operated from November 1956 - June 1967. Its function was to "secure
and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces...
from Egyptian territory, and after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between Egyptian
and Israeli forces." UNITED NATIONS, UN PEACEKEEPING BOOKLET 9 (1996) [hereinafter
UN PEACEKEEPING BOOKLET].
37. United Nations Emergency Force, Summary Study of the Experience Derived From
the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary General, UN GAOR,
13th Sess., Agenda Item 65(c) 1 179, U.N. Doc A/3943 (1958) (emphasis added).
38. Marrack Goulding, The Use of Force by the United Nations, in MOUNTBATTEN-
TATA MEMORIAL LECTURE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 8 (1995).
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The same was not true of ONUC in the Congo, where circum-
stances eventually compelled the UN to authorize the peacekeeping op-
eration to use more extensive force. 39 ONUC was deployed in the sum-
mer of 1960 to essentially assist the Government of the Congo in
carrying out tasks related to the maintenance of law and order. Ini-
tially, the establishment of the force was based upon the principles of
UNEF I, including the principle that there should be no initiative in the
use of armed force by UN troops. This is made clear in the First Report
of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council
Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 196040 in which Hammarskjold reiterated
his earlier comments made in the UNEF I Report regarding the limits
on the use of force by UN troops. In this report he again emphasized
the prohibition of any initiative by UN forces in the use of armed
force.41
The original mandate of the operation emphasized the restoration
of law and order in the Congo. 42 Soon after the deployment of ONUC,
opposition and secessionist movements in the Congo brought about dis-
order and violence and the peacekeeping operation started to face diffi-
culties. It became evident that ONUC could not achieve its objective of
halting the civil war whilst it was limited to the use of force within the
confines of 'personal self-defense.' 43 If ONUC were to act effectively it
would need to be able to exercise a more expanded use of force. Under
39. United Nations Operation in the Congo. ONUC operated between July 1960 -
June 1964. Its initial function was to "ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist
the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance." Later
this function was modified to include "maintaining the territorial integrity and political
independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the re-
moval from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not un-
der the UN command and all mercenaries." UN PEACEKEEPING BOOKLET, supra note 36,
at 19.
40. First Report by the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council
Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960, United Nations Emergency Force, Summary Study of
the Experienced Derived From the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/4389 (1960).
41. He stated as follows:
In my initial statement I recalled the rule applied in previous United Na-
tions operations to the effect that the military units would be entitled to
act only in self-defence. In amplification of this statement I would like to
quote the following passage from the report to which I referred. '[Mien en-
gaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the use of armed
force, but are entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms, in-
cluding attempts to use force to make them withdraw from positions which
they occupy under orders from the Commander', acting under the authority
of the Security Council and within the scope of its resolution. 'The basic
element involved is clearly the prohibition against any initiative in the use
of armed force.
Id. 15 (emphasis in original).
42. S.C. Res. 143, U.N. SCOR, 873d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960).
43. BOWETT, supra note 4, at 201.
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the circumstances the Security Council revised the mandate of ONUC
to enable it to use force as a last resort to prevent civil war in the
Congo.44 It is hard not to view this authorization for the use of force as
going beyond self-defense. As Bowett has stated, "[I]t is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that the Security Council by this Resolution
[S/RES/161(1961)] abandoned a strict reliance on the principle of self-
defence." 45 However it is interesting that the Secretary-General con-
tinued to express the opinion that troops should only engage in defen-
sive action, or they would risk becoming a party to the conflict.46
Bowett regards this statement as "clinging to the 'self-defence' con-
cept."
47
In many ways the UN's experience in the Congo was a premonition
of the difficulties that came with the evolution of the more complex sec-
ond generation of peacekeeping operations. Although it is generally
agreed that ONUC was a peacekeeping operation, there is no doubt that
it involved some enforcement elements. 48 In the operation's aftermath,
44. In Security Council Resolution 161, paragraph 1, the Security Council urged,
"that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occur-
rence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all
military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last
resort." S.C. Res. 161, U.N. SCOR, 942d mtg. 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/4741 (1961) (emphasis
added). In Security Council Resolution 169, paragraph 4, the Security Council authorized
the Secretary-General "to take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure
of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action
and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advis-
ers not under the UN Command, and mercenaries... S.C. Res. 169, U.N. SCOR, 982d
mtg. 4, U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1961) (emphasis added).
45. BOWETT, supra note 4, at 201-02.
46. See Report of the Secretary-General on Certain Steps Taken in Regard to the Im-
plementation of the Security Council Resolution Adopted on 21 February 1961, U.N.
SCOR, 942d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4752, Annex 7 (1961).
47. BOWETT, supra note 4, at 202.
48. There has been dispute about whether or not ONUC was actually a peacekeeping
operation because it was couched in language of Chapter VII of the Charter and author-
ized the use of force. The consensus is that ONUC was not an "enforcement action." This
was the determination of the ICJ in the Certain Expenses Case. Certain Expenses of the
United Nations Case (Art. 17, Para. 2 of the Charter), 1962 I.C.J. 151, at 177. Certainly,
the purposes for which ONUC was created "were essentially different from those for
which, at San Francisco, forces used under Article 42 were contemplated." See BoWETT,
supra note 4, at 176. The United Nations force in the Congo was present with the consent
of the government of Congo and the measures authorized by the Security Council were
specifically aimed at implementing the Security Council peacekeeping mandate. Fur-
thermore, as Higgins points out, "even though the circumstances in which ONUC was
permitted to use force was [sic] enlarged, the action was still not a sanction against the
Congo[, and] there is ample evidence that the UN still regarded itself as bound by the
domestic jurisdiction requirements .. " For example, the Article 2(7) restraint operated
so that intervention into the internal affairs of a State was not permissible without the
consent of that State. 3 HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 58. Most commentators express the
view that the constitutional basis of ONUC lay in Article 40, Chapter VII of the Charter.
This was the view of the Secretary-General and has been described as the "official" view of
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and as a result of the UN's experiences in the Congo, the narrow defini-
tion of self-defense was revised. It was thought that a broader defini-
tion of self-defense would make peacekeeping operations more viable
and would enable the United Nations to effectively carry out
peacekeeping mandates without the need to resort to 'enforcement
measures.' Thus ONUC, while not the definitive peacekeeping opera-
tion of the Cold War period due to its expansive use of force, played a
notable role in the development of the use of force within the realm of
peacekeeping.49
B. Use of Force in Defense of One's Mandate
When the UN peacekeeping operation was set up in Cyprus the
situation with regards to the use of force in self-defense was more
clearly defined by the Secretary-General.5 0  In an Aide-Memoire of the
Secretary-General Concerning Some Questions Relating to the Function
and Operation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 10
April 196451 the Secretary-General outlined an expanded definition of
self-defense. The traditional principles were confirmed (for example,
the principle that troops should never take the initiative in the use of
armed force) but additional elements were included in the definition.5 2
the United Nations. See BOWETT, supra note 4, at 177; 3 HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 54-60;
Schachter, supra note 5, at 82.
49. Fink has written, "The concept of self-defense, as well as the principles of non-
intervention and sovereignty, were loosely defined and greatly modified in the Congo op-
eration." See Fink, supra note 8, at 15.
50. The United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has operated
from 1964 to the present. Its initial mandate was to "prevent a recurrence of fighting be-
tween Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and to contribute to the mainte-
nance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions." Since 1974 its
mandate has been expanded and UNFICYP has "supervised the cease-fire and main-
tained a buffer zone." UN PEACEKEEPING BOOKLET, supra note 36, at 17-18.
51. Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/5653 (1964).
52. Id. I I 17(c), 18 (c). The full text of the Principles of Self-Defence read as follows:
16. Troops of UNFICYP shall not take the initiative in the use of armed
force. The use of armed force is permissible only in self-defence. The ex-
pression "self-defence" includes:
(a) The defence of United Nations posts, premises and vehicles under
armed attack;
(b) The support of other personnel of UNFICYP under armed attack.
17. No action is to be taken by the troops of UNFICYP which is likely to
bring them in to direct conflict with either community in Cyprus, except in
the following circumstances:
(a) Where members of the Force are compelled to act in self-defence;
(b) Where the safety of the force or of members of it is in jeopardy;
(c) Where specific arrangements accepted by both communities have
been or in the opinion of the commander on the spot are about to be,
violated, thus risking a recurrence of fighting or endangering law and
order.
18. When acting in self-defence, the principle of minimum force shall al-
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Thus while troops were not to take the initiative in the use of armed
force, they could use force in "self-defense" where:
specific arrangements accepted by both communities have been or
... are about to be violated, thus risking a recurrence of fighting or
endangering law and order . .. [or where there were] attempts by
force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities as
ordered by their commanders. 53
The most significant expansion to be noted here, and one that de-
finitively moves way from the idea that self-defense only includes the
defense of the peacekeeping force itself, is the premise that peacekeep-
ers could use force in response to attempts by force to prevent them
from carrying out their responsibilities or where agreements agreed to
by both sides were not honored. Interestingly, it seems that force could
even be used in 'anticipatory self-defense' where such agreements were
about to be violated.
This interpretation of self-defense, although expressed more gener-
ally, was reapplied in 1973 when UNEF II was established.5 4 In the
Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security
Council 340 (1973), Kurt Waldheim, the then Secretary-General, wrote
ways be applied, and armed force will be used only when all peaceful
means of persuasion have failed. The decision as to when force may be
used under these circumstances rests with the commander on the spot,
whose main concern will be to distinguish between an incident which does
not require fire to be opened and those situations in which troops may be
authorized to use force. Examples in which troops may be so authorized
are:
(a) Attempts by force to compel them to withdraw from i position
which they occupy under orders from their commanders, or to "
infiltrate and envelop such positions as are deemed necessary by their
commanders for them to hold, thus jeopardizing their safety;
(b) Attempts by force to disarm them;
(c) Attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their respon-
sibilities as ordered by their commanders;
(d) Violation by force of United Nations premises and attempts to ar-
rest or abduct United Nations personnel, civil or military.
19. Should it be necessary to resort to the use of arms, advance warning
will be given whenever possible. Automatic weapons are not to be used ex-
cept in extreme emergency and fire will continue only as long as is neces-
sary to achieve its immediate aim.
Id. 11 16-19.
53. Id. 1 17(c)-18 (c).
54. United Nations Emergency Force II. UNEF II operated from October 1973 to
July 1979. Its function was to "supervise the cease-fire between Egyptian and Israeli
forces and, following the conclusion of agreements... [and] to supervise the redeployment
of Egyptian and Israeli forces and to man and control the buffer zones established under
those agreements." UN PEACEKEEPING BOOKLET, supra note 36, at 10. See also Goulding,
supra note 38, at 9; Adam Roberts, From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use
of Force, 37 SURvIvAL 7 (1995).
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that self-defense included "resistance to attempts by forceful means to
prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Secu-
rity Council."5 5  In other words, self-defense included situations in
which peacekeepers needed to use force to fulfil their mandate. This is
a significantly broadened definition of self-defense when compared to
the definition that applied in UNEF I, and may be regarded as covering
all subsequent UN peacekeeping operations.5 6 Indeed, Boutros-Ghali
made it clear in 1993, that at least at that point in time, "existing rules
of engagement allow [United Nations soldiers to open fire] if armed per-
sons attempt by force to prevent them from carrying out their orders." 57
C. Conclusion
As discussed above, one of the legal principles of peacekeeping is
that the use of force is restricted to that used in self-defense. The fact
that this is a legal principle which the UN considers to be binding upon
itself can be gauged from the way it responded to difficulties encoun-
tered whilst operating within this self-imposed limit. Instead of doing
away with the principle, it remained, as Schachter has described, the
"touchstone" of peacekeeping and the use of force was justified by
adopting an expanded and somewhat artificial definition of self-
defense.58 The actual scope of this expanded notion of 'self-defense,' and
the extent to which it applies, and has applied, in various peacekeeping
operations, is not clear. If self-defense is interpreted broadly to mean
'in defense of one's mandate' in all operations, it would presumably
mean that if any operation is hindered (by the use of force) from carry-
ing out any part of its mandate, its inherent right to 'self-defense' enti-
tles it to use force in order to fulfil its duties. The ability of a
peacekeeping operation to use force would then largely depend on how
broad its mandate was. The broader the mandate, the more occasions
in which the peacekeeping operation might find itself not only needing
to use force but also legally 'permitted' to do so.
However, interpreting self-defense in this manner, comes perilously
close to enforcement measures. Such an approach leads one to ask to
what extent force can be used in self-defense to fulfil a mandate and
still remain consistent with the principles of consent and impartiality
underlying peacekeeping operations? The answer lies in the fact that in
practice and for many years, commanders in the field have very rarely
55. Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolu-
tion 340 (1973), U.N. SCOR 4(d), U.N. Doc S/l1052/Rev. 1 (1973). UNEF II was set up
on the basis of Security Council resolution 340 of October 25, 1973.
56. Goulding, supra note 38, at 9; Roberts, supra note 54, at 14.
57. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 89, 91.
(1992)
58. Schachter, supra note 5, at 84.
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applied the expanded definition of self-defense.5 9 Instead, negotiation
and persuasion have been used. In reality the use of force in the con-
text of peacekeeping is a perilous activity which does not rest easily
along side the concepts of consent and impartiality. The reluctance to
use force in self-defense by commanders in the field is essentially in-
tended to secure the impartiality of peacekeepers and ensure the con-
tinued cooperation of the parties concerned. Thus, while theoretically
the concept of self-defense was broadened, in practice the expanded doc-
trine has remained, at least until more recent times, largely unused.
Clearly, UN peacekeeping operations have an inherent right to use
force in self-defense; at least in so far as they have a right to use force to
protect themselves and seemingly to defend at least some aspects of
their mandate. The issue remains, however, what is the scope of self-
defense in the context of peacekeeping? To what degree can force be
used in defense of one's mandate? Is the use of force limited to what is
necessary and proportionate? Where does anticipatory self-defense fit
into the picture? Do some uses of force in 'self-defense' need to be ex-
plicitly authorized by the Security Council or risk being considered an
illegal use of force? Some of the recent resolutions authorizing the use
of force have been couched in terms of "self-defense," indicating that at
least in some instances, the Security Council still takes the view that
force must be explicitly authorized, even if it is in 'self-defense.' In con-
trast, there are other resolutions that tend to indicate that no such
authorization is necessary. In this regard, the Security Council has
been inconsistent, or at least given confusing signals, with respect to
the extent to which the use of force by peacekeeping operations is possi-
ble. After an examination of recent UN peacekeeping operations, I will
discuss some possible answers to the above questions and also reflect on
whether or not such a use of force, whilst possibly legitimate, is desir-
able.
IV. BEYOND SELF-DEFENSE: AN EXAMINATION OF RECENT USES OF
FORCE BY UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Since the end of the Cold War the number of peacekeeping opera-
tions authorized by the Security Council has outstripped the previous
operations not only in number but also in complexity and size.60 Many
of the peacekeeping operations established since 1989 have gone beyond
the traditional peacekeeping role of monitoring cease-fires and control-
ling buffer zones between belligerent States. Although peacekeeping
operations continue to carry out such tasks, they have been entrusted
additionally with mandates as varied as the monitoring of troop with-
59. Roberts, supra note 54, at 14.
60. During the Cold War there were 15 peacekeeping operations. Since 1989 there
have been 26 established. See BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6, at 3.
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drawals, elections and human rights violations.6 1 Peacekeeping forces
have also provided assistance in the resettlement of refugees and dis-
placed persons, the rebuilding of political and administrative structures
and the protection of deliveries of humanitarian relief supplies. Certain
peacekeeping operations, such as those deployed in Cambodia, Mozam-
bique, and Angola, required an integrated program in which most of the
above mentioned tasks were included.62
During the Cold War, the concept of self-defense, as elaborated
above, remained static and force was not widely used in practice by UN
peacekeeping forces. 63 Since then, as peacekeeping itself became more
complicated and difficult, peacekeepers have been authorized to use
force more liberally and have increasingly resorted to the use of force.
Both the authorization and use of force has come about for several rea-
sons: first, due to the number of attacks against civilian and military
personnel engaged in peacekeeping operations; secondly, in order to
more effectively carry out difficult mandates; and thirdly, due to more
complex conflict situations in which peacekeepers are engaged. Given
the limited scope of this paper, it is not possible, or desirable, to under-
take a detailed examination of all the peacekeeping operations that
have taken place since 1989. However, such an analysis is not neces-
sary for the purpose of illustrating the increasing tendency of the Secu-
rity Council to authorize the use of force by peacekeepers and in so do-
ing to give them more "muscle."64 In order to illustrate this trend I will
give examples of recent Security Council resolutions which explicitly
authorize peacekeepers to use force. I will also argue that the use of
force may have been implicitly sanctioned in other Security Council
resolutions. This can be shown by examining the language of these
resolutions and related United Nations reports.
It should be understood that this study is complicated by the fact
that in recent times the Security Council has "authorized Member
States to use all necessary means to achieve specific goals in operations
in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, separate from United Nations
peacekeeping missions."65 This kind of support was also authorized in
61. Ratner describes second generation peacekeeping in the following way: (1) Second
generation operations aim primarily at assisting a State or group of States in executing
an agreed political solution to a conflict; (2) Second generation peacekeeping operations
are limited to an exclusively military mandate, but can have a substantial or predomi-
nantly nonmilitary mandate and composition; (3) Second generation peacekeeping has
complex agendas; (4) The new peacekeeping is as likely to respond to an ostensibly inter-
nal conflict as an interstate conflict; (5) Second generation operations involve numerous
types of actors; (6) The new peacekeeping is a fluid phenomenon. See RATNER, supra note
13, at 21-24.
62. See BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6.
63. Except in the case of the Congo.
64. Goulding, supra note 6, at 461
65. BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6, at 6.
1999
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the former Yugoslavia, in the UNPROFOR, UNCRO and UNTAES
peacekeeping operations. 66 Such measures, for the purpose of this pa-
per, are characterized as enforcement measures and are not within its
scope. 67 Instead, this paper focuses on examples where the peacekeep-
ing force itself was authorized to use force. It is acknowledged, how-
ever, that it is becoming harder to distinguish, legally speaking, be-
tween peacekeeping and enforcement measures. 68 Indeed, considerable
controversy exists in some instances as to how to characterize particu-
lar operations. UNOSOM 11,69 for example, is alternatively described as
a peacekeeping operation, 70 or as the first "peace-enforcement operation
authorized and commanded by the United Nations." 71 This confusion as
to characterization is borne in mind in undertaking this analysis.
Finally, it is important to emphasize the common theme that runs
through the peacekeeping operations discussed below, as it is this
theme which underlies the expanded use of force by peacekeepers. The
use of force, whether its specific purpose be to ensure freedom of move-
ment or protect a safe area, is primarily geared towards the ultimate
goal of alleviating human suffering. In this respect, I argue, that a sig-
nificant expansion of the use of force by peacekeepers has occurred.
Force, in these instances, has been used for the protection of civilians
and the protection of humanitarian activities. This use of force goes be-
yond self-defense, in even the broader sense of the meaning, because al-
though it might be termed as being in 'defense of a mandate', the man-
date now involves the protection of third parties, as distinct from the
protection of peacekeepers themselves (albeit in pursuit of their duties).
In the context of UNPROFOR, Marrack Goulding has stated that this
66. United Nations Protection Force, United Nations Confidence Restoration Opera-
tion in Croatia & United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Ba-
ranja, and Western Sirmium respectively. See S.C. Res. 1037, U.N. SCOR, 3619th mtg.
14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1037 (1996) (UNTAES); S.C. Res. 981, U.N. SCOR, 3512th mtg. 6,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/981 (1995) (UNCRO); S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 3228th mtg. 1 10, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/836 (1993) (created safe areas which Member States could protect through air
power); S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 3122d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (1992) revised by
S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 3191st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993) (created no-fly zone
and gave Member States authority to use all necessary measures to enforce the ban).
67. I use the term "enforcement measures" to encompass measures outlined in Article
42 of the Charter which can be exercised once the Security Council has determined the
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, i.e., a more ac-
tive and aggressive use of force than that involved in peacekeeping. Thus, enforcement
measures are not undertaken with the consent of the State involved (in fact such meas-
ures are used 'against' the State) and the use of such force is offensive as opposed to de-
fensive. See U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
68. For a discussion on this point see Fink, supra note 8.
69. United Nations Operation in Somalia II.
70. UNOSOM II is included in the U.N.'s review of United Nations peace-keaping.
See BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6.
71. UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA 1992-1996 at 43, U.N.
Sales No. E.96.I.8 (1996) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA].
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use of force, under the "fig leaf of 'self-defence"', was incompatible with
the operation's peacekeeping role.72 It is for this reason that such an
expansion of the concept of self-defense should be considered carefully
before being adopted.
In the examination below I will trace the development of this
broader interpretation of self-defense. I have divided the analysis into
three categories: force authorized to deliver humanitarian assistance
and relief, force authorized to secure the freedom of movement of UN
personnel and force authorized to protect safe areas and protected sites
and populations. These are not watertight categories and, as will be-
come evident, there are frequent overlaps between the first two in par-
ticular. 73 It is also worth noting that events in the former Yugoslavia
dominate this analysis. Indeed, it has been said that the "performance
of UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia will doubtlessly form a prototype
for successor peacekeeping forces assigned with a mission that involves
the use of force beyond self-defense."74
A. Force Authorized to Ensure Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance &
Relief- UNOSOM II, UNPROFOR, UNCRO & UNAMIR
The UN's involvement in the Somalia is long and complicated: it
consisted of three operations (and phases) being UNOSOM I, UNITAF
and UNOSOM II. UNOSOM I can be regarded as essentially a tradi-
tional peacekeeping operation that failed primarily because the situa-
tion into which in went was not conducive to peacekeeping. UNITAF, a
US-led multinational operation, followed UNOSOM. Its mandate, un-
der Chapter VII of the Charter, was to use force to establish a secure
environment for humanitarian relief operations.7 5 Upon restoration of
peace (albeit of a precarious nature) in southern and central Somalia, a
second peacekeeping operation, UNOSOM II, took over operational re-
sponsibility for the area. This operation is sometimes described as a
peacekeeping force, and yet was "deployed without the consent of the
parties, [and had] the right to use all necessary measures to carry out
its mandate - including the right to the use of force." 76 Such use of
force was authorized because UNITAF's task of establishing a secure
environment in all of Somalia was "far from complete" when UNOSOM
72. Goulding, supra note 38. Marrack Goulding is the Under-Secretary-General for
Political Affairs of the United Nations.
73. Indeed, Goulding merely divides the new uses of force into two categories: force
authorized to protect civilians; and force authorized to protect humanitarian activities.
See id.
74. Fink, supra note 8, at 31.
75. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
76. Serge Lalande, Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peacekeeping, in NEW
DIMENSIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 69, 77 (Daniel Warner ed., 1995).
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II took over.77 In this respect, UNOSOM II must be regarded as an en-
forcement measure, albeit under the control and command of the
United Nations. While, for this reason, UNOSOM II does not truly fit
within the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning the operation be-
cause it forged a path for the use of force to deliver humanitarian assis-
tance. The mandate of UNOSOM II was to "take appropriate action,
including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a se-
cure environment for humanitarian assistance."78 Although UNOSOM
II had many other purposes and duties, 79 this was the driving force be-
hind the operation.
This theme has been picked up in subsequent peacekeeping opera-
tions. The role of UNPROFOR in delivering humanitarian relief was
confirmed in numerous Security Council resolutions. 80 Although the
use of force was not explicitly authorized for this purpose in these
resolutions, it is interesting to note that the Secretary-General was of
the opinion that force could be used. In September 1992 the Secretary-
General stated that, in the context of ensuring the delivery of humani-
tarian aid and protecting humanitarian convoys, "self-defence is
deemed to include situations in which armed persons attempt by force
to prevent United Nations troops from carrying out their mandate." 81
Clearly the Secretary-General was of the opinion that self-defense could
include situations involving the protection of third parties. The fact,
however, that the operation was later explicitly authorized to use force
to secure their freedom of movement in resolution 871 (primarily to en-
77. UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA, supra note 71, at 42.
78. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 75. See also S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 3188th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993) (establishing UNOSOM II); BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6, at
722.
79. These duties included, through disarmament and reconciliation, the restoration of
peace, stability, law and order. Its main responsibilities included monitoring the cessa-
tion of hostilities, preventing resumption of violence, seizing unauthorized small arms,
maintaining security at ports, airports and lines of communication required for delivery of
humanitarian assistance, continuing mine clearing and assisting in repatriation of refu-
gees in Somalia. See S.C. Res. 814, supra note 78; Further Report of the Secretary-General
Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1993), U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., Addendum 1, U.N. Doc. S/25354/Add. 1 (1993); Further Report of the Secretary-
General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1993), U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., Addendum 2, U.N. Doc. S/25354/Add.2 (1993) (proposing that the
mandate of UNOSOM II cover the whole country and include enforcement powers under
Chapter VII of the Charter).
80. See S.C. Res. 776, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3114th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/776
(1992); S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/770 (1992);
S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3093 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/764 (1992); S.C. Res.
761, U.N. SCOR, 3087 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/761 (1992); S.C. Res. 749, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3066th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/749 (1992); S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992).
81. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess. 1 9, U.N. Doc. S/24540 (1992).
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sure delivery of humanitarian assistance) seems to indicate that the Se-
curity Council did not regard UNPROFOR as being able to use such ex-
tensive force without explicit authorization. 82 This interpretation is
supported by a later resolution which similarly explicitly authorized the
use of force in self-defense in the safe areas, in the event of any obstruc-
tion in or around the areas which interfered with the freedom of move-
ment of protected humanitarian convoys.8 3
UNCRO's mandate also included "facilitating the delivery of inter-
national humanitarian assistance" and other humanitarian tasks.8 4 Al-
though the use of force was not explicitly authorized in Resolution 981,
the resolution under which UNCRO was established, the operation's
mandate included "facilitating the implementation of all relevant Secu-
rity Council resolutions."8 5 In the Report of the Secretary-General Sub-
mitted Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 981
(1995) the Secretary-General stated clearly that the resolutions referred
to in resolution 981 included "those relevant to the functioning of
UNCRO (freedom of movement, security, self-defense, including close
air support)."8 6 This implies that force could be used in 'self-defense'
where it was necessary to ensure freedom of movement and the delivery
of humanitarian aid. As part of the implementation of UNCRO's man-
date was to protect and escort humanitarian convoys,8 7 and given that
the use of force in self-defense to ensure freedom of movement had pre-
viously been explicitly authorized, it is plausible to argue that force
could be used in self-defense to protect humanitarian convoys and en-
sure assistance was delivered. 88
In Rwanda, the Security Council "recognized" that the United Na-
tions Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) might need to take action in self-
defense "against persons or groups who threaten[ed] . . . the means of
delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief."8 9 Interestingly, there
was no explicit authorization to use force in this regard and no refer-
ence made to Chapter VII. This implies that, in this instance, the Secu-
rity Council did not believe it was necessary to explicitly authorize such
82. See discussion below on the use of force to secure freedom of movement of UN
personnel.
83. S.C. Res. 836, supra note 66 1 9. See discussion below on the use of force to secure
freedom of movement of UN personnel.
84. S.C. Res. 981, supra note 66 3(c), (e). United Nations Confidence Restoration
Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) was one of the three peacekeeping operations which re-
placed UNPROFOR.
85. Id. 3(c).
86. Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Security
Council Resolution 981 (1995), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess. 1 18, U.N. Doc. S/1995/320 (1995).
87. Id. I 24(c).
88. S.C. Res. 871, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3286th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/871 (1993).
89. See S.C. Res. 925, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3388th mtg. 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/925
(1994); S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3377th mtg. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918
(1994).
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a use of force. This interpretation is supported by the Report of the Sec-
retary-General on the Situation in Rwanda. In this report it was made
clear that UNAMIR was expected to provide security assistance to hu-
manitarian organizations in their programs for distribution of relief
supplies. 90 Although the rules of engagement were not to envisage en-
forcement action, it was acknowledged that UNAMIR might have to
take action in self-defense against persons who threatened the means of
delivery and the distribution of humanitarian relief.91 As before, no ex-
plicit mention is made of the use of force in this report, however, be-
cause 'rules of engagement,' by definition, cover the use force it is clear
that forceful measures were contemplated. Furthermore, the Secretary-
General was of the opinion that for UNAMIR to successfully execute its
mandate it had to be "composed of a credible, well-armed and highly
mobile force" indicating that the operation had to be suitably armed for
such a role.92
B. Force Authorized to Secure the Freedom of Movement of UN
Personnel: UNPROFOR, UNCRO & UNTAES
Freedom of movement is deemed to be essential to the functioning
of all peacekeeping operations and is generally provided for in the
Status of Forces Agreements establishing an operation. 93 The right to
use force in self-defense to defend one's freedom of movement has ex-
isted since ONUC. Bowett has stated that:
In simple terms, it may be said that ONUC was entitled to assert
its freedom of movement and to resort to self-defence against any
action constituting a denial of freedom of movement: this would not
have meant abandoning the principle, then operative, that ONUC
could not take the initiative in military action. 94
Schachter has likewise recognized that a "significant extension of
self-defense resulted from granting the ONUC freedom of movement
throughout the country."95  UNPROFOR, however, was the first
peacekeeping operation to be explicitly authorized to use force in self-
defense to ensure freedom of movement and some commentators regard
this authorization as significantly expanding the concept. 96
90. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 12, U.N. Doc. S/1994/565 (1994).
91. Id. 1 15.
92. Id. 1 16 (emphasis added).
93. Bowett states that "the right to freedom of movement should be acknowledged by
the host State as early as possible [and] recognized in the basic agreement, but the details
of the right should be worked out in the SOFA." See BOWETT, supra note 4, at 434.
94. Id. at 204.
95. Schachter, supra note 5, at 85.
96. Certainly Fink is of the view that "the peacekeeper's mandate to use force for self-
defense in Bosnia is greatly expanded by their authority to secure 'free movement,'
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What distinguishes the use of force to secure freedom of movement
in recent operations from past operations is that recently it has been
closely linked to the delivery of humanitarian aid. Not surprisingly
then, there is a fair degree of overlap between the force authorized to
secure free movement and that authorized to ensure delivery of aid.
The main difference between the two is that force here is being used to
secure the freedom of movement of UN personnel, as opposed to hu-
manitarian convoys. For example, in order to carry out their humani-
tarian objectives, UNPROFOR was authorized under Chapter VII of the
Charter, "in carrying out its mandate in the Republic of Croatia, acting
in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use force,
to ensure its security and freedom of movement."97 This new resolution
was passed primarily to enable the operation to ensure that humani-
tarian assistance was provided in compliance with earlier Security
Council resolutions. 98 Arguably, this explicit authorization indicates
that the Security Council was in some way expanding the operation's
original self-defense mandate. 99 The Security Council's determination
to ensure the freedom of movement of UN personnel was reaffirmed in
many subsequent Security Council resolutions. 100
The trend allowing peacekeepers to use more forceful measures to
secure their freedom of movement in order to deliver humanitarian aid,
was implicitly followed in two subsequent former-Yugoslavia opera-
tions. In Security Council Resolution 981, in which UNCRO was estab-
lished,101 the Security Council reaffirmed its "determination to ensure
the security and freedom of movement of the personnel of United Na-
tions [pleace-keeping operations in the territory of the former Yugosla-
via."102 The peacekeeping operation was established under Chapter VII
thereby facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid." See Fink, supra note 8, at 37.
97. S.C. Res. 871, supra note 88 9 (emphasis added). Fink likens the mandate of the
peacekeepers in Bosnia to that of the ONUC peacekeepers in the Congo. Fink, supra note
8, at 31.
98. S.C. Res. 836, supra note 66 1 9.
99. The language of this authorization followed that used in the earlier Security
Council Resolution 836, which had authorized peacekeepers to use force in self-defense to
ensure their freedom of movement within certain 'safe areas.' See discussion below con-
cerning the authorized use of force to protect 'safe areas' and 'protected sites and popula-
tions.'
100. See generally S.C. Res. 1026, U.N. SCOR, 3601st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1026
(1995); S.C. Res. 998, U.N. SCOR, 3543d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/998 (1995); S.C. Res. 987,
U.N. SCOR, 3521st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/987 (1995); S.C. Res. 982, U.N. SCOR, 3512th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/982 (1995); S.C. Res. 947, U.N. SCOR, 3434th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/947 (1994); S.C. Res. 941, U.N. SCOR, 3428th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/941 (1994);
S.C. Res. 914, U.N. SCOR, 3369th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/914 (1994).
101. United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia.
102. S.C. Res. 981, supra note 66. This determination was reaffirmed in Security
Council Resolutions 990, 994, 1009, and 1025. See S.C. Res. 1025, U.N. SCOR, 3600th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1025 (1995); S.C. Res. 1009, U.N. SCOR, 3563d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1009 (1995); S.C. Res. 994, U.N. SCOR, 3537th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/994 (1995);
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of the Charter. As stated above, in the Secretary's report on the opera-
tion he made it clear that the previous resolutions relevant to the func-
tioning of UNCRO applied to the operation. This included resolutions
relating to freedom of movement and self-defense. 103 As UNPROFOR
had previously been authorized to use force in self-defense to secure
freedom of movement in Croatia, there seems to be no reason why
UNCRO would not also be covered by this authorization.
The operation that took over from UNCRO, UNTAES, was estab-
lished under Security Council Resolution 1037.104 In this resolution the
Security Council again stated that it was "determined to ensure the se-
curity and freedom of movement of the personnel of the United Nations
peace-keeping operation in the Republic of Croatia." 10 5  As with
UNCRO, the peacekeeping operation was established under Chapter
VII of the Charter. Although the use of force is not explicitly authorized
in this operation it was made clear by the Secretary-General in his Re-
port Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1025 (1995), that the op-
eration implemented should be able to use force, at least in self-defense.
He stated, in advising the UN on the type of force to be implemented,
that:
The force deployed must... have a mandate under Chapter VII of
the Charter, must have the capacity to take the necessary action to
maintain peace and security, must be sufficiently credible to deter
attack from any side and must be capable of defending itself. Any-
thing less than a well-armed division-sized force would only risk re-
peating the failures of the recent past.106
It is not clear what the scope of this use of force is and whether or
to what extent it included the use of force to ensure freedom of move-
ment. The absence of an explicit authorization allowing force to be used
in this manner indicates, however, that unlike the UNPROFOR and
UNCRO operations, the scope of the right to self-defense with regards
to UNCRO should be interpreted more narrowly. There does not ap-
pear to be any reason, however, why force could not be used to secure
movement required to carry out its mandated tasks, such as facilitating
the return of refugees. 107
S.C. Res. 990, U.N. SCOR, 3527th mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRES990 (1995).
103. Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Security
Council Resolution 981 (1995), supra note 86 118.
104. United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Sirmium.
105. S.C. Res. 1037, supra note 66.
106. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1025,
U.N. SCOR 1 22, U.N. Doc. S/1995/1028 (1995).
107. S.C. Res. 1037, supra note 661 1 1(d).
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C. Force Authorized to Protect 'Safe Areas' & 'Protected Sites &
Populations:' UNPROFOR & UNAMIR
In 1993, the critical situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina led the
Security Council to adopt two resolutions under Chapter VII creating
six 'safe areas' primarily aimed at protecting the civilian populations in
those areas. Under Security Council Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993, the
Security Council decided to ensure full respect for these areas. 0 8 For
this purpose the Council extended the mandate of UNPROFOR to en-
able it to deter attacks made against the areas. It further authorized
UNPROFOR:
[A]cting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including
the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas, in
reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties
or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate ob-
struction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of
UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys. 109
The Security Council also authorized Member States, acting na-
tionally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take
through the use of air power in and around the safe areas and in close
coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all neces-
sary measures to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its man-
date. l0 Subsequently NATO enforced the use of air power authorized
by the Security Council for "close air support" to protect UNPROFOR
personnel and for "air strikes" to enforce respect for the safe areas.
However, it is clear that UNPROFOR, in its own right as a peacekeep-
ing operation, was authorized to use force in self-defense.
A parallel can be drawn in Rwanda where 'protected sites' were to
be established, patrolled and monitored by UNAMIR. In Resolution
918, the Security Council recognized that "UNAMIR may be required to
take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten pro-
tected sites and populations.""' Interestingly, as described above, no
reference is made to Chapter VII or the use of force in this context. It is
possible to argue that the "action" described does not include the use of
force, however, this seems unlikely. More likely is that the Security
Council did not believe it was required to explicitly authorize such a use
of force. As discussed above, support for this interpretation can be
108. Established under Security Council Resolutionw 819 and 824. See S.C. Res. 824,
U.N. SCOR, 3208th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993); S.C. Res. 819, U.N.SCOR, 3199th
mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/ 819 (1993).
109. S.C. Res. 836, supra note 66 1 9 (emphasis added).
110. Id. 1 10.
111. See S.C. Res. 918, supra note 66 j 4; S.C. Res. 925, supra note 89 5 (emphasis
added).
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found in the Secretary-General's report on Rwanda. 112 He stated that
the rules of engagement would not cover enforcement measures, but ac-
knowledged that UNAMIR might have to take action in self-defense to
protect sites and populations. 1 3 There is no reason why the use of force
would not be included in this "action."
Later, in a letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the
President of the Security Council, in which he reports on the breakdown
of the peace process in Rwanda," 4 the Secretary-General recommends
that a French-commanded multinational operation take place in
Rwanda under Chapter VII of the Charter. Interestingly, in this letter
he states that:
[I]t would be necessary for it to request the Governments concerned
to commit themselves to maintain their troops in Rwanda until
UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength to take over from
the multinational force and the latter has created conditions in
which a peace-keeping force operating under Chapter VI of the Char-
ter would have the capacity to carry out its mandate. 1 5
This indicates clearly that the Secretary-General did not regard
any use of force in self-defense by UNAMIR as requiring authorization
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In fact he seems to regard
UNAMIR as an operation falling squarely within Chapter VI of the
Charter.
D. Conclusion
As discussed above, there is clear evidence that 'self-defense' has
been, or is in the process of being, expanded to include the defense of
third parties: namely, civilian populations and humanitarian convoys.
Force has also been authorized to ensure the freedom of movement of
UN personnel. Although on its face this does not appear to be an ex-
pansion of the concept of self-defense, the purpose for which such force
is authorized in fact brings this use of force within the rubric of pro-
tecting humanitarian activities, and thus indirectly third parties. This
expanded use of force can be traced from the explicit authorizations for
the use of force in self-defense in UNPROFOR, to the implicit acknowl-
edgment that such force may be used in self-defense in UNAMIR. It is
not clear, with regards to future operations, what kind of authorization
or acknowledgement would be required (if any) to enable an operation
to legitimately use force in this manner.
112. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, supra note 90.
113. Id. 1 15.
114. Letter Dated 19 June From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1994/728 (1994).
115. Id. 1 12 (emphasis added).
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It is true that the uses of force outlined above can all be described
as being in 'defense of a mandate'. The use of force to secure freedom of
movement was to enable humanitarian aid to be delivered, 1" 6 the use of
force to protect safe areas was to enable the civilian population to be
protected, 117 and the use of force to protect humanitarian convoys ful-
filled, in an even more direct way, the mandate to provide humanitar-
ian relief.118 Indeed, it is not clear why the Security Council regarded it
as necessary to explicitly authorize the use of such force in 'self-defense'
in the first place, given that such force would have presumably could
have come within the already established inherent right to 'defend one's
mandate.' Whether the Security Council did so because it felt legally
bound to, or whether it did so merely because it wanted to make it une-
quivocally clear that peacekeeping operations could use such force, is
not evident. France, for example, was of the opinion that bringing the
UNPROFOR operation under Chapter VII, was in itself enough to
strengthen the peacekeeping's operation traditional right to self-
defense, without the need for explicit authorization.119
Ultimately it is not clear on what basis force can and cannot be
used by peacekeeping operations. Nor is it clear how far the concept of
self-defense can be pushed. At the moment it is apparently limitless,
able to encompass even the defense of others so long as a legitimate
mandate is being pursued. This, in effect, means that the use of force is
dependent on an operation's mandate, not on any clear and fixed rules
as to how force may and may not be used. The confusion and vagueness
that results from this approach must prevail in all operations where
clear authorization for the use of force is not set. The main problem
with this is that too much is left to chance. Troops are left to apply
force haphazardly, with authority to use that force being drawn, not
from a mandate, or any concept of an inherent right to defend third par-
ties, but through guesswork and reading between the lines. This is not
a desirable state of affairs: it leads to misunderstandings and possible
recriminations. Furthermore, while such use of force may come within
the concept of 'defending one's mandate,' that is not to say that it
should. There are many implications to allowing a peacekeeping opera-
tion to use more forceful measures in carrying out its mandate. Some of
these are discussed below.
116. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia for example.
117. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda for example.
118. In Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Rwanda for example.
119. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred and Seventy
Fourth Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 3174th mtg., at 13-15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3174 (1993) (remarks
of Ambassador Merim6e of France).
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V. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPANDED USE OF FORCE BY
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS?
Creating this kind of grey area between peace-keeping and peace en-
forcement can give rise to considerable dangers. In political, legal
and military terms, and in terms of the survival of one's own troops,
there is all the difference in the world between being deployed with
the consent and cooperation of the parties to help them carry out an
agreement they have reached and, on the other hand, being de-
ployed without their consent and with powers to use force to compel
them to accept the decisions of the Security Council.120
As the above passage indicates, there are many implications in-
volved in having a peacekeeping operation that can exercise a more ex-
tensive amount of force than was traditionally the case. The problems
that arise have two root causes. First, the use of force is unpredictable
because there is no understanding regarding the basis on which force is
used by peacekeeping operations or how force can and cannot be used.
Secondly, the use of force undermines the fundamental principles of
peacekeeping and confuses the concepts of peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement. As Fink has stated, the "blurring of peacekeeping 'guiding
principles' and peace-enforcement standards for use of force... jeop-
ardizes the safety of the peacekeepers and hampers the effectiveness of
their mission."12 1 Thus there are two issues that need to be dealt with
by the international community. First, when and how force is used by
peacekeeping operations needs to be clarified. It appears that the
United Nations has recognized this need and is currently undertaking
the complex project of revising guidelines for rules of engagement for
future peacekeeping operations. This is being done in light of the fact
that the use of force in peacekeeping operations and 'Chapter VII opera-
tions' is no longer distinct and separate. However, these guidelines are
unlikely to be completed for quite some time.122
Secondly, the international community needs to determine whether
it is in fact desirable to 'blur' the notions of peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement. Certainly once a peacekeeping operation uses force be-
yond that required for self-defense, the line between defensive and of-
fensive force becomes harder to distinguish. Indeed, if a peacekeeping
operation has a broad mandate, it is possible to argue that any force
used is exercised in defense of the operation's purpose. Yet it is not
hard to see how far removed this is from acting in strict self-defense.
120. Goulding, supra note 6, at 461.
121. Fink, supra note 8, at 31.
122. I have been given this information by a senior legal officer in the Office of the Le-
gal Counsel, United Nations Secretariat, New York. I was also told that the current
model rules of engagement, the mission specific rules of engagement and the revised rules
of engagement are confidential.
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For example, it is possible to argue that UNOSOM II was a peacekeep-
ing operation acting in defense of its widely drawn mandate, rather
than an 'enforcement measure.' Clearly, almost any forceful action
taken by a UN operation can be described as a 'peacekeeping operation
defending its mandate' if the mandate is wide enough. The danger with
this approach is that "once you allow a peacekeeping force to use force
in defence of its purposes instead of simply in defence of its personnel,
the action becomes an enforcement action."123 This is even truer if force
is used in defense of third parties. Because peacekeeping operations
and enforcement actions are so different, the legal significance of
merging the two operations should not be underestimated. 124 Some of
the problems and implications that have emerged due to the unpredict-
ability and confusion regarding the use of force by peacekeepers are dis-
cussed below.
A. Legal Implications
The most fundamental problem with authorizing peacekeepers to
use force is that the use of force is not compatible with consent and im-
partiality. This problem has legal and practical implications. If force is
authorized in order to allow peacekeepers to implement part of their
mandate, ultimately it tends to jeopardize other parts of the mandate,
which rely upon the consent and cooperation of the parties. Although
technically such force would only be used to support a peacekeeping
mandate under threat, the practical reality is that the use of such force
could not be carried out without endangering the peacekeeping opera-
tion as a whole. As the Secretary-General put it in his supplement to
the Agenda for Peace: "To blur the distinction between the two
[peacekeeping operations and enforcement measures] can undermine
the viability of the peacekeeping operation and endanger its person-
nel."125 Ironically, therefore, a mandate designed to protect such per-
sonnel under the banner of "self-defense" may ultimately do more harm
than good.
Aside from the legal difficulty of distinguishing between
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, there are other legal
issues which arise in this context. One such issue derives from the need
to have a clear legal understanding as to the nature of peacekeeping.
Ralph Zacklin, Director and Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General,
Office of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, has explained,
123. McCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 21, at 87.
124. Some of the practical implications of merging the two operations are outlined be-
low.
125. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on
the Occassion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR 1 35, U.N.
Doc. A150/60 - S/1995/1 (1995).
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Insistence on clarifying the nature of meaning of peacekeeping is
not merely a lawyer's obsession with clarity and legal definition; it
is necessary because the legal character and nature of the operation
has a direct bearing on the legal issues which arise and their reso-
lution.1 26
As emphasized in the introduction to this paper, lack of clarity in
an operation's mandate will give rise to legal difficulties when drafting
peacekeeping agreements between the parties (such as SOFAs) and
giving advice on the interpretation and implementation of such agree-
ments. More specifically, with regards to the use of force, if it is not
clear what authority there is for the use of force, difficult questions
arise about what the acceptable levels and uses of force are. As stated
above, it is the rules of engagement that govern the use of force in the
field.1 27 If the mandate of the Security Council is not clear, then the
rules of engagement cannot accurately reflect the degree of force that
has been authorized by the Council. The importance of specifying the
authority for the use of force in order that it can be articulated in the
rules of engagement is crucial to establishing an operation with a clear,
purposeful, and attainable mandate. 128
Other more probing issues arise in this context: for example,. can
the peacekeepers use force in "anticipatory" self-defense when the use of
force against them while carrying out their mandate is foreseeable? Do
the customary requirements of necessity and proportionality apply to
an expanded form of self-defense in the context of peacekeeping? 129
These questions should not be left unresolved only to be 'answered' by
chance through future uses of force in the field. As sound reasons are
needed to explain and justify why force may be used in one situation
and not in another it is preferable to clarify the instances in which force
can be used before, rather than after, the event. Furthermore, it is bet-
ter to use legal reasoning to justify the use of force, rather than ap-
pealing to ad hoc and random arguments in any given situation. Such
legal reasoning is more likely to enable a consensus among Member
States to develop with regards to the use of force. As the future credi-
bility of the United Nations depends on successful peacekeeping opera-
tions the utmost attention must be given to these legal issues, and the
sooner the better.
126. Ralph Zacklin, Managing Peacekeeping from a Legal Perspective, in NEW
DIMENSIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 159, 159 (Daniel Warner, ed. 1995).
127. McCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 21, at 146-47.
128. Fink, supra note 8, at 46.
129. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1635-38 (1984).
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B. Political and Military Implications
While expanding the concept of self-defense to include a more of-
fensive use of force may be legitimate and cannot be regarded as illegal
or intrinsically 'bad,' such an expansion may lead to great political and
military difficulties when conducting operations. This is particularly so
if the differences between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement become
blurred. Some of these problems are outlined below. 130
It may be harder to get a host State or States to consent to a
peacekeeping operation if the "operation is perceived as liable to be
transformed into a peace-enforcement operation against one party
which initially accepted the deployment."131 Thus, peacekeeping may,
as a result, become an increasingly ineffective and useless tool of the
UN, with peace-enforcement left as the primary measure of resolving
conflict in the world. If this were to happen the UN would arguably
find itself less able to resolve disputes via conciliatory means.
It may be harder to get States to contribute troops to peacekeeping
operations if they may be involved in the use of coercive force. This
may be due to constitutional reasons. For example, neutral countries or
countries with constitutional limitations on getting involved in foreign
military involvement, may find it difficult to reconcile involvement in
such a force with their constitutional values or limitations.132 Alterna-
tively States may be reluctant to contribute troops for political reasons.
Clearly, there is a huge political difference between becoming involved
in a peacekeeping operation with the consent of a host State and work-
ing with the cooperation of the parties as opposed to taking sides in a
conflict and imposing Security Council resolutions by the use of force.
States will have to pay much greater regard to their domestic and for-
eign policies before deciding to become involved in operations that may
entail forceful measures. This is primarily because a State could only
justify risking the lives of its military personnel if it had a significant
national interest in the conflict.
It follows then, that in an enforcement operation States with a
vested interest in the matter are more likely to get involved than neu-
tral States. Thus, not only are peacekeeping operations that use force
less likely to retain the consent and impartiality of the parties (princi-
ples they traditionally espoused), but they may no longer attract the
neutral States that they want and need for an operation to be viewed as
130. See also Lalande, supra note 76; Connie Peck, Summary of Colloquium on New
Dimensions of Peacekeeping, in NEW DIMENSIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 181 (Daniel Warner
ed., 1995).
131. Lalande, supra note 76, at 78.
132. Neutral countries include Austria, Switzerland, Finland or Sweden. Countries
with constitutional limitations on foreign military involvement include Japan and Ger-
many.
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impartial by the host State. The national make-up of operations may
inadvertently aggravate the conflict, where for example it is a dispute
based on ethnic or religious grounds.
In military terms there is a vast difference between a peacekeeping
operation and peace-enforcement measures. This is particularly true of
the military conduct and command structure of the operation and how
it is equipped. For example, the way in which force can be used and the
rules of engagement vary greatly according to the type of operation that
is undertaken. Furthermore, a peacekeeping operation may be author-
ized to use force but, in reality, not be equipped to do so. Thus if it does
try to use force it may leave itself exposed to more forceful attacks to
which it cannot reply. Leaving the use of force to Member States who
can 'support' the peacekeeping operation using 'all necessary measures'
is unlikely to resolve the problem. Peacekeepers are still more likely
bear the brunt of any forceful retaliation. 133
The relations between all the parties in peacekeeping operations,
as opposed to the relations in an enforcement operation, are different.
In a peacekeeping operation everyone works together in a conciliatory
atmosphere of cooperation. In peace-enforcement all parties are adver-
saries and the mission is in a position of authority. It is not realistic to
expect that a peacekeeping operation based on consent and impartiality
would be able to retain those qualities if force was used against parties
in a conflict. The very basis upon which peacekeeping is founded is un-
dermined by allowing an expansive use of force to take place.
On a more theoretical level, conflicting concepts of peacekeeping
and peace-enforcement may "lead to confusion, uncertainty and ambi-
guity in the minds of policy makers currently designing the shape of
their countries' involvement in future peacekeeping operations."13 For
example, policies may be designed which limit a country's involvement
in future peacekeeping operations because of concern about what kind
of operations are being instigated by the UN. A good example of this is
in the U.S. where, in response to the events in Somalia, President
Clinton issued a Presidential Decision Directive which severely limited
the future role of U.S. troops in peacekeeping operations. 135
A more ethereal effect of the lack of a clear-cut distinction between
a peacekeeping operation and peace-enforcement is that it makes it ex-
133. Goulding, supra note 38, at 10.
134. Lalande, supra note 76, at 80.
135. See Statement by the Press Secretary on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,
30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 998 (May 5, 1994). The United States will now only par-
ticipate where there have been grave threats to international peace and security, major
disasters which require relief, or gross violations of human rights. U.S. troops would
most likely be under U.S. command. See Fink, supra note 8, at 46; Steven J. Lepper, The
Legal Status of Military Personnel in United Nations Peace Operations: One Delegate's
Analysis, 18 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 359, 366 (1996).
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tremely difficult for the press and the general public at large, to com-
prehend the role, nature and purposes of future UN peacekeeping op-
erations. The importance of this problem should not be underesti-
mated. Public opinion, which is sharply influenced by the press, may be
decisive in determining whether action is taken in a humanitarian cri-
sis and in determining whether a State gets involved or not.
VI. CONCLUSION
The erosion of the fundamental principles of peacekeeping occurs
when force is authorized to such a degree that it can be used to protect
third parties and carry out any part of a broad mandate. Such use of
force threatens the basis of successful peacekeeping and does not neces-
sarily lead to better results. While the concept of self-defense has been
deemed to include 'defense of one's mandate', the continued expansion
of this concept, in order to give peace-keepers even greater enforcement
powers, is not a good idea for the legal, political and military reasons
described above. It is time for the United Nations to accept that it must
"either maintain a neutral role with consent of parties to the conflict in
future peacekeeping operations, or be prepared to encounter increasing
threats to the safety of its peacekeepers and be ready to exercise a level
of force beyond the traditional legal meaning of self-defense." 136 In
other words, it must choose between peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement as its two major methods of conflict resolution.
However, if recent uses of force (as discussed in this paper) are to
be regarded as a legitimate expansion of the concept of self-defense, it is
essential that the legal basis for such force and the extent to which it
can be used, be definitively clarified. It is in the interest of everyone,
the UN, the host and contributing States, the troops who risk their
lives, and the public at large, that the extent to which peacekeeping
troops may become involved in a conflict is made clear. It is only with
this kind of clarification that an extensive use of force by a peacekeep-
ing body will remain, in any sense, palatable with the goals and pur-
poses of peacekeeping. The fundamental principles of peacekeeping
were developed and based on sound legal and practical reasoning. They
should not be done away with without serious reflection about what the
possible consequences might be.
136. Fink, supra note 8, at 45.
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CONSTITUTIONALISM UNDER CHINESE
RULE: HONG KONG AFTER THE
HANDOVER
MICHAEL C. DAvIs*
I. INTRODUCTION
With nearly two years having passed since the founding of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) it is a good time to
assess Hong Kong's constitutional and human rights prospects. The
1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration set Hong Kong aside for a unique
Chinese experiment with the fundamentals of modern liberal constitu-
tional government.' In the 1984 agreement providing for the return of
Hong Kong to China, Hong Kong was promised democracy, human
rights and the rule of law, along with a "high degree of autonomy" un-
der China's "one country, two systems" formula. 2 With the July 1997
handover, after thirteen years of preparation, the final phase of exe-
cuting this agreement commenced. The people of Hong Kong and the
world are watching to see if China's solemn commitments to set up a
regime of liberal human rights and democracy within an authoritarian
national system are carried out. While the transfer of sovereignty in
Hong Kong on July 1, 1997 went relatively smoothly, tension between
real power, reflected in China's perceived national imperatives, and the
aspirations of liberal constitutionalism and autonomy remain and will
shape the Hong Kong constitutional experiment. This tension is ex-
amined in the current essay.
The Hong Kong project highlights the demanding task of con-
* Professor of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong (mcdavis@cuhk.edu.hk). A special
thanks to Thomas Eldert for his excellent research assistance. A further thanks for the
benefit of comments given in regard to earlier versions of this article presented as a ple-
nary talk at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Seoul,
South Korea, August 1997 and for a round-table panel at the Annual Meeting of the Asso-
ciation of Asian Studies, Washington, DC, March, 1998.
1. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question
of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1371 , UK-PRC [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
The promises of the Joint Declaration were stipulated in Article 3 (12) to be included in
the HKSAR's constitution, the Basic Law. Id. at 1372.
2. Id. at 1371; People's Republic of China: the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the Peoples' Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1511,
1529 [hereinafter Basic Law].
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structing an adequate regime to secure autonomy and liberal human
rights in a hostile national environment. In this regard, it is important
to note that the nature of that national environment has changed from
that envisioned in the Joint Declaration. The original design of the
Joint Declaration seemed fundamentally concerned with the theoreti-
cally worthy task of separating a local liberal capitalist system from a
Marxist national system. The advent of the free market in China means
this project now may simply distinguish an authoritarian capitalist sys-
tem on the mainland from an aspiring liberal capitalist or even soft-
authoritarian one in Hong Kong.
The success of Hong Kong's model will have enormous implications
for both Hong Kong and China. A successful Hong Kong, under the
commitments in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, would alone be a
sufficient basis for this demanding constitutional effort. However, it is
important to remember that this success will not only work to China's
economic benefit, but may also afford a laboratory for China's ongoing
political reform process. The Joint Declaration will certainly raise the
high water mark for securing the benefits of human rights, liberty and
democracy in Chinese society. Hong Kong's money and its rule of law,
as well as its political and social values, are already traveling across the
very porous Sino-Hong Kong border. Viewed internationally, Hong
Kong is a major player in the global economic order and will be watched
by its many trading partners. They will be watching to see if Hong Kong
is a truly autonomous open community, which can be relied upon in the
conduct of external relations. This is the high hope of the Hong Kong
promise and of Hong Kong's service to China.
This essay consists of three substantial parts. The first part ad-
dresses the basic constitutional order and its evolving commitments. Af-
ter concluding that the Sino-British Joint Declaration includes a com-
mitment to liberal constitutionalism, this part assesses the health of
three key liberal constitutional elements, including sections on democ-
racy, human rights and the rule of law. Both the Hong Kong Basic Law
and subsequent transition and post-handover policies and practices are
addressed. The remaining parts of this essay offer analysis of two key
areas of concern, or what might be considered the main challenges fac-
ing Hong Kong in the implementation of its promised liberal constitu-
tional order. These include the emergence of a competing political
model evident in a "Singaporean" vision for Hong Kong, and the chal-
lenges associated with autonomy. The first of these relates to an eco-
nomic paradigm, offered in competition to the liberal one discussed
herein, that may animate current government policies and undermine
this constitutional commitment. The final part analyzes the constitu-
tional politics of autonomy, both in terms of Hong Kong's domestic rela-
tionship with China and its international personality.
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II. THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS
The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, in addition to providing
for the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, essentially promised
Hong Kong a future with a liberal constitutional order and a high de-
gree of autonomy under the Basic Law. 3 As a general proposition, the
basic structural elements of liberal constitutionalism are thought to in-
clude (1) democracy with multi-party competition, (2) liberal human
rights protection, including freedom of speech, and (3) the rule of law,
including adherence to principles of legality.4 With the exception of
some limitations on the level of democracy, the Joint Declaration
promises all of these elements. In 1984, it was understood that any-
thing less would fail to secure adequate confidence in Hong Kong's fu-
ture. At that time a substantial portion of Hong Kong's people had es-
caped from the brutality of totalitarian communism, and the Chinese
leaders themselves had just escaped the national trauma of the Cul-
tural Revolution. While the Joint Declaration is general in character, it
leaves little interpretive space for vitiating the liberal capitalist inten-
tions of its drafters. 5 While the Chinese leaders may have been naive
about the political implications of the great social experiments embod-
ied in their open policy at home and in their Hong Kong policy, they left
little ambiguity as to the nature of their Hong Kong commitment.
Their commitment was for liberal constitutional government. Respect-
ing democracy, the Joint Declaration promises that the Chief executive
is to be chosen by "elections or consultations" held locally and that the
legislature is to be chosen by "elections." 6 Regarding human rights, the
Joint Declaration lists the full panoply of liberal rights, of which more
than half relate to freedom of expression.7 It also guarantees the appli-
cation of the international human rights covenants. 8 The rule of law is
expressly secured by the continued application of the common law, the
independence and finality of the local courts, the supremacy of the Ba-
sic Law (which is stipulated to include the content of the Joint Declara-
tion), and the right to challenge executive actions in the courts, which
presumably includes the right to challenge the actions legal basis under
the Basic Law.9 By implication, this promised nothing less than a full
system of constitutional judicial review to enforce a substantial bill of
3. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1371-75.
4. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY & ITS CRITICS 223 (1989).
5. See generally Joint Declaration, supra note 1.
6. See id. at para. 3(4) & Annex I, art. I.
7. See id. at para. 3(5) & Annex I, art. XIII.
8. Id.
9. Id. at para. 3(3), (5), (12), & Annex I, arts. I-III, XIII.
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rights. In tandem with a degree of democracy and a high degree of
autonomy, the Joint Declaration committed China to liberal constitu-
tional government in Hong Kong.
The HKSAR Basic Law, enacted in 1990, lives up to these commit-
ments in many respects but falls ambiguously short in others. 10 As a
constitutional document, the Basic Law is the product of an extraordi-
nary five year drafting process.11 After multiple drafts and endless dis-
cussions a constitutional road map for the future HKSAR took shape.
While these discussions, engaged a wide range of ideas, Chinese offi-
cials did seek to constrain the outcome. They were cautious about
democratic development from the start.12 But at the final stage, before
approving the final Basic Law in April 1990, the 1989 Tiananmen dem-
onstrations in Beijing and the enormous supporting demonstrations in
Hong Kong left their mark. Although many key provisions were already
finalized in the February 1989 final draft 13 and remained unaffected by
Tiananmen, the 1989 demonstrations in Hong Kong shifted the para-
digm of China's Hong Kong policy from protecting Hong Kong from
China to the other way around.
China's basic political instincts to maximize control and this "Tian-
anmen effect" combined to produce the conservative Hong Kong policy
evident in the final Basic Law and China's transition practices. Both in
the Basic Law and in subsequent transition policies, a degree of erosion
from the Joint Declaration commitments has occurred. The following
sections consider each of the key liberal constitutional components dis-
cussed above as they have emerged in the Basic Law, the transition
process, and the post-handover politics of the first couple years of Chi-
nese rule.
A. Democracy
The erosion of the Joint Declaration commitments is especially evi-
dent with regard to democracy, where the Tiananmen effect was most
pronounced. The relevant provisions respecting democracy were not fi-
nalized in the first draft of the Basic Law published in 1988.14 The
10. Basic Law, supra note 2, at 1520-50.
11. This process included China's appointment of a 180-member Basic Law Consulta-
tive Committee (all Hong Kong residents), and a 58-member Basic Law Drafting Commit-
tee (of which 23 members were Hong Kong residents). Id at 1511.
12. See MICHAEL C. DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION IN HONG KONG, ISSUES
AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE BASIC LAW, 28-29 (1989) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFRONTATION].
13. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China (Draft)) [hereinafter Draft Basic Law], reprinted in DAVIS,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION, supra note 12, at 175-215.
14. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 28-29.
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1989 Draft Basic Law then adopted a very conservative model.' 5 After
the 1989 demonstrations, as Chinese leaders worried about Hong Kong
becoming a base of subversion, they sought to tighten the noose on de-
mocracy, insisting on retaining this very conservative evolutionary
model in the final Basic Law. 16 This model, respecting the election of
the first post-handover Legislative Council, allows the sixty-member
body to have only twenty directly-elected geographical seats, ten Selec-
tion Committee seats and thirty functional constituency seats (from
various professional and commercial sectors). 17 It is noteworthy that
this figure was worked out with the British as part of a convergence
plan to allow for the pre-handover Legislative Council to have only
eighteen such directly elected geographical seats in 1991 and twenty in
1995. With convergence, it was anticipated that those elected in 1995
would remain in office through 1997 until 1999.18 For the second and
third term, under the Basic Law, there will be an evolutionary process
expanding the number of directly elected geographical seats to thirty
(along with thirty functional seats) by 2004.19 For the period after 2007
a two-thirds contingent of the Legislative Council and the Chief Execu-
tive can amend the Basic Law providing for greater democracy in elec-
tion of the Legislative Council.20 The Chief Executive, after the first ap-
pointment, is to be selected by an 800 member Election Committee.21
The Basic Law declares that the "ultimate aim is . . . universal suf-
frage."22 By the late drafting stage as the leading democrats were
eliminated from the post-Tiananmen process finalizing the Basic Law,
this conservative model was adopted with little resistance. 23
15. See Draft Basic Law, supra note 13, at Annexes I and II.
16. Basic Law, supra note 2, at Annexes I and II.
17. Basic Law, supra note 2, at Annex II; Decision of the National People's Congress
on the Method for the Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Coun-
cil of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, adopted at the Third Session of the
Seventh National People's Congress on 4 April 1990, 1550-51 [hereinafter First Govern-
ment Decision].
18. Id.
19. Basic Law, supra note 2, at Annexes I and II.
20. Basic Law, supra note 2, at Annex II.
21. Id. at Annex I. The process for electing the Election Committee, largely through
functional constituencies, insures that conservative business and pro-China forces will
hold the controlling vote.
22. Id. at arts. 45, 68.
23. Martin C. M. Lee and Szeto Wah, the two leading democratic activists of the
1980s, served on both the Basic Law drafting and consultative committees. After leading
more than a million demonstrators under the banner of the Alliance in Support of the
Democratic Patriotic Movement in China in 1989, after the June 4, 1989 Beijing massa-
cre, they withdrew from these Basic Law committees. They attempted to resume their
positions when the temporarily suspended drafting process resumed in late 1989 but they
were refused entry. See Chronology of Major Events in PRECARIOUS BALANCE: HONG
KONG BETWEEN CHINA AND BRITAIN, 1842-1992 209-211 (Ming K. Chan ed., 1994) [here-
inafter Chronology].
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Any hope that democratic forces can use their foothold to expand
democracy is also tightly controlled by other provisions in the Basic
Law. Not only is there the two-thirds vote requirement to institute full
universal suffrage after 2007, but there are a plethora of other con-
straints on democracy. 24 As the Legislative Council is to take the lead
in democratization, these constraints mostly relate to legislative pow-
ers. 25 For example, for local legislative action members of the Legisla-
tive Council are required to get the Chief Executive's approval before
they can introduce bills involving expenditure or government policy. 26
Additionally, amendments to government bills and motions or bills in-
troduced by individual members of the Legislative Council require ma-
jority approval by each of two different groups of legislators: thirty from
functional constituencies and thirty made up of members directly
elected from geographical constituencies, and those chosen by the Elec-
tion Committee. 27 As if this obstacle course for democratic initiative
were not enough, the government argued, in challenging the newly en-
acted Rules of Procedure of the first post-handover elected Legislative
Council, that even amendments to government bills, proposed by legis-
lators, require the Chief Executive's approval. 28 The chance of avoiding
these constraints through amendment of the Basic Law is also blocked.
The power to amend the Basic Law is vested in the National People's
Congress (NPC).29 Even the submission of local proposals for amend-
ments requires a two-thirds vote in the Legislative Council, the consent
of two-thirds of the local NPC deputies, and the approval of the Chief
Executive. 30
After promulgating the Basic Law in 1990, China's policy of resist-
ing democracy persisted in the 1990s processes of transition and in
post-handover politics. By the early 1990s, influenced by the initiation
of direct election for eighteen geographical seats to the Legislative
Council in 1991, Hong Kong, under colonial rule, began to develop a
democratic political system, with numerous political parties across a
broad spectrum, an informed public and a vibrant press attuned to po-
litical coverage. 31 In October 1992 the then new Hong Kong Governor,
Chris Patten, put forth a controversial proposal for the last British
24. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 74 and Annex II.
25. Id.
26. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 74.
27. Id. at Annex II.
28. Angela Li, Justice Chief to Challenge Bill in Court; To Apply a Judicial Review
Shows Disrespect for the Legislature's Unanimous Decision, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 8, 1998, at 6; Margaret Ng, Restrictions Will Clip Legco's Wings, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 17, 1998, at 17.
29. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 159.
30. Id.
31. It is noteworthy that, Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, after leading the protest in
1989, went on to form and lead the political parties (now the Democratic Party) which
won the most popular votes in the elections at various levels held in the 1990s.
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Hong Kong election in 1995.32 This proposal aimed to further
strengthen the foundation for democratic political development by
maximizing the space allowed by the Basic Law electoral ratio.33 His
proposal allowed for nine appointed seats from the 1991 Legislative
Council to be replaced by broad-based functional constituencies that in-
cluded all working voters.34 It further provided that the Selection
Committee, anticipated in the Basic Law, for selecting ten seats in the
first post-handover Legislative Council, be made up of directly elected
members of the district and regional boards. 35 This substantially broad-
ened the franchise for two-thirds of the seats in the Legislative Council.
Chinese officials attacked this proposal aggressively. 36  They
seemed set to exclude certain elected democrats, who had been active in
the 1989 demonstrations, from the 1997 through-train. 37 After failing
to resolve the ensuing impasse through. seventeen rounds of negotia-
tions, both sides decided to go it alone. 38 The Patten proposal was en-
acted and followed in the 1995 election, setting the high point, to date,
32. The Right Honorable Governor Christopher Patten, Our Next Five Years, The
Agenda for Hong Kong, Address at the Opening of the 1992/93 Session of the Legislative
Council (Oct. 7, 1992).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. His proposal expanded elections and eliminated appointed seats to various sub-
Legislative Council district boards and regional councils. These elected bodies then made
up his Selection Committee for the selection of ten legislators, as specified in China's
transition legislation. By matching China's basic formula Patton hoped his full Legislative
Council would ride on the through-train to serve beyond the 1997 handover. There was
an interesting development after the handover, in addition to eliminating the Board
members prominent electoral role in the Legislative Council, China's Hong Kong govern-
ment re-introduced into Hong Kong Government some appointed seats to district boards
and even abolished one level of councils. Angela Li, Five Walk Out as Appointed Seats
Secure Approval, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 1999, at 6.
36. See Representative Government in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer,
1994)(reproducing the text of the White Paper presented to Parliament by the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty on 24 Feb-
ruary 1994) (representing the British account of the negotiations and their breakdown)
[hereinafter Representative Government in Hong Kong]; UK Accused of Breaching Trust
By Leaking Confidential Details, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 1, 1994, at 12-13 (con-
taining China's report on the breakdown of negotiations).
37. Democratic party members Martin Lee and Szeto Wah were excluded from the
Basic Law drafting and consultative committees. Both had led the 1989 demonstrations
in Hong Kong and were founders of the alliance in support of the Patriotic Democratic
Movement In China, which China has branded as subversive. Chronology, supra note 23,
at 208-10. In the course of the 1993 Sino-British negotiations over elections, Chinese offi-
cials repeatedly proposed a review formula that would allow them to exclude both Mr. Lee
and Mr. Szeto from the through-train. See Representative Government in Hong Kong,
supra note 36; UK Accused of Breaching the Trust by Leaking Confidential Details, supra
note 36.
38. Representative Government in Hong Kong, supra note 36; Linda Choy, Calls to
Release Minutes for Fair Analysis, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 1, 1994, at 4.
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for democracy in Hong Kong. 39
Objecting to the British Hong Kong actions, China started to roll
back these democratic developments. 40 China created a "second stove"
by appointing its' supporters to a large number of transition bodies. 41
These appointed bodies included several local advisory groups, and ul-
timately, for the transition process, a Preliminary Working Committee
and its successor, the Preparatory Committee.42 The Preparatory
Committee was charged with several transition functions, including the
selection of a 400 member Selection Committee. 43 This Selection Com-
mittee then chose both the first Chief Executive and a Provisional Leg-
islature. 44 The appointed Provisional Legislature, took office on July 1,
1997 and remained in power until April of 1998. The Provisional Leg-
islature was never mentioned in the Basic Law or the transition legis-
lation, concurrently enacted by the National People's Congress (NPC),
which specifies the electoral make-up of the first HKSAR Legislative
Council.45 Though it survived a judicial challenge raised immediately
after the handover, the Provisional Legislature appeared to clearly vio-
late the NPC transition legislation's specific electoral requirements and
the more general requirement that the legislature be chosen through
elections, specified in both the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration. 46
During its one year tenure, the Provisional Legislature enacted the
electoral law, under which the current Legislative Council was elected
39. See Jubilant Democrats Eye Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 7, 1995, at 1.
Fung Wai-Kong and Lok Wong, Democrats Dominate Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 19, 1995, at 1.
40. Representative Government in Hong Kong, supra note 36; UKAccused of Breach-
ing the Trust by Leaking Confidential Details, supra note 36.
41. Beijing Names New Advisers, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 26, 1999, at 1.
42. Chris Yeung, Players in the Power Game, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 2, 1995,
at 17.
43. Id.
44. Incumbent and Legco Losers Win Selection Fight; Qian's Pointer to Smooth Tran-
sition in Martin Lee's 'darkest day' since '89, While Governor Sickens, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 22, 1996, at 1; Chris Yeung, The Obligations of Office, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 14, 1998, at 21; Chris Yeung & Linda Choy, Tung Leads The Way; 'We are Fi-
nally Masters of Our Own House . . . We Must Put Aside Our Differences and Find Com-
mon Ground to Build Hong Kong Together', S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 12, 1996, at 1.
45. First Government Decision, supra note 18.
46. Since the court held that the Basic Law preserved the law in question, being
challenged by a criminal defendant, without need of the Reunification Ordinance, the
ruling upholding the legality of the Provisional Legislature was orbiter dicta. HKSAR v.
Ma Wai Kwan David & Ors, Court of Appeal, No. 1, 1997 330-31. See also Cliff Buddle,
Handover Body Facing New Court Test; Appeal Judges Ready to Review Landmark Rul-
ing on Validity of Provisional Legislature, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 6, 1998, at 8;
Cliff Buddle, Same Judges to Hear New Challenge to Legislature, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 19, 1998, at 5; Margaret Ng, Decision that Resonates, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Aug. 8, 1997, at 19.
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on May 24, 1998.4 7 The electoral method for this election was an ex-
tremely conservative version of the post-handover model specified in the
Basic Law, and the NPC Decision respecting the first government, con-
sisting of thirty functional constituency seats, ten Selection Committee
seats and twenty directly elected geographical seats.48 This conserva-
tive quality was evident in the narrowing of the nine functional con-
stituencies that Chris Patten's model had broadened to include all
working voters; functional constituencies were considerably narrowed,
such that only 230,000 voters from elite sectors made up the potential
size of the functional constituencies. 49 The Selection Committee, to fill
ten seats, required that the 400 members be selected by approximately
140,000 functional constituency voters, plus other designated local and
national political figures. 50 The twenty directly elected geographical
seats were structured through a proportional representation scheme to
limit the role of the democratic camp in the Legislative Council.5 1 The
directly elected seats were formerly based on one seat, one vote districts
where the candidate with the most votes prevailed.5 2 The new model
provides for three to five seat districts with one vote per voter, and then
employs a complex formula to distribute the seats to ensure some seats
for less popular candidates. 53 The end result is a government made up
of an appointed Chief Executive and a Legislative Council where an
elite minority of about 230,000 individual and corporate voters select
two thirds of the legislators.5 4 In this model the electoral process seems
to have considerably drifted from the Joint Declaration's liberal prom-
ises.
47. Legis. Council Ordinance, CAP 542 (Sept. 28, 1997).
48. Id. at arts. 19, 21 and 23.
49. Linda Choy & Chris Yeung, Uneven Response as Voter Drive Ends, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 17, 1998, at 1. Registration of 2.77 million geographical voters (70%
of those eligible) and 148,000 functional individual and group voters (about 60% of those
eligible) occurred. No Kwai-Yan, 290,000 New Voters Register in Campaign, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 18, 1998, at 4.
50. Week-long Nominations for Poll Body Set to Begin, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar.
9, 1998, at 6.
51. Quinton Chan & Linda Choy, 'List Voting' Lets Candidates Run as Independents,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 9, 1997, at 8; Greater Uncertainty for Key Candidates, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 2, 1998, at 6.
52. Margaret Ng, Democrats the Losers in Tung's Game Plan, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 19, 1997, at 29; Fung Wai-Kong, Pro-China Party Leader Calls for Propor-
tional Representation, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1.
53. In addition to favoring less popular pro-China candidates, this system has had
the effect of pitting pro-democracy candidates, both from different parties and within the
same party, against each other. Historic Poll a Fight Among Friends Revamped Multi-
Seat Battlegrounds Pit Allies Against Each Other in Scramble for Votes, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 23, 1998, at 6.
54. The use of corporate votes in functional constituencies has been cited as a poten-
tial source of abuse of this functional system, with some in the Real Estate and Construc-
tion sector being accused of setting up shelf companies which become corporate voters.
Gren Manuel, Tycoons Buy Extra Ballots, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 22, 1998, at 2.
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The design of this model seemed clearly aimed at keeping the
democratic camp in the minority; it successfully accomplished its' mis-
sion. With a relatively high voter turnout of fifty-three percent, the
various democrats, including members of three parties and some inde-
pendents, were given over sixty percent of the vote at the May 24, 1998
Legislative Council elections.5 5 Despite this resounding victory, demo-
crats were able to secure only one-third (twenty) of the sixty seats in the
Legislative Council. 56 Given that the ten Selection Committee seats
were a virtual give-away to the pro-China camp, and that ten functional
seats were awarded uncontested (nine to pro-business candidates and
one to a democrat), one might conclude that conservative and pro-China
politicians were practically given, through this conservative electoral
model, as many seats as democrats won through their landslide vic-
tory.57 After their victory, the democrats' attempt to secure passage of a
Legislative Council motion for a quicker pace of democratization was
predictably scuttled by split voting and other Basic law requirements. 58
All of this offers little optimism for democratization efforts. The
democrats are effectively left with only the moral force of their argu-
ment directed at highly resistant national and local governments, the
latter of which faces consequent legitimacy problems. Some have urged
that in the context of this legitimacy gap, and China's resistance to lib-
eralizing the formula for its so-called executive led local HKSAR gov-
ernment, it is wise to institute a ministerial system, thereby engaging
elected legislators in the government. 59 Given the moderate nature of
the democratic camp in Hong Kong this might work, though it is doubt-
ful that democrats will accept it as a substitute for democratization. In
the face of very moderate and responsible democrats the current con-
frontational approach by the government seems unwarranted. 60 One
55. Record Turnout Poised to Give Democrats Sweeping Victory, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 25, 1998, at 1.
56. Lessons of the Poll, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 26, 1998, at 18.
57. Jimmy Cheung & Joice Pang, Ten Take Office in Polls Walkover, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 25, 1998, at 1.
58. Chris Yeung, Democracy Debate Scuttled by Sparring, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 16, 1998, at 4. It is noteworthy that one leading democrat has even proposed that the
Chief Executive call a constitutional convention to address the demand for an increased
pace of democracy, a demand that seems unlikely to gain an affirmative response. No
Kwai-Yan, Call for Forum on Pace of Democracy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 10, 1998,
at 6.
59. C.K. Lau, A Search for Harmony, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 25, 1998, at 19;
Siu-kai Lau, Ministers in the Making, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 3, 1998, at 25. The
current system employs various high-ranking civil servants to run government depart-
ments and an Executive Council, made up of private sector appointees that advises the
Chief Executive. Such a ministerial system might become a kind of bandage to lend le-
gitimacy to the government in the absence of substantial democratization.
60. The moderate quality of the democratic camp is evident even in their willingness
to participate in this biased electoral system. Beyond that, their moderateness was dem-
onstrated after their election when they joined hands with conservative forces to form a
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can only hope that when political difficulties arise the wall of resistance
to democracy does not result in increased political conflict.
B. The Human Rights Structure
Considering human rights on a constitutional level, the rights
chapter in the Basic Law, on its face, appears adequate because it in-
cludes various rights specified in the Joint Declaration, and specifies
that any restrictions on rights are subject to the requirements of the in-
ternational human rights covenants. 61 This chapter, along with provi-
sions respecting interpretation and review, was finalized in the Febru-
ary 1989 draft of the Basic Law, and was thus not a product of the
Tiananmen effect. It was the product of substantial debate and revision
of earlier, less satisfactory drafts. Where rights took a hit in the Basic
Law were in provisions beyond the rights chapter allowing for applica-
tion of national law in cases of emergency or where the central govern-
ment determines there is "turmoil" in the region and in provisions
which require the enactment of local laws against "sedition" and "sub-
version."62 These provisions had the imprint of Tiananmen. With an
adequate rights chapter and such ambiguous terms in other sections,
rights protection will ultimately depend on interpretation in the proc-
esses of enacting and enforcing laws, especially in the exercise of review
power.63
Looking beyond the Basic Law, when considering the current
evolving human rights regime in Hong Kong, one discovers a surprising
vitality, though a plethora of threats.6 4 The vitality is a product of rich
public discourse and is evident in both cases and in the legislative proc-
united position on a six-point proposal to address the effects of the Asian economic crisis
in Hong Kong. Chris Yeung & Jimmy Cheung, Coalition, Donald Tsang Set for Show-
down, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 6, 1998, at 6.
61. Basic Law, supra note 2, at arts. 24-42.
62. Id. at arts 18, 23.
63. Any mainland role in delineating the boundaries of Hong Kong's rights protec-
tions is of concern. The mainland Chinese rights regime, is ideologically opposed to the
liberal one promised Hong Kong. It is said to have the following characteristics: 1) rights
are juxtaposed with duties; 2) rights are not considered inherent in humanhood but are
treated as the creation of the state; 3) welfare rights are emphasized over political rights;
and 4) instead of rights being a limit on the state, the state's interest are a limit on rights.
See generally R. RANDLE EDWARDS ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
(1986). (stating that the contradiction in the respective systems is the basis for the "one
country, two systems" model for Hong Kong).
64. Under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance enacted in 1991, the level of hu-
man rights litigation has been substantial. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, No. 59
(June 8, 1991) reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1310 (1991). See generally Johannes Chan, The
Hong Kong bill of Rights 1991-1995: A Statistical Overview in HONG KONG'S BILL OF
RIGHTS: TWO YEARS BEFORE 1997 (George Edwards & Johannes Chan, eds.
1995)(discussing various aspects of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights and the Basic Law).
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ess.65 In many respects, the 1984 Joint Declaration, and later, the
tragic events at Tiananmen, stimulated a great deal of self-reflection
about human rights in Hong Kong's political culture. 66 With the han-
dover on the horizon, there was a degree of urgency, and Hong Kong's
people rose to the occasion. Though there were many menacing actions
by Chinese officials before the handover, and recent retrograde steps by
appointed Hong Kong officials, Hong Kong's evolving rights tradition
may survive such pressures. Certainly if vitality is a measure of the
survivability of this rights tradition, there is room for hope.
The international character of the emerging rights regime is its'
most striking quality.67 Hong Kong is at a veritable crossroads of inter-
national human rights forces. China stimulated much of this energy by
including substantial human rights guarantees, the international hu-
man rights covenants, and maintenance of the common law in the Joint
Declaration. 68 Because of this, the 1991 Bill of Rights Ordinance (which
remains in force after the handover, minus certain key provisions) cop-
ies almost verbatim the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).69 When the Bill of Rights Ordinance was enacted, the
colonial constitution, the Letters Patent, was amended to include the
ICCPR.70 Under this rights regime the courts were called upon in the
last five years of colonial rule to exercise substantial constitutional ju-
dicial review power.7 1 Here again, the international character of the
rights regime was enhanced by frequent judicial reference to overseas
common law and European Union precedent. 72 After the enactment of
the Bill of Rights Ordinance the government, and the increasingly
democratic Legislative Council, in the last years of colonial rule, re-
formed many non-conforming colonial laws to better protect human
rights.7 3 Many of these reforms were especially important to secure
65. See id.
66. Id. See also HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONG KONG 1-2 (Raymond Wacks, ed., 1992).
67. See generally Michael C. Davis, Adopting International Standards of Human
Rights in Hong Kong, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES: LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL,
AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 168 (Michael C. Davis, ed., 1995) (discussing the impact of
international standards, practices and values on human rights legislation).
68. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3(5) and Annex I, art. XIII.
69. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, No. 59 (1991) reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1310
(1991); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
70. Hong Kong Letters Patent, No. 2 1991, reprinted in PUBLIC LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A HONG KONG SOURCEBOOK 19 (Andrew Byrnes and Johannes Chan eds., 1993).
71. See Chan, supra note 64.
72. See R v. Sin Yau Ming [1992] 1 H.K.C.L.R. 127, at 141-42 (CA) (specifying at
length the various foreign sources to be considered, including other common law jurisdic-
tions and the European Union cases under the European Convention on Human Rights).
73. The amended laws included the: 1) Societies Ordinance (1992); 2) Television Or-
dinance (1993); 3) Broadcast Ordinance (1993); 4) Public Order Ordinance (1995); and 5)
Emergency Regulations Ordinance (1995). See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
1995 Critique, 235-36 (1996).
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equal protection and freedom of speech.7 4
This reform process engendered a rather positive political environ-
ment for human rights protection, with substantial media coverage and
legislative consultation over proposed bills. During the last years of
colonial rule the largest local threat to rights development was the
rather conservative character of the evolving human rights jurispru-
dence and the ominous open hostility of several members of the then
highest local court, the Court of Appeals, to the Bill of Rights Ordi-
nance. 75 In spite of this, there was a surprising vitality both in political
discussion and in the courts.76 In some respects, the court's conservative
character may have served to reduce Chinese official hostility to the
rights regime. Subsequent to the handover, the Chinese government
announced it would continue to file reports on behalf of Hong Kong un-
der the international human rights covenants. Though it appears that
the local producers of these reports will follow a policy of keeping them
secret and not consulting with the Hong Kong public until after they
have been reviewed by officials in Beijing. 77
There is, however, considerable cause for pessimism about human
rights, evident in developments following the final handover process.
The initial flurry of activity relating to interpretation and implementa-
tion of human rights under the HKSAR regime has been disheartening.
The initial actions arose out of the Basic Law stipulation in Article 160
74. Several laws were passed or amended in this period to address the issue of dis-
crimination against women, including a 1994 ordinance allowing the inheritance of land
by women in the new territories, the 1995 sex discrimination ordinance, the 1995 equal
opportunities ordinance, and extension of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to Hong Kong. Lawyers Committee for Hu-
man Rights, 1996 Critique, at 260-61. Despite these steps forward, more comprehensive
equal opportunity law proposals suggested by then legislator Anna Wu, were rejected by
the government. See Anna Wu, Why Hong Kong Should Have Equal Opportunities Legis-
lation and a Human Rights Commission, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES 185-
202 (Michael C. Davis, ed., 1995).
75. In a 1995 survey of Hong Kong court cases that raise the Bill of Rights issue, well
under one-third of the challenges were successful. See Chan, supra note 64, at 7. In the
last years of colonial rule, several members of the highest local court, the Court of Appeal,
expressed reservations about the Bill of Rights Ordinance, one even going so far, as the
Chair of the Local Judges Association, to file a critical report. Connie Law, Top Judge
Condemns Rights Bill, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 14, 1995, at 2; Benjamin Liu, The
Past, the Present, and the Future of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, reprinted in
CHAN, supra note 64, at 183; Margaret Ng, These Men Must Guard Our Liberty, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 31, 1996, at 21.
76. On the popular front, tens of thousands of Hong Kong people continued after the
handover to attend the June 4th Tiananmen memorial demonstrations in a public park.
Linda Choy & No Kwai-Yan, Tiananmen Sorrow Undimmed, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
June 5, 1998, at 1.
77. Jane Moir, Secrecy Over Rights Report Condemned, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Apr. 19, 1998, at 2. China has signed both of the two leading international human rights
covenants, though neither has been ratified. Beijing to Sign UN Rights Pact in Autumn,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 22, 1998, at 1.
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that the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC)
could determine existing laws to be in contravention of the Basic Law,
and therefore invalid. Assisted by its transition Preliminary Working
Committee, and later the Preparatory Committee, China proceeded to
review all of Hong Kong's laws under this provision.78 This became a
vehicle to reverse the most important parts of the above noted law re-
forms, especially respecting reform legislation which Chinese officials
had earlier opposed.7 9 The use of Article 160 review to take away
rights, rather than protect them, became a source of Hong Kong anxiety
about future rights security.
Several of the Beijing handover reversals had serious implications
for Hong Kong. The most serious reversal related to the 1992 electoral
proposal discussed above. At the handover, Beijing set aside the mod-
erately democratic electoral law for the 1995 election and established
an appointed provisional legislature.8 0 The Beijing appointed Prepara-
tory Committee also recommended deleting several implementing pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and setting aside the reforms in
the public order and societies ordinances; this recommendation was
formally carried out by the Standing Committee of China's NPC.81
The actions of the local government and the Provisional Legislature
immediately after the handover further heightened concern among
rights advocates.8 2 Laws were pushed through by this appointed provi-
sional body with little regard for the deprivation of the rights presuma-
78. See Connie Law & Chris Yeung, PWC Asks China to Bury Bill of Rights, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 18, 1995, at 1. Ultimately approximately twenty-five laws, including
the electoral laws and key rights guarantees, were recommended for abolition or revision.
Linda Choy & No Kwai-Yan, Tung In Talks Pledge as Laws Voted Down, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 2, 1997, at 1; Chris Yeung, China Ignores UK to Change Laws, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 24, 1997, at 1.
79. See Michael Davis, et al., Human Rights in Hong Kong: The Year of Transition, in
CHINA AND HONG KONG IN TRANSITION CH. 12 (Joseph W. Dellapena, ed., forthcoming
1999).
80. Legis. Council Ordinance CAP 542 (Sept. 28, 1997). See Davis, et al., supra note
79.
81. Yeung, supra note 78, at 1.
82. On July 1, the provisional legislature passed the reunification bill, which gave le-
gal effect to 13 bills that had been drafted by the appointed provisional legislature over
the border in Shenzhen in the months prior to the handover. These bills included
amendments to the 1992 Societies Ordinance and the 1995 Public Order Ordinance, re-
ducing protection of the freedom to assemble and to protest. The reunification bill was
followed by the legislative provisions (suspension of operations) bill, which froze and even-
tually scrapped pre-handover labor laws, including a bill protecting the right to collective
bargaining as stipulated in International Labor Organization Conventions 87 and 88.
Furthermore, the bill removed key elements of the 1991 Bill of Rights Ordinance, claim-
ing that it violated the Basic Law. This alleged violation was never explained. The Bill of
Rights Ordinance is a nearly verbatim adoption of the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights, which is guaranteed in the Basic Law. See Davis, et al., supra note
79.
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bly secured under the Basic Law. While most rights and freedom of
speech are still protected in Hong Kong, there is cause for concern about
the roll-back of reform.83 As noted above, this Beijing appointed Provi-
sional Legislature also passed a very conservative electoral law that
guaranteed to reduce the democratic camp to a minority position. Be-
cause such electoral law deprives Hong Kong residents of substantial
democratic rights, the isolating of the democratic camp throughout the
transition is especially troubling .84
The post-handover period saw a whole list of other retrograde leg-
islative steps. The Provisional Legislature enacted new laws regarding
public order and societies. These laws contain ominous provisions with
respect to "national security".85 The provisional Legislature also en-
83. While free speech rights are generally protected in Hong Kong, areas of emerging
concern still arise. For example, empowering police to protect "national security" has
given rise to some ambiguous areas under vague guidelines. Sharon Cheung & Angela Li,
Ousted Legislators Express Concern at Protest Rules, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 19,
1997, at 6; Stella Lee & Angela Li, Security Ban on Freedom Rallies, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 19, 1997, at 1. There has been a noticeable increased aggressiveness of the
police as they enforce public order during demonstrations. Yulanda Chung & Clifford Lo,
Qiao Protestors Try to Storm Barricades, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 12, 1998, at 8;
Stella Lee, Democrat Criticises 'Hard-line' Policing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 26,
1998, at 4. A primary concern for the police is to protect mainland officials from protests.
An example of one method occurred when the police played loud music to drown out pro-
test noise. Stella Lee, 'No Penalty' for Beethoven Protest Officer; Complaint Initially
Backed but Council Recommends Against Punishment Say Sources, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 6, 1998, at 2; Stella Lee & No Kwai-Yan, Police Clash with Anti-Jiang Demon-
strators, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 2, 1998, at 2. Pro-Beijing political figures have
also occasionally raised cause for concern. The recent situation where leading pro-Beijing
politician Xu Simin verbally attacked the local public broadcaster, RTHK, is a case in
point. Specifically, in March, 1998, Mr. Xu used the occasion of the meeting of the Chi-
nese People's Political Consultative Committee in Beijing to express concern that RTHK
was too critical of the government. Chiefs 'Failed' RTHK in Free Speech Debate, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 6, 1998, at 6; Linda Choy & Chris Yeung, Tung Sparks RTHK
Autonomy Fears; Government Policies Used to be Positively Presented Says Chief, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 5, 1998, at 1. It is noteworthy that officials in Beijing indi-
cated that this is a matter for Hong Kong and encouraged Hong Kong NPC and CPPCC
deputies not to meddle in Hong Kong's local affairs. Linda Choy, Xu's Attack on RTHK
Dismissed, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 8, 1998, at 4; Linda Choy, HKDeputies Warned
Not to Meddle; Jiang Tells NPC Delegation They Must Stay Out of SAR Government Af-
fairs, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 10, 1998, at 1. A similar criticism was leveled by
Beijing at local NPC delegates when they criticized a court decision in 1999. Kwai-Yan
No, 'Keep Quiet'Call to Local NPC Deputies, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 1999, at 4.
84. Leading democrats continue to be refused the right to enter the mainland that is
accorded all other Hong Kong Chinese. Angela Li & Genevieve Ku, Twelve Still Face
Travel Ban on Mainland, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 6, 1998, at 9.
85. Margaret Ng, Threat to Our Civil Rights, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 11, 1997,
at 23; Joice Pang, National Security 'Knife Hanging Over Us, Activists Tell of Fears SAR
Government Could Use Changes In Laws As Pretext to Bar Those It Dislikes, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 16, 1997, at 3; Chris Yeung, Restraints on Protests and Political
Finding Relaxed; 11 Changes But Future Government Stands Firm on National Security,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 16, 1997, at 1. The only positive event relating to national
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acted a law that deprives mainland children of local Hong Kong perma-
nent residents of their immediate right of entry into Hong Kong, that
guaranteed reducing the Basic Law right of residence; this law applied
retroactively.8 6 In addition, the Provisional Legislature voted to sus-
pend (for further study) labor rights ordinances and provisions extend-
ing the Bill of Rights Ordinance to include private violations. 87 These
laws were enacted by the previous elected Legislative Council in its fi-
nal days.88 The "study" ultimately resulted in the full suspension of
nearly all of the labor rights protections and the right for private ac-
tions under the Bill of Rights provided by pre-handover legislation. 89 All
of this adds up to a rather crass disregard of rights protection and por-
tends a rather ominous future.
C. Rule of Law
Whether the Basic Law falls short of the Joint Declaration's re-
quirements regarding human rights depends a great deal on interpreta-
tion and the institution of constitutional judicial review. On their face
the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law implicitly require the exercise
of constitutional judicial review under the Basic Law. 9o Both docu-
ments require supremacy of the Basic Law, maintenance of the common
law system, and independence and finality in the local courts. 91 These
general requirements, now fully embodied in the Basic Law, would not
security is that the government has not yet carried out the Basic Law Article 23 require-
ment to enact a subversion law. May Sin-Mi Hon, Subversion Law Will Not Be Rushed, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, June 30, 1998, at 1.
86. Sin-Mi Hon, supra note 85, at 1; May Sin-Mi Hon & Angela Li, Abode Status Bill
Gets Vote of Approval; Legislators Ignore Growing Fears of Court Challenge to Endorse
Government Move, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 10, 1997, at 1.
87. The elected Legislative Council enacted several laws in the final hours of the pre-
July 1, 1997, session, but the provisional legislature suspended them for further study
until October 31, 1997. The suspended laws included labor laws that protect workers
rights to collective bargaining-, forbid discrimination against workers for union activities;
and a general law that extends the Bill of Rights to include private actions. Genevieve
Chan, Activists in Last-ditch Bid to Save Labour Laws, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 15,
1997, at 6; Angela Li, et al., Protestors Invade Gallery But Fail to Thwart Snub to Dis-
banded Legco; Pre-July I Laws Frozen, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 17, 1997, at 1.
88. See Davis, et al., supra note 79.
89. Jimmy Cheung, Vote Overturns Amendments to Bill of Rights, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 26, 1998, at 6. See also Margaret Ng, Wrong Way on Rights, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 23, 1998, at 21.
90. The Joint Declaration guarantees the maintenance of the common law system,
the independence and finality of the local courts and the right to challenge the executive
in the courts. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at Annex I, arts. 2, 3 and 13. The Basic
Law includes the same requirements in addition to various detailed requirements com-
mon to common law systems respecting the judiciary. Basic Law, supra note 2, at arts. 2,
8, 17, 80-96 and 158.
91. Id. See also id. at art. 11.
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allow less.92 Article 158 of the Basic Law specifically vests the power of
interpretation of the Basic Law in the Standing Committee of the NPC.
However, the Article further specifies that the Standing Committee
shall authorize local courts, when adjudicating cases, to interpret those
provisions which are "within the limits of the autonomy of the Region"
and "other provisions."93  Under further provisions in Article 158, if
courts are confronted with the interpretation of provisions, which are
the responsibility of the Central People's Government or concern lo-
cal/central relations, then they must refer the matter to the Standing
Committee of the NPC.94 The Standing Committee, upon such referral,
then decides the matter with the advice of the Committee for the Basic
Law.95
Basic Law Article 17 further specifies that the Standing Committee
can review newly enacted local legislation for conformity to the Basic
Law, again within the scope of central authority or local/central rela-
tions, and with the advice of the Committee for the Basic Law.96 Sym-
metry and common law practice suggest that courts have such review
power within the scope of autonomy, or in any other case where the
court determines that such referral is not required.97 As a further limi-
tation, under Article 19 courts have no jurisdiction over "acts of state
such as defense and foreign affairs."98 These are the two areas where
China retains power over the HKSAR. 99 The breadth of the HKSAR act
of state doctrine is yet to be determined. 10 0 Other than the Basic Law,
92. Id. at arts. 2, 8, 11.
93. Id. at art. 158. The reference to "other provisions" in the third paragraph of Arti-
cle 158 is not limited by the scope of autonomy.
94. Id.
95. The Committee for the Basic Law is provided for in NPC legislation enacted along
with the Basic Law. It is made up of six local and six mainland members. Decision of the
National People's Congress to Approve the Proposal by the Drafting Committee for the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the Establishment of the
Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Under the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Adopted at the Third Session of
the Seventh National People's Congress on 4 April 1990 (published with the Basic Law).
The Basic Law Committee was already appointed and in place upon the handover. Linda
Choy & May Sin-Mi Hon, Airport Boss Gets Senior Basic Law Job, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, June 28, 1997, at 6.
96. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 17.
97. In that the Joint Declaration requires independence and finality in the local
courts and the Basic Law assigns some review power, especially concerning matters of
central authority or local/central relations to the NPC Standing Committee, the Basic
Law appears to fall somewhat short of the Joint Declaration's requirements in this area.
98. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 19.
99. Id. at arts. 13 and 14.
100. One would hope that this exclusion of court jurisdiction will be rather narrowly
defined, perhaps with a scope roughly equivalent to the United States act of state or po-
litical question doctrines. However, this hope might be misplaced in light of a Sino-
British deal on the Court of Final Appeal which added the word "etc." to the phrase "de-
fense and foreign affairs."
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the only mainland laws that ordinarily apply, through local enactment,
in the HKSAR are those specifically listed in Annex III to the Basic
Law. 0 1
In the 1998 landmark judgment in the Ng Ka Ling case, the Hong
Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) declared quite clearly that it has the
power of constitutional judicial review over local Hong Kong legislation
and that it has the right to examine acts of the mainland's NPC for con-
formity to the Basic Law. 10 2 The Ng Ka Ling judgment arose out of a
challenge to a local Hong Kong immigration statute which severely in-
hibited the Basic Law guaranteed right of abode in Hong Kong for chil-
dren born to Hong Kong resident parents. 0 3 In exercising the power of
constitutional judicial review to overturn several provisions which
heavily burdened that right, the Court declared it would take a pur-
poseful and generous approach to interpreting constitutional rights
guaranteed in the Basic Law. 10 4 In the judgment, the Court also ex-
plicitly declared that the CFA would have to determine when, in decid-
ing disputed cases, to refer provisions respecting local-central relations
or matters of central authority to the Standing Committee of the
NPC.105 The court took a narrow view of when such referral was re-
quired and concluded it was not required in this case.
While this decision was widely applauded in Hong Kong for its firm
and unambiguous defense of human rights and the rule of law, there
was a very severe response on two occasions. Immediately after the
judgment was issued, leading mainland officials and "legal scholars", as
well as their local pro-China supporters attacked the part of the judg-
ment where the court articulated its right to "examine" acts of the NPC,
claiming the Court was putting itself above the NPC.106 They claimed
101. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 18.
102. Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, Court of Final Appeal, Final Appeal 14 of
1998 (January 29, 1999) [hereinafter Ng Ka Ling 1].
103. Article 24 of the Basic Law (the first Article in the chapter entitled "Chapter III:
Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents) provides that Hong Kong residents in-
clude "persons of Chinese nationality born outside of Hong Kong" of Hong Kong residents.
Under the Article, such residents are entitled, as are other Hong Kong residents, to the
right of abode and a permanent identity card. The suit was brought by several such chil-
dren claiming a denial of their basic right of residence under a newly enacted immigration
ordinance which required them to apply on the mainland for an exit permit. The practical
effect of such application process was likely to cause a lengthy delay, even years, of their
entry into Hong Kong. See Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 24.
104. While the courts assertive approach to protect the rule of law was widely ap-
plauded in Hong Kong, there was considerable public concern over the dangers of a flood
of mainland born people with this right which would result from the decision. Lau Siu-
Kai, Verdict Tips the Political Balance, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at 17.
105. The standing committee would then be advised by the Basic Law committee
when rendering such interpretation. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 158.
106. Mark O'Neill, Beijing Says Abode Ruling was Wrong and Should be Changed, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 9, 1999, at 1.
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the judgment had to be "rectified". 0 7 The HKSAR government filed an
unprecedented motion for the CFA to "clarify" the orbiter dicta in its
judgment declaring its power to examine acts of the NPC.108 This clari-
fication was granted in a second brief judgment in which the Court ex-
plicitly stated that it did not hold itself above the NPC, a judgment in
which the Court essentially restated its original position. 109 A second,
more serious attack on the Judgment and the Rule of Law occurred in
May 1999 when the government, after issuing a Report claiming the
Judgment would produce a flood of 1.67 million migrants into Hong
Kong, made a request to the Standing Committee of the NPC to inter-
pret the relevant provisions of the Basic Law, effectively overturning
the CFA Judgment. 11 As a result of the latter action, the finality of
judgments of the CFA in Hong Kong has clearly been called into ques-
tion and the Rule of Law has been seriously undermined.
107. See Margaret Ng, The Legal Perils of 'Rectification"', S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 26, 1999, at 19.
108. Cliff Buddle, et al., Judges Asked to Clarify Right of Abode Decision, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 25, 1999, at 1.
109. Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, Court of Final Appeal, Final Appeal No.
14 of 1998 (Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter Ng Ka Ling I]. In the original judgment the Court
had really not held itself above the NPC, but had merely indicated that it would imple-
ment the Basic Law as required by the NPC; it had not denigrated the NPC Standing
Committee's power to interpret the Basic Law. In the second clarifying judgment, the
CFA simply made this more explicit while continuing to uphold the pre-eminence of the
Basic Law. The Court concluded, "nor did the court's judgment question, and the Court
accepts that it cannot question, the authority of the National People's Congress or the
Standing Committee to do any act which is in accordance with the provisions of the Basic
Law and the procedure therein." Id. It appears that a Court created under the Basic Law
was merely upholding the priority of the Basic Law as required on its face. The over-
turning of local legislation implicates the standard separation of powers concerns of con-
stitutional judicial review. In addressing its relationship to the NPC, the Court appeared
to be merely giving priority, as a source of law, to the sovereign instructions of the NPC
reflected in the Basic Law. In the Second clarifying judgment, the Court explicitly sought
only to respond to confusion over "interpretations (which) have been put on part of the
court's judgment", and not to amend the judgment.
110. In late April the government eventually estimated the likely migration figure to
be 1.67 million. Chris Yeung, Court Gives 1.67 m Right of Abode, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Apr. 29, 1999, at 1. The government asked the Standing Committee to re-interpret
Articles 22 (which relates to Mainland control of people from other parts of China) and
24(3) (which specifies the residence rights of children born to Hong Kong residents) to ef-
fectively overturn the CFA Final Judgment. Chris Yeung, NPC Will be Asked to Revoke
Abode Rights for 1.5m Migrants, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 19, 1999, at 1. In doing
this, the government targeted for exclusion the children of Hong Kong residents who were
born before their parents became residents. The CFA previously upheld the right of such
children under Article 24. The government explicitly rejected the more legally acceptable
alternative of amending the Basic Law. The government's decision to undermine a Final
Court Judgment has produced strong condemnation from the Democratic camp, the Bar
and leading constitutional scholars. Michael C. Davis, Home to Roost, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 16, 1999, at 10; Angela Li, Uproar Sweeps Democracy Camp, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 19, 1999, at 3.
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When it comes to the rule of law in Hong Kong, there are several
troubling aspects of the circumstances surrounding this case. The most
blatent damage is reflected in the simple reality that final judgments in
Hong Kong, at least where constitutional rights are concerned, are sim-
ply not final. They are subject to being overturned by a combination of
local government and Mainland interference. This will certainly have a
chilling effect on courts."'i There is reason for real concern that the
Hong Kong courts will be faced with further political attacks by main-
land and pro-China forces in the future. This may lead to intimidation
and timidity in the Courts. There is specific concern that several of the
political attacks on the court's judgment were articulated by members
of the Basic Law Committee, the very committee which would be called
upon to advise the Standing Committee of the NPC when issues of Ba-
sic Law interpretation are referred.11 2 The members of this committee
showed little concern to maintain a judicial demeanor, leading to suspi-
cion that any future advice forthcoming from this committee will be of a
political, rather than legal, nature. The government's motion for clarifi-
cation raises further concern about the court's independence and final-
ity. The only positive aspect of this procedure and the resultant ex-
traordinary judgment is that the Court appeared to stick to its
substantive position in articulating its clarification.
111. Article 158 of the Basic Law designates the Hong Kong CFA to determine when
a matter must be referred to the Standing Committee. For the Standing Committee to be
asked by the government to offer an alternative interpretation in reaction to a final judi-
cial decision violated the guaranteed independence and finality of the local courts and the
procedures outlined in Article 158. Basic Law, supra note 2, at arts. 19 and 158. The
governments sidestepped the problem of a lack of specified power in the government to
make such referral by seeking an endorsement from the Legislative Council (which was
assured, given the process by which the majority of the Legislators were selected) and
asking the State Council to make the referral on its behalf. In referring the right of abode
case to the Standing Committee, the government took the position that the right of the
Standing Committee to interpret the Basic Law has no limits. The government's submis-
sion emphasized that the Standing Committee has the best grasp of the true legislative
intent. This emphasis on the privileged knowledge of the drafters appears to empower
Mainland leaders and their local Hong Kong supporters in a perverse use of a rather
questionable original intent doctrine. Under this view, neither independence and finality
in the courts, the provisions in Article 159 respecting Basic Law amendment, nor Hong
Kong's autonomy appear to constrain NPC Standing Committee action. Mainland leaders
and their appointed Hong Kong supporters, among local NPC delegates and the Basic
Law Committee, will take up the central role of giving meaning to the Basic Law. Such
interpretation of the Mainland NPC Standing Committee's power would seemingly, in the
face of local or Mainland government dissatisfaction, render the Basic Law a nullity, and
cannot be right.
112. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 158; Decision of the National People's Congress
to Approve the Proposal by the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region on the Establishment of the Committee for the Basic Law
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress, adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People's
Congress on 4 April 1990 (Apr. 4, 1990) [hereinafter Basic Law Committee Decision].
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Though the Court of Final Appeals has seemingly taken a firm
stand on constitutional judicial review there is plenty of room for timid
judges to shirk this responsibility and for the government to continue to
threaten the judicial bedrock of Hong Kong's stability. In addition to a
generally conservative human rights posture, judges may avoid their
responsibility through several routes. by: 1) claiming to avoid sensitive
political issues;113 2) too readily referring matters to the Standing
Committee under the above noted articles; 1 4 or 3) simply giving in to
official political pressure or intimidation. 115 The President of the Legis-
lative Council (and the then Beijing appointed Provisional Legislature),
Rita Fan Hsu Lai-tai, soon after the handover, had even argued that
legislation that has not been overturned by the Standing Committee of
the NPC under Article 17 of the Basic Law was presumptively constitu-
tional. 1 6 The concern with this negative presumption theory is that it
would undermine the entire system of common law review and repre-
sents a serious hazard to the rule of law in Hong Kong. Another hazard
would be for the Standing Committee to all too frequently interfere by
reviewing laws or overriding final judicial judgments, as has been re-
quested in the Ng Ka Ling Case.
Finally, the Rule of Law in Hong Kong has been continuously
threatened by the rather passive approach of the Hong Kong Secretary
for Justice, the government official charged with upholding the Rule of
Law and prosecutorial functions. The government has been rocked by a
series of criticisms concerning its commitment to the Rule of Law. 1 7
113. When a member of the Democratic Party was denied leave for judicial review to
challenge the legality of certain actions of the Provisional Legislature prior to the hando-
ver, the judge is reported to have described him as a pawn of the Democratic Party and to
have indicated that the court would not get involved in a political wrangle between the
Chinese and British governments. See Audrey Eu, Keep Politics Out of the Law, FAR E.
ECON. REV., July 10, 1997, at 34.
114. Michael C. Davis, Threat to Integrity, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 20, 1997, at
10.
115. In this regard it is ominous that the mainland Public Security Bureau already
got into the debate on the law respecting the residence rights of mainland children of
Hong Kong residents by indicating its view that the law did not violate the Basic Law.
Chris Yeung & Linda Choy, Beijing Backs Bill Deporting Thousands of 'II Children, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 15, 1997, at 1.
116. Specifically she noted the legislative obligation under Article 17 to report all
new ordinances to the Standing Committee; if the Standing Committee did not object to
the ordinance, (in that case the ordinance restricting the residence rights of Mainland
children of Hong Kong permanent residents) then she argued it was presumptively consti-
tutional. May Sin-Mi Hon, Public 'Can Judge Attempts for Help,' S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 14, 1997, at 6.
117. These included the failure to prosecute Xinhua for allegedly violating the privacy
act; the failure to prosecute Sally Aw, a prominent business executive and CCPCC mem-
ber, after she was implicated as a co-conspirator in the Hong Kong Standard corruption
scandal in which several others were convicted (the Secretary of Justice argued in part
that "the public interest" demanded that Ms. Aw not be prosecuted because she was the
head of a large corporation in financial trouble); the big spender case, in which the gov-
1999
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The government appears to continually take a passive approach to de-
fending the Rule of Law and seems determined to shy away from any
challenges to central authorities.1 18 The risk of further hazards await
additional post-handover experience. To the government's credit, it has
put in place a highly respected Chief Justice and the Court of Final Ap-
peal that provided the excellent judgment in the right of abode case dis-
cussed above. 119 But even good judges, in a politically unsupportive en-
vironment, may not save Hong Kong's human rights and rule of law
regime from the many potential hazards on the horizon. 120
ernment remained silent while a Hong Kong citizen was executed for crimes committed in
part within Hong Kong's local jurisdiction; the related case of the Telford Gardens mur-
der, where the government again remained quiet while a Mainland court tried and con-
victed a suspect for crimes committed entirely within Hong Kong's jurisdiction; and fi-
nally, with regard to the right of abode case, pushing for a clarification and the ultimate
overturning of the decision by the Court of Final Appeal, after speaking to leaders in Bei-
jing. The Secretary of Justice was reported to have actually discussed her plans to file the
clarification motion with the Chief Justice of the Court before the decision to seek clarifi-
cation was made public. As a result of the Sally Aw case and these various circum-
stances, the Legislative Council held a vote of no-confidence in the Secretary of Justice on
March 12, 1999, but the motion failed to pass after heavy government lobbying. Chris
Yeung, Doubts Planted Over Rule of Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 6, 1999, at 5;
Chris Yeung & Rhonda Lam Wan, Justice Secretary Survives Vote Despite Attacks on
Competence, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 12, 1999, at 1.
118. In one of the last ordinances proposed by the government for enactment by the
Provisional Legislature in April 1998 - the Adaptation of Laws Ordinance - the review of
certain acts of Mainland bodies was delivered a severe blow when certain Mainland or-
ganizations were exempted from the application of any laws that did not explicitly or by
necessary implication apply to them. This law exempts both mainland official bodies and
the local HKSAR government. The bill was widely criticized for exceeding the powers of
the Provisional Legislature, for violating Basic Law provisions specifying that Mainland
organs are subject to the HKSAR laws, and for essentially putting Mainland official bod-
ies above the law. The Mainland bodies to which this law applies seemingly include the
local branch of the New China News Agency (Xinhua), the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the
local PLA Garrison and the Chinese side of the Joint Liaison Group. Gren Manuel, Legal
Experts Fear Bill Will Make Mainland Organs Immune to at Least 14 Pieces of HK Legis-
lation: State Bodies 'Exempt for Laws', S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 29, 1998, at 1; Gren
Manuel & Felix Chan, Rights Monitor Fears 'Two Systems of Law,' Bar Lashes Out Over
Transfer of Privileges, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 7, 1998, at 1; Gren Manuel & Angela
Li, Courts Decide on Exempt State Bodies, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 8, 1998, at 6.
119. May Sin-Mi Hon & Patricia Young, Continuity in Choice of Top Appeal Judges,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 13, 1997, at 1; Chris Yeung, Andrew Li Named as Top
Judge, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 21, 1997, at 1. The Court of Appeal (under the
CFA) has also recently gained some credit by overturning local ordinances that prohibit
flag desecration. HKSAR v. Ng Kung-Siu, Court of Appeal, Magistry Appeal No. 563 of
1998, Mar. 23, 1999. This case is now on appeal to the CFA. With the recent intimidation
in the Ng Ka-Ling case there is cause for concern that the CFA may shy away from ruling
that flag desecration is protected as a matter of Freedom of Speech. Cliff Buddle, Defiling
Flags No Crime: Judges, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 24, 1999, at 1.
120. To the current court's credit, it has recently demonstrated a serious commitment
to open justice by adopting a report requiring a large number of civil proceedings, that
were previously held in chambers without public access, to be open to the public. Cliff
Buddle, Judges Unlock Doors of Closed Court Hearings, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 11,
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III. A COMPETING POLITICAL PARADIGM- THE SINGAPOREANIZATION OF
HONG KONG
To make constitutional sense out of the above policies and practices
it is important to consider the objectives that may underlie China's
plans for Hong Kong and to evaluate their internal consistency. This
section considers the political and economic ideas that shape China's
evolving Hong Kong human rights policies. The long-standing Chinese
official admonition that Hong Kong is to be an "economic," not a "politi-
cal" city, suggests the ideological source of Hong Kong's current human
rights tensions, and the political risks on the horizon.'21 There appears
to be a kind of Singaporean vision-authoritarianism plus liberal eco-
nomic policies and some commitment to the rule of law-evident in offi-
cial circles in China and the HKSAR.122 For the present analysis, I will
just briefly focus on some of the evidence of this vision and the difficul-
ties it offers for human rights purposes. 23 The general idea of this vi-
sion is that Hong Kong people should just concentrate on making
money and leave politics to China's chosen Hong Kong leaders. The
purveyors of this vision would have Hong Kong people avoid political
agitation and criticisms that might trouble the mainland regime and
concentrate on business and material wealth formation. That is, the
business of Hong Kong is business; politics should not distract people
from that. This view is consistent with the views of the local business
elite, who are being asked by mainland officials to run Hong Kong. Yet,
this view creates a considerable challenge to those who value democracy
and freedom.
The most striking evidence of the attempted Singaporeanization of
Hong Kong is purposeful concentration of political power in Hong Kong
in the hands of the business elite. Appointed Chief Executive Tung
Chee Hwa is one of the most successful businessmen in Hong Kong. He
has surrounded himself in the chief government deliberative body - the
Executive Council - with a predominance of conservative business and
pro-China people. 124 Similar appointees make up the local NPC delega-
tion and the Basic Law Committee that have seized center stage in the
1998, at 1; Cliff Buddle, Top Judges Back Changes in Full, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
25, 1998, at 1.
121. Warnings that Hong Kong not be turned into a political city were made by
China's then chief policy spokesman on Hong Kong, Mr. Lu Ping. Linda Choy, Lu Warns
Against Meddling, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 7, 1994, at 1.
122. See generally Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Sin-
gapore (1995) (discussing Singapore's political development).
123. A more thorough analysis of this aspect of China's Hong Kong Policy is taken up
in my recent article. Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism in Hong Kong: Politics Versus
Economics, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 157 (1997).
124. Chris Yeung, Tung Reveals His Top Team, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 25,
1997, at 1.
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right of abode row. A similar concentration of political power was also
reflected in the defunct appointed Provisional Legislature. 125 This rule
by tycoon is the rather stunning product of political appointments by
Beijing's allegedly Marxist regime. In the transition, both the Chief
Executive and the Provisional Legislature were chosen by a 400 mem-
ber Selection Committee which was itself chosen by the business sector
dominated, and Beijing appointed, Preparatory Committee. 126
By insuring a predominance of business elite in the now defunct
Selection Committee and Preparatory Committee, China insured a like-
minded first HKSAR government. 127 Throughout the closing years of
colonial rule, Chinese officials worked energetically to exclude the more
grass roots oriented Democratic Party from its various appointed advi-
sory bodies, though it allowed another grass roots oriented pro-China
party to have a minor role.128 As noted above, China has been especially
concerned with ensuring that popular democracy does not take hold.
This was the basis for objecting to Chris Patten's democratization for-
mula. The continued concentration of power in the conservative busi-
ness elite seems assured under the above noted electoral model slated
for the coming years. A legislative majority agreeable to Beijing is es-
sentially assured through the combination of narrow business oriented
functional constituencies and proportional representation in direct geo-
graphical polls. 129
This Singaporeanization is more widely evident on the rhetorical
125. With a makeup of 33 of the then incumbent legislators mostly from conservative
functional constituencies and parties, minus the democrats, plus eleven mostly pro-China
losers of the 1995 elections, the Provisional Legislature reflected a sharp swing to the
right and the pro-China camp in comparison to the previous elected Legislative Council.
Incumbents and Legco Losers win Selection Fight; Qian's Pointer to Smooth Transition is
Martin Lee's 'Darkest Day' since '89, While Governor Sickened, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Dec. 22, 1996, at 1.
126. Linda Choy and Fung Wai-Kong, Four Lesser Known Candidates Declared After
Selection Body Finalized: Race for Chief Executive Down to Eight Runners, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 3, 1996, at 1.
127. In the 150-member appointed Preparatory Committee, only about 15 (many of
which are from the pro-China camp) would be considered grassroots representatives. The
Preparatory Committee - The List of Members, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 29, 1995, at
6; Fung Wai-Kong, Committee 'Full of China Puppets,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 14,
1996, at 7 (reporting a Legislative Council motion condemning this). The Selection Com-
mittee, which was selected by a vote of the Preparatory Committee, had 400 members, of
which 100 were listed as grassroots, with the balance being business and professional.
Full List of Winners in the Beijing Ballot, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 3, 1996, at 4.
128. The popular Democratic Party was completely excluded from appointment to the
Preparatory Committee, which served as the foundation for the subsequent chain of selec-
tion processes culminating in the formation of the HKSAR government. Connie Law &
Louis Won, Warning of Threat to Autonomy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 29, 1995, at 5.
129. See Chris Yeung, Keeping a Tight Rein on Legco; 'It Will Be a More Fragmented
Body With No Single Political Party Able to Snap Up a Sizeable Majority of Seats, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 12, 1997, at 15.
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plane, in the rhetoric of mainland officials and their Hong Kong ap-
pointees. This rhetoric began to emerge in 1989 when mainland officials
began worrying about Hong Kong being a "base of subversion."'130 Many
of the above noted efforts to cut back on democracy, human rights and
the rule of law followed in the early 1990s. 131 But this rhetoric acquired
a more concrete "Asian values" and economic developmental message in
the late transition period. The notion of a politically inert and economi-
cally dynamic Hong Kong began to take shape in Chinese policy pro-
nouncements. A sampling of this rhetoric includes the following situa-
tions. In May 1994, China's then chief policy spokesman on Hong Kong,
Lu Ping, warned against attempts to turn Hong Kong into a "political
city;" China's Ninth Five-Year Plan in 1995 introduces an economic
partnership, while characterizing the political relationship as "between
a parent and a child."132  By 1996 Chinese officials were warning
against commemorative marches to remember June 4, 1989, personal
attacks on Chinese leaders, the spreading of rumors and lies, demon-
strations against the Chinese government or the advocacy of Taiwan
independence. 13 3 Although some of the latter warnings were later re-
tracted, the main emphases of these comments have persisted in the
post-colonial HKSAR government.1 34
China's appointed HKSAR leaders, charged with passing laws on
public order, subversion and sedition, have shown an alarming ten-
dency to pick up on some of these politically charged themes to advance
"national security" and restrain hostile international forces.135 The
130. In July 1989 the new Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin
warned that "the well water does not interfere with the river water" and the People's
Daily accused democrats Martin Lee and Szeto Wah of "subversive activities." See Chro-
nology, supra note 23, at 209 (providing a chronology of the history of Hong Kong).
131. See id. at 211-14.
132. See Willy Wo-lap Lam, Economy to Remain Separate After '97, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 8, 1995, at 1.
133. See Chris Yeung, Anti-Beijing Protests to Be Banned, Says Lu Ping, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, June 5, 1996, at 1; Chris Yeung, Britain to Take Action on Quian's June 4
Ban, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 18, 1996, at 1; Chris Yeung, Contradictions Cast a
Shadow; 'They (The Media) Can Put Forward Critic, But Not Rumors or Lies (or)... Per-
sonal Attacks on Chinese Leaders', S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 19, 1996, at 19; Chris
Yeung, Lu Clarifies Position on Press Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 6, 1996, at
1.
134. John Ridding, Tung Denies Plan for Crackdown on Dissent, FIN. TIMES, May 1,
1997, at 6. After the Handover, Mainland Foreign Ministry Officials said that the June 4,
1998 commemorative demonstrations posed no threat and would not affect Hong Kong-
Mainland relations. Linda Choy & No Kwai-Yan, Tiananmen Sorrow Undimmed, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, June 5, 1998, at 1.
135. The 1997 Public Order Ordinance allows police to object to demonstrations on
"national security" grounds, which is defined as "safeguarding the territorial integrity and
independence of the People's Republic of China." They are also allowed to take into con-
sideration whether Tibetan or Taiwanese independence was advocated. See Davis, et al.,
supra note 79. In August 1998, fears over "foreign speculators" were marshaled to sup-
port government intervention in the stock market and to give the Chief Executive greater
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above noted attack by local CPPCC delegate Xu Simin on the failure of
public broadcaster RTHK to support the government position is just a
more blunt recent local manifestation of this political line. The Chief
Executive has often emphasized alleged Chinese values to avoid con-
frontation, encouraging people to "talk more about our duties rather
than our rights."136 In early 1998, the Chief Executive reemphasized
that Hong Kong should not be an "anti-Beijing base."'137 The passage by
the Provisional Legislature of a law to set aside the protection of vari-
ous workers' rights in the first weeks of the HKSAR, further suggest
the intention of China's appointed Hong Kong leaders to impose a
strong business orientation on the new Hong Kong regime. 138 Likewise,
the elevation of expediency over the principles associated with the Rule
of Law in the right of abode row demostrates the ascendency of the Sin-
gaporean vision. This intention is also evident in the increased empha-
sis on the need to plan Hong Kong's economy. 139 This emphasis became
evident when the government established a new high-powered advisory
Commission on Strategic Development. 140 In the face of the East Asian
economic crisis, one would hope the movement would be away from the
East Asian developmental model. These various developmental argu-
ments have thus far been confronted by a well developed democratic
movement and a sophisticated free press.
The disturbing aspect of this ostensibly Singaporean orientation is
the lack of a coherent vision that may have animated some of the ear-
lier Asian developmental models, and the utter inapplicability of this
decision-making power. Tsang Plea for Global Purge of Speculators, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 9, 1998, at 1.
136. Fung Wai-Kong, et al., Tung Stresses Consensus, Not Confrontation, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at 1; Chris Yeung, Tung Wants Focus on Daily Life, Not
Politics, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 28, 1996, at 4; Chris Yeung and Linda Choy, Tung
Manifesto Preaches Chinese Cultural Virtues, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at
4. See also Hong Kong's Freedoms Imperiled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1996, at 28.
137. Jimmy Cheung, Anti-Beijing Base Warning by Tung, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 9, 1998, at 4; Fung Wai-Kong et al., Tung Stresses Consensus, Not Confrontation, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at 1.
138. The Provisional Legislature set aside several laws to protect workers rights and
rights under the Bill of Rights Ordinance enacted in the last week of the elected Legisla-
tive Council. See Angela Li et al., Pre-July 1 Laws Frozen, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
17, 1997, at 1.
139. The influential Chair of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce has em-
phasized that Hong Kong should move away from the colonial laissez faire economic pol-
icy toward more planned business-friendly anti-labor policies. James Tien Pei-chun,
Bright Prospects, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 8, 1997, at 10.
140. Tung Chee-Hua, Policy Address 97, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 9, 1997; Chris
Yeung, Public to Help Forge Long-term Strategy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 17, 1998,
at 6. In addition to the Commission on Strategic Development, the Government also es-
tablished a Council of International Advisors, comprised of fourteen foreign business
leaders. Offering a New Perspective, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan 20, 1999; Win Friends
and Influence People, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 16, 1998.
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Singaporean model to Hong Kong. Asian developmental models seek to
capitalize on certain alleged Asian values 141 and a form of capitalist
planned economy.142 The more substantial micro-planning component
tends to target certain industries for external competition under an ex-
port-led growth paradigm. 43 This might be combined with certain
forms of social welfare, especially housing and health care, to afford the
regime legitimacy based on success relating to livelihood issues.
There are two apparent problems with this idea in the Hong Kong
context. First, Hong Kong, as distinguished from the other Asian
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), has not traditionally relied on
this micro-planning model to achieve its enormous economic success.
Second, even those Asian NICs that have relied on such a model have,
in recent years, recognized the need for political and economic reform to
allow greater openness and competition. This recognition has been es-
pecially encouraged by the current economic crisis. With regard to the
first issue, political economists have generally characterized the Hong
Kong model as embodying laissez faire competition and macro-
infrastructural support. 144 The laissez faire component has relied on
the rule of law and freedom to insure a level playing field; the infra-
structural support has included substantial housing and transportation
subsidy, as well as substantial public health care. 145
Regarding the second point, the other Asian rapid-developers have
141. Samuel Huntington argues that Confucian society advances the group over the
individual, authority over liberty, responsibility over rights, and values such as harmony,
cooperation, order, and respect for hierarchy. Samuel P. Huntington, Democracy's Third
Wave, in THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 3 (Larry Diamond & Marc F.
Plattner, eds. 1996). Some scholars have attacked this brand of "orientalism" and have
accused East Asian authoritarian leaders of adopting it as a self-defining discourse. See
CHUA, supra note 122, at 159; Francis Fukuyama, Confucianism and Democracy, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 20 (1995).
142. The prototype Asian authoritarian developmental model is usually characterized
by a tripartite framework of a highly autonomous technocratic bureaucracy, a politically
authoritarian regime or ruling party, and a connected or compliant business elite. See
PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION 12
(1995); CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 17-23 (1982); ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET:
ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 26-
29 (1990).
143. See Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in
the Newly Industrializing Countries 9-22 (1990).
144. See STEPHEN CHIU, THE POLITICS OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE: HONG KONG'S STRATEGY OF
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 7-8 (1994); HAGGARD, supra note 143. at
25-27. A recent study characterizes the role of government in the Hong Kong model as
one of positive non-intervention: "The clear separation in Hong Kong between the role of
government as referee, and the role of private companies as active players in the econ-
omy, is unique in Asia, and rare world-wide." MICHAEL J. ENRIGHT ET AL., THE HONG
KONG ADVANTAGE 30 (1997).
145. Id. at 29-32.
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discovered that their success has produced more demands for represen-
tation of diverse social interests, inspiring political reforms; at the same
time, the increased costs of production and the globalization of the
economy have required Asian companies to compete with each other on
a global scale. 146 Many blame the East Asian economic crisis beginning
in late 1997 on the business/government alliance evident in this East
Asian developmental model, a model which is said to have spawned
what many now call crony capitalism. 147 The critical point here is the
increased recognition of the pernicious qualities inherent in business
decisions made in such incestuous ways. In the face of these develop-
ments, the rolling back of civil liberties in Hong Kong becomes merely a
poorly disguised attempt to control political opposition. So-called
authoritarian Asian political values have no role to play in contempo-
rary Hong Kong. Any attempt to stifle freedom and access to informa-
tion in Hong Kong would be a retrograde step detrimental to Hong
Kong's competitiveness.
IV. SUSTAINING HONG KONG'S AUTONOMY
In addition to the difficulties relating to the competing paradigm
discussed in the previous section, Hong Kong's status as an HKSAR in
China presents problems of sustaining its autonomy on both domestic
and international levels. The two sections in this part address respec-
tively Hong Kong's domestic and international autonomy. This analysis
raises several serious implications for Hong Kong's constitutional order,
including maintenance of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Under the "one country, two systems" formula, in the face of a dramati-
cally contrasting mainland system, autonomy is the key tW the success
of the Hong Kong model. On the domestic level, the absence of true
autonomy will result in the undermining of Hong Kong's constitutional
and human rights regime, a dramatic increase in corruption and the
full integration of Hong Kong into the mainland system. This repre-
sents a serious threat to both Hong Kong's way of life and its livelihood.
This threat may disadvantage both Hong Kong and China. On an in-
ternational level, true autonomy can be the source of investor confi-
dence in Hong Kong and empowerment in Hong Kong's international
affairs and its relationship with the mainland.
146. See Michael C. Davis, The Price of Rights: Constitutionalism and East Asian
Economic Development, 20 HuM. RTs. Q. 303, 303-37 (1998). Dietrich Rueschemeyer and
colleagues have described the ways that economic development transforms societies and
creates needs for diverse representation. DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER ET AL., CAPITALIST
DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY (1992).
147. See David E. Sanger, Bailout Time: The Stock of 'Asian Values' Drops, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1997, at §4, p. 1. See also Donald K. Emmerson, Americanizing Asia?,
FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1998, at 46.
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A. Establishing Domestic Autonomy
It is sometimes useful to think of Hong Kong's late colonial consti-
tutional and human rights order in terms of a tripartite framework. 148
One may visualize this as an inverted triangle with Britain and China
represented by the vertices on the top and the Hong Kong community
the vertex on the bottom. Political discourse along any boundary or
axis has often been related to activities or the cessation of activities
along the other axes. During the late colonial period the people were not
confronted directly with Chinese rule, though the resumption of Chi-
nese sovereignty at some point in the future, as specified in the Joint
Declaration, represented the primary human rights concern. 149 Never-
theless, at various times, especially in the Basic Law drafting process in
the late 1980s, and in the late transition period in the mid-1990s, Hong
Kong people engaged in a direct human rights dialogue with Chinese
leaders. 150 At other times, especially during the post-1989 Tiananmen
crisis and in the 1992-94 debate over democratic reform, the Hong Kong
political and human rights culture was permitted to grow in an envi-
ronment largely sheltered from rather menacing Chinese government
actions. 151 There were similar hot and cold periods in the relations be-
tween the two governments. In spite of the increasing Chinese involve-
ment in Hong Kong affairs, pre-handover Hong Kong achieved a degree
of genuine autonomy. Before the handover, when conflicts arose there
was still the possibility of saying no to or resisting China's demands
over democracy, human rights and other issues that may arise.
This pre-1997 period also experienced an emerging dialogue be-
tween Hong Kong people, Britain and China, over the substantial
148. A detailed analysis of such tripartite framework is provided in a recent article.
Michael C. Davis, Human Rights and the Founding of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region: A Framework for Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301 (1996).
149. Joint Declaration, supra note 1.
150. In the late 1980s the Basic Law drafting process was in full bloom and even the
leaders of the democracy movement participated in this more hopeful dialogue with
China. This largely came to an end with the development of the Tiananmen crisis. But,
again, in the immediate pre-handover period substantial numbers of business and pro-
China elite became party to China's second stove operations, which by 1996 had largely
displaced British policy machinery. NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF
HONG KONG 14-42, 228-38 (5th ed. 1998).
151. After the Tiananmen massacre even Chinese contact with the substantial pro-
China community ground nearly to a halt, as the Basic Law process was itself suspended.
At this stage Britain began to question its earlier policy of accommodation; it then ad-
vanced initiatives on nationality and human rights, while still holding out on democracy.
Limited democracy became the subject of an agreement with China. Britain was more
forthcoming in its 1992 democracy initiative, and again a storm ensued, this time pro-
ducing polarization between the democratic and pro-China forces in Hong Kong. Id.
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mainland intrusion into Hong Kong affairs. The political establishment
in Beijing developed substantial formal mechanisms for monitoring de-
velopments in Hong Kong and reviewing the actions of the British Hong
Kong government. 15 2 The Beijing government demanded and seized
veto power over developments set to extend beyond the handover
date. 153 Large infrastructure projects, such as the airport and port fa-
cilities, required Beijing approval for financing. 54 China likewise de-
manded the same for political and legal developments that would ex-
tend beyond the handover date. 155 Due to the radically different
ideological perspectives of the parties, these developments, relating to
democracy, human rights and the court system, became the focus of al-
most all conflicts along all axes. 56 For any institutional change to be
allowed, they ultimately required China's approval. In response, Hong
Kong people either contested China's policies directly or pressured Brit-
ain to do so.1' 7 Yet all the while, moderate political reforms were al-
lowed to take place under the shelter of British rule, producing an evo-
lution of Hong Kong's political and legal skills, in the civil society, the
media and legal institutions. 158 On a structural level the tripartite
152. In Beijing the Hong Kong and Macau affairs office took primary responsibility
for Hong Kong Policy. In Hong Kong the local branch of the New China News Agency
served as China's representative in Hong Kong. After Governor Patten introduced his
election model for 1995, Xinhua and the Hong Kong and Macau affairs office seized every
opportunity to "undermine the authority and prestige of the government, and create un-
rest, in order to persuade Britain to recall Patten and appoint a more amenable Gover-
nor." MINERS, supra note 150, at 237. A Sino-British Joint Liaison Group (JLG) was es-
tablished for consultation over transition matters, as provided for in Annex II of the Joint
Declaration. In the Basic Law drafting process, there were the Basic Law Drafting and
Consultative Committees and, as the handover neared, the various Mainland transition
bodies noted above, emerged. The preliminary working committee, in particular, was set
up in 1993 to bypass the JLG altogether and prepare for the transition without British
and Democratic Hong Kong participation. Id. at 237-38.
153. Frank Ching, Toward Colonial Sunset, in PRECARIOUS BALANCE, supra note 23,
at 187-88. Britain and China disagreed over the purpose of the JLG, China arguing that
the Joint Declaration compelled Britain to use the JLG to obtain Chinese permission on
all important matters, effectively giving China veto power. MINERS, supra note 150, at
232.
154. Ching, supra note 153, at 187-88.
155. See Representative Government in Hong Kong, supra note 36; Ching, supra note
153, at 189-91; UK Accused of Breaching the Trust by Leaking Confidential Details, supra
note 36, at 12-13.
156. Ching, supra note 153, at 189-91.
157. After Britain caved in to Chinese demands that only one overseas judge sit on
the Court of Final Appeal, the newly elected Legislative Council voted to reject this pro-
posal. This was the first time that the Legislature opposed an agreement between Britain
and China involving Hong Kong. Id. After Chris Patten became Governor, the British
government became more responsive to Hong Kong concerns, resulting in the 1995 elec-
tion proposals that sped up the democratization time-table and increased local participa-
tion in government decisions. See MINERS, supra note 150, at 228-38. See also Davis, su-
pra note 148, at 310-11.
158. Most noteworthy in this regard were the 1991 and 1995 elections to the Legisla-
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framework grew to reflect aspects of the emerging constitutional char-
acter of this changing society.
At the same time, China learned to play the Hong Kong political
game, cultivating its own supporters to promote its preferred policies.
At the transition's end, in 1996-1997, through the complex system of
appointments to various mainland committees and previously discussed
rewards, China put in place a post-1997 political regime occupied al-
most entirely by its loyal lieutenants. This process began with drafting
the Basic Law, and reached its zenith in the late transition, by which
time the Hong Kong-British axis was almost entirely eclipsed by the
axis of discourse between China and its chosen Hong Kong supporters.
In the late transition stage China refused nearly all contact with electo-
rally popular democratic forces in Hong Kong. Upon the handover, the
Chinese government expelled remaining democratic forces in the Leg-
islative Council. Within the pro-China camp was a well worn path to
Beijing, as China focused on the minutia of the transition. For Hong
Kong's elite willing to play this game, Beijing was the venue for impor-
tant political and economic rewards.
The post-1997 period shows a confrontation between two forms of
power: the forces of a liberal democratic society and the forces of power
and influence achieved through the national regime. Both power
sources have enjoyed some success. Hong Kong decision-makers ignore
both popular opinion and powerful Beijing connected business interests
at their peril. In many respects, some success in both aspects suggests
the tripartite relationship that developed during the transition period
will likely continue as the fundamental character of Hong Kong's con-
stitutional politics. Britain's position in the pre-handover triadic rela-
tionship is being taken up by a partially responsive Hong Kong gov-
ernment and the pre-handover Hong Kong vertex occupied by an
emergent civil society. This tripartite structure is not as attractive as
true autonomy in Hong Kong, but it is more attractive than direct Bei-
jing rule. With a substantial level of political and economic development
already achieved in Hong Kong, any attempt to rule too closely by Bei-
jing would almost certainly be noticed and invite strong public protest.
The maintenance of tight control requires heavy-handed tactics and
Hong Kong would almost certainly be destroyed in the ensuing conflict.
Even a looser attempt by Beijing to control outcomes in Hong Kong,
perhaps under a de facto tripartite model, invites erosion of Hong
Kong's distinct character. Through interfering too readily in Hong
tive Council and the 1991 passage of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, bringing in an era of
active public debate on politics and human rights. Political, educational, legal and media
institutions have developed in this vibrant environment, presenting political leaders who
have endeavored to roll back these developments with a formidable challenge. See
MINERS supra note 150, at 196-213, 256-60. See generally Ching, supra note 153. at 188-
89 (discussing the 1991 elections).
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Kong's domestic issues, Beijing may invite a corruption of Hong Kong's
political and economic systems, and an intrusion by the mainland's sys-
tem into Hong Kong. Any attempts by either locally influential people
or highly placed mainland officials to cut around local political decisions
will directly corrupt Hong Kong's political and constitutional systems.
This would create a system where cultivating influence in Beijing will
be important, and invite further corruption. Mainland institutions that
offer avenues to invite intrusion by Beijing leaders include Hong Kong's
appointed delegations to China's NPC and CPPCC, the Basic Law
Committee (especially local members), the local branch of the New
China News Agency (an agency which historically has been China's de
facto embassy in Hong Kong), Beijing's Hong Kong and Macao Affairs
Office, the newly instituted branch office of the Mainland Foreign Min-
istry in Hong Kong, the local People's Liberation Army Garrison Com-
mand, and the local underground cell of the mainland Chinese Commu-
nist Party. 5 9 Perhaps the most important channel is through the Hong
Kong elite that can directly approach mainland leaders. 160 Democratic
processes and openness are the only reliable security for local auton-
omy.
In the initial phase of the HKSAR there was a noticeable diminu-
tion in mainland public official comment on Hong Kong. It is not clear
whether mainland interference diminished or went behind closed doors,
given that mainland chosen local officials are now in place. 16 1 It is clear
that China's locally appointed business and pro-China leaders and offi-
159. The local cell of the Chinese Communist Party has historically been the Hong
Kong Macao Work Committee, but recent rumors suggest this committee may be replaced
by the Party Organization of Hong Kong-Based Chinese Enterprises. Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Cadres and Tycoons Jockey for Position, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 17.
160. In this regard several examples of such influence are evident in local developer
Li Ka Shing going directly to Beijing to get a mainland prosecution in the Big Spender
case; local complaints regarding the local public broadcaster RTHKs criticisms of gov-
ernment policy made by Local NPC delegate Xu Simin; and local Basic Law Committee
member Raymond Wu attacking the recent landmark Court of Final Appeal judgment
(encouraging Beijing to overturn it). See Linda Choy, Xu's Attack on RTHK Dismissed:
Local Delegates Told CPPCC Has No Role in SAR, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 8, 1998,
at 4; No Kwai-Yan, Beijing Adviser Rejects Calls for His Resignation, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 5, 1999, at 4; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Beijing's Answer to Tycoon's Lament, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 6, 1999, at 15.
161. There were some attempts by local NPC deputies (who, by virtue of their ap-
pointment process, tend to be pro-China business elite) to have a direct role in the
HKSAR but these were seemingly rebuffed by Beijing. Linda Choy, NPC Deputies Want to
Give Tung Views on Policy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 6, 1998, at 2; No Kwai-Yan,
'Keep Quiet' Call to Local NPC Deputies, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 1999, at 4.
Others have accused local officials of attempting to "second-guess" Beijing. Stella Lee, Of-
ficials 'Second-guess' Beijing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 30, 1998, at 6. The Chief
Secretary Anson Chan was once quoted as saying that Beijing officials give policy hints,
but this was later denied. Genevieve Ku, Beijing May Have Given Policy Hints, Says An-
son, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 18, 1998, at 4; Genevieve Ku & Jimmy Cheung, Anson
Denies Job Hints From Beijing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 19, 1998, at 4.
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cials offer little challenge to well-known mainland policies, leaving
mainland officials with little reason to openly interfere. These local
leaders appear very accommodating of favored mainland policies, to the
extent of sometimes exceeding the conservative policies of mainland of-
ficials. The example of local NPC Deputy Xu Simin's comments about
RTHK's failure to support the HKSAR and Chinese governments is a
case in point, where even the mainland officials seemed disapproving of
Mr. Xu's conservative position. 162
Recent examples of seeming favoritism toward mainland entities
and pro-China figures from within the HKSAR government include the
failure of Hong Kong's Department of Justice to prosecute the New
China News Agency for violating privacy laws and the failure to prose-
cute a leading pro-China publisher for distorting circulation figures,
though she was charged as an unindicted co-conspirator with three of
her prosecuted colleagues. 163 If allegations of favoritism were substanti-
ated, this calls into question the degree of autonomy from mainland in-
fluence, and, as discussed above, delivers a severe blow to popular con-
ceptions of human rights and the rule of law in Hong Kong. To their
credit, mainland officials have often reiterated that Hong Kong issues
are for Hong Kong officials to determine. 164 It is not clear whether this
attitude will persist as the democratization process proceeds and Hong
Kong officials are under more severe pressure to be less accommodat-
ing.165
Another possible source of corruption and threat to liberty and
property interests could arise from the large mainland business contin-
gency in Hong Kong. The perception that mainland companies are fully
subject to local autonomy and laws, and that local officials are fully
committed to enforcing such laws, is vital to Hong Kong's future. The
improper offering or withholding of business privileges on the mainland
should also be of concern to mainland officials. Local companies relin-
162. See Linda Choy, Xu's Attack on RTHK Dismissed Local Delegates Told CPPCC
Has No Role in SAR, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 8, 1998, at 4.
163. Fear of One Law for Rich, One for Poor, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 19, 1998,
at 3; Row Over Aw Decision; Justice Boss Urged to Explain Why Publisher was not Prose-
cuted, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 19, 1998, at 1.
164. It is noteworthy that the mainland government has even attempted to rein in lo-
cal NPC Deputies, rejecting calls that they be given separate offices within the territory,
an arrangement which surely would have contributed to the establishment of a separate
power base. Linda Choy, Local NPC Base Ruled Out, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 4,
1998, at 4. See also Linda Choy, supra note 161.
165. Annexes I and II of the Basic Law allow for the possibility of reforming the
method for selection of the Chief Executive and Legislative Council in 2007, allowing for
the possibility of universal suffrage and full direct elections in geographical constituen-
cies. But since this requires the approval of two-thirds of the Legislative Council (which
at that stage will only have half of its members directly elected) and the Chief Executive,
it seems unlikely such reform will be approved if China and the pro-China camp fear a
loss of control. Basic Law, supra 2, at Annexes I and II.
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quishing substantial interest to mainland companies to gain favor
raises cause for concern in this latter regard. Without strict control,
mainland practices can intrude across the border and local attempts to
curry favor with powerful mainland investors could intrude upon free
market practices and decisions in Hong Kong. The ability of mainland
companies' to influence local markets is also of concern. Occasionally
stock market and property increases in Hong Kong are supported, in
part, by the perception that the mainland government is a quasi-
guarantor of sustained growth. The mainland government should
clearly recognize the local boundary and be reluctant to over-react to
every hiccup in Hong Kong markets.16 6 There should also be concern
over any reluctance of local business advisers to offend prominent
mainland companies. 167 This phenomenon raises important liberty is-
sues for business advisors and the related media. Overall, the security
of property rights is at stake if mainland companies are allowed to
avoid the same legal standards as others, and flex their muscles in the
local economy. Though the attempt was later abandoned, a group of
mainland enterprises attempted to be assigned a functional constitu-
ency under the Electoral law that governed Hong Kong's 1998 election
for the Legislative Council.168 This open channel may have been prefer-
able to numerous possible back-door channels to power.
B. External Autonomy and the Global Process
A final concern when it comes to Hong Kong's autonomy and ulti-
mately the security of human rights and the rule of law is the preserva-
tion of Hong Kong's international status. Any properly constituted
community must have a fully recognizable external projection if it is to
survive. It has been argued in this regard that external effectiveness
translates into internal effectiveness. 69 As hinted by the previous sec-
tion, internal effectiveness also translates into external effectiveness.
The international community was told in the Joint Declaration that it
could rely on Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy when dealing with
Hong Kong. Any perception that Hong Kong is merely a front for the
Chinese government would destroy any confidence in this promise to
166. The East Asian economic crisis is believed to have spawned increased corruption,
such that the dangers of mainland companies under economic pressure being pulled into
corruption is realistic. Niall Fraser, 'Economic Turmoil to Blame' for Graft Surge, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 9, 1998, at 5.
167. There is some evidence that local investment advisors may shy away from criti-
cizing influential companies in an Asian environment where official approval is critical.
Mark Landler, Asian Dilemma: Can 'Guests'Advise?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 12, 1999,
at 13.
168. Chris Yeung & Quinton Chan, Mainland-funded Firms Dropped Bid for New
Seat, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 7, 1998, at 8.
169. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, PUERTO RICO AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS: NEW
ROLES IN ASSOCIATION 53-67 (1975).
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the fatal detriment of Hong Kong. The price for China of any confi-
dence in its commitments is to fully allow Hong Kong, without interfer-
ence, to conduct it internal affairs, as discussed above, and its external
relations, as discussed in this section. China's policies in this regard are
not without concern.
The Joint Declaration and the Basic Law are quite generous in
granting Hong Kong the right to conduct its own external affairs.170
The present essay need only highlight the contours of this authority.
While retaining control over Hong Kong's foreign and defense affairs
the mainland government has granted Hong Kong almost complete
autonomy in nearly all areas of external relations with respect to com-
mercial, cultural and social affairs.171 This includes the right to partici-
pate in most international organizations, with the proviso that if such
organization is confined to states then Hong Kong must participate as
part of the Chinese delegation. 172 Hong Kong has its own overseas
trade offices and may issue its own visas.173 It is also allowed to sign
international agreements on its own within the scope of these permitted
areas. 74 Again, China is required to assist Hong Kong in this regard
where necessary. On paper this is an extraordinary degree of autonomy
for a non-state community, but a degree that is essential to the kind of
constitutional community that Hong Kong is expected to be.
The present analysis of the tensions running through the Hong
Kong model concerns the degree of compliance. The above sections al-
ready consider the degree of compliance with the Joint Declaration on
the domestic front. The question for the present section is the degree of
external compliance or Hong Kong's degree of effectiveness in comply-
ing with it own commitments. In this regard, Hong Kong runs up
against some serious difficulties inherent in China's world view. There
seems little doubt that the current world order would generally be wel-
coming of an autonomous community like Hong Kong. Historically sta-
tist world views have generally given way to views that favor local self-
determination and participation by a wide range of territorial communi-
ties. Exclusive control by nation-states has generally given way to an
inclusive order regulating vast areas of human endeavor. 175 Hong Kong
already belongs to several international organizations and is party to
many international agreements. 76
170. Basic Law, supra note 2, at arts. 150-57.
171. Basic Law, supra note 2, at arts. 2, 13, 39, 114-18, 148-57; Joint declaration, su-
pra note 1, at art. 3(6)-(10), and Annex I arts, VI-IX.
172. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 152.
173. Id. at arts. 154-57.
174. Id. at arts. 151 and 153.
175. See Myres McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Deci-
sion, in MYRES McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 191
(1981).
176. As of early 1996, the Joint-Liaison Group, which under the Joint Declaration co-
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The problem for Hong Kong is that China's world view has been far
less accommodating of flexible approaches to sovereignty. Under nine-
teenth century views of sovereignty China has been more likely to ad-
monish others to not meddle in its internal affairs and has specifically
taken the view that both its human rights practices and Hong Kong are
internal affairs. 177 This legal positivist view may be further colored by a
nationalistic view that the world is out to contain China; of particular
concern in the present context is China's concern that Hong Kong not be
employed in the service of this containment. 178 In this regard, sustain-
ing real autonomy for non-nationalistic Hong Kong may be the best
strategic option. Such seems preferable to a less autonomous Hong
Kong which would have incentives of its own to meddle in China's af-
fairs and would, at the same time, be a subject of suspicion regarding
foreign meddling. Any attempt to disempower Hong Kong internation-
ally is clearly contrary to the Joint Declaration and the expectation of
international reliance on Hong Kong's autonomy.
In addition to the formal channels offered to territorial communi-
ties. The other channel, beyond the exclusive control of nation-states,
increasingly available to international actors, is what is now referred to
as the global order. Globalization, the tendency to move areas of inter-
national power and effectiveness beyond state control, has opened up
vast areas of influence to non-state actors. This non-territorial global
space is concerned with a wide range of topics from human rights, in-
formation and the arts to science and business. In the commercial area
John Gerald Ruggie describes a world of "transnational microeconomic
links."179 As a non-state international commercial center Hong Kong is
a very effective player in this latter global space. However, global effec-
tiveness, while beyond state control, depends a great deal on territorial
communities to provide a hospitable environment for global actors.18 0
ordinates transition matters between China and Britain, had already agreed on Hong
Kong's continued participation in thirty international organizations; others were antici-
pated. RODA MUSHKAT, ONE COUNTRY, TWO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITIES: THE
CASE OF HONG KONG 6 (1997).
177. China's claims that, despite the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Hong Kong is
China's internal affairs have persisted after the handover. Glenn Schloss, West Warned to
Stop Meddling, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at 4. An early twentieth century
case expresses this 19th century positivist view of sovereignty, arguing for the "principle
of the exclusive competence of the state in regard to its own territory in such a way to
make it the point of departure in settling most questions that concern international rela-
tions." Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (1928). A
month after the handover, China's Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Hong Kong, Ma Yuzhen, hit out at Britain's first six-monthly report on Hong Kong by
warning that Hong Kong was now an internal affair. Schloss, supra.
178. See SAMUEL S. KIM, & LOWELL DITMER, CHINA'S QUEST FOR NATIONAL
IDENTITY 258 (1993).
179. John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in In-
ternational Business, 47 INT'L ORG. 139 (1993).
180. See Davis, supra note 146, at 303-37.
VOL. 27:2
CONSTITUTIONALISM UNDER CHINESE RULE
Communities which provide democratic processes, human rights and
the rule of law are more likely to attract global commercial and other
activities.18 1 Such communities, in the present world, are also likely to
provide a better quality of life and a wealthier environment for their in-
habitants. 182 Hong Kong is such a community, and as a global city, has
served as a conduit for vast amounts of mainland Chinese business that
seeks participation in this global economy. 183 In this regard, destroying
Hong Kong's autonomy and constitutional order would operate to de-
stroy Hong Kong as a venue for global enterprise. Destroying Hong
Kong as such a venue would be a great detriment to both China and
Hong Kong. Even the leader of the largest mainland enterprise in Hong
Kong, Larry Yung, argued that the mainland government must not in-
terfere with Hong Kong's autonomy or its rule of law, that to do so
would destroy Hong Kong.184
V. CONCLUSION
This article described a new type of territorial community for which
the assurances of constitutional order and human rights are vital. The
analysis seeks to contextualize human rights in the processes of com-
munity construction and survival. Autonomous functioning is vital to
these processes. Smaller territorial communities, including nation-
states, in a world marked by a rapidly expanding international order
and globalization, are constantly called upon to defend their autonomy
and political integrity, while pursuing greater integration in the wider
global order. The Hong Kong case of a highly autonomous community
within a much larger and more powerful state highlights the complexity
of this effort. In the context of Hong Kong, it is important to see that
constitutionalism and human rights are both constructive of and de-
pendent on autonomy, both domestic and external. In focusing our at-
tention on competing concerns surrounding constitutional developments
prior to the handover and during the first two years of the HKSAR this
paper seeks to highlight the complex tensions inherent in this constitu-
tional process and the attendant risks of failure.
In the face of China's contrarian system, protection of Hong Kong
people's liberty, human rights and way of life, as valuable ends in
themselves, is dependent on political will, both in terms of ideological
181. Id.
182. See GERALD W. SCULLY, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 12-14, 183-84 (1992); Adam Przeworski, et al., What Makes Democracies En-
dure?, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 1, 39-55 (1996).
183. See ENRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 144, at 53-83; Yue-Man Yeung and Fu-Chen Lo,
Global Restructuring and Emerging Urban Corridors in Pacific Asia, in EMERGING
WORLD CITIES IN PACIFIC ASIA 17-47 (Yue-Man Yeung and Fu-Chen Lo, eds., 1996).
184. Larry Yung, et al., Risk, Guanxi and 40% Luck-An Interview With CITIC Pa-
cific Chief Larry Yung, TIME, June 30, 1997, at 22-23.
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aspirations and in respect of autonomous space. With respect to Hong
Kong's role in China, three prominent hazards are identified and ad-
dressed with the following conclusions: (1) the attempted Singaporeani-
zation of Hong Kong, with the attendant loss of liberty and rights,
would likely lead to serious diminution in the entrepreneurial effective-
ness of Hong Kong as a developed commercial center; (2) failure to re-
spect Hong Kong's autonomy within China and preserve its liberal con-
stitutional order will lead to the integration of Hong Kong into China's
under-developed economy, with the attendant risk of corruption, loss of
confidence and diminution of wealth to the detriment of both Hong
Kong and China; and (3) failure to respect Hong Kong's autonomy in ex-
ternal affairs will deprive it of the ability to confidently represent its
own interest in both formal international arenas and the global eco-
nomic space. As a consequence, any failure to fully comply with the
Joint Declaration's commitments to liberal constitutional government
and a high degree of autonomy in a generous spirit that is protective of
basic human rights and the rule of Law will result in a tragic loss to
both Hong Kong and China.
MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: A CASE STUDY IN THE
FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW*
CRAIG L. CARR** AND GARY L. SCOTT***
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the question of whether multilateral treaties create cus-
tomary international law upon coming into force remains controversial,
there is good reason to suppose that they do.' Pressing global problems
demand cooperative solutions, and cooperative solutions are best
achieved by means of the treaty process. Yet treaties bind only those
states that are parties to the treaty, and often the critical number of
parties is not great enough to assure an effective international response
to global problems like environmental degradation. So it is tempting to
assert that multilateral treaties generate an "instant custom" 2 that ob-
* An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Joint Convention of the Mexican
International Studies Association (AMEI) and the International Studies Association
(ISA), Manzanillo, Mexico, December 11-13, 1997.
** Professor, Division of Political Science, Mark 0. Hatfield School of Government, Port-
land State University.
*** Professor, Division of Political Science, Mark 0. Hatfield School of Government,
Portland State University.
1. See e.g., R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International
Law, 41 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 275,(1965-66) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties]; ANTHONY
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971) [hereinafter CONCEPT
OF CUSTOM]. But see, Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of
Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1 (1988). For a cogent debate on the subject of cus-
tomary law formation from treaties see, Anthony D'Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Re-
sponse to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 459 (1988); Anthony
D'Amato, A Brief Rejoinder, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 489 (1988); A.M. Weisburd, A Re-
ply to Professor D'Amato, 21 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 473 (1988). See also Hiram E. Chodosh,
An Interpretive Theory of International Law: The Distinction Between Treaty and Custom-
ary Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 973 (1995). For a specific discussion of the law-
creating abilities of environmental multilateral treaties see Oscar Schachter, The Emer-
gence of International Environmental Law, 44 J. INT'L AFF. 457 (1991); Daniel Bodansky,
Customary (and Not so Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 105 (1995).
2. See supra note 1 for sources discussing the meaning of "instant custom" and how
multilateral treaties may create instant custom under international law.
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ligates even non-parties to adhere to their terms.
In an earlier article in the Denver Journal of International Law
and Policy we argued that multilateral treaties can in fact generate cus-
tomary international law upon coming into force when three basic con-
ditions are met:
1) A sufficient number of states in the international system accept
the treaty.
2) A significant number of those states whose interests are sub-
stantially affected by the treaty (hereinafter "pertinent states") are par-
ties to the treaty.
3) The treaty does not allow reservations on the part of the par-
ties.3
We do not intend to repeat our argument here. Instead, we shall
examine the universe of environmental treaties to see which treaties, if
any, qualify as customary international law under our standards. We
do so for two reasons. First, our prospective case study will enable us to
sharpen and refine the standards themselves, thus demonstrating with
some degree of precision how they structure the reach of customary in-
ternational law in one particularly important policy area. Second, the
study should aid a state in understanding its legal obligations to other
states regarding the environment.
We will begin in Part II with a brief review of our three conditions
and a discussion of why we think them necessary for the formation of
customary international law. In Part III we briefly discuss some pre-
liminary matters regarding the formation of instant custom. Then in
Part IV we will arrange the existent multilateral treaties on the envi-
ronment into three categories, viz., those treaties that establish cus-
tomary international law according to our standards, those treaties that
do not, and those troubling cases that remain too close to call from the
standpoint provided by our three conditions.
II. MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The reasons for thinking that multilateral treaties establish cus-
tomary international law upon coming into force derive from the princi-
ple of customary international law itself. Customary practices reach
the status of international law when a large number of the states
within the international system suppose these practices establish ap-
propriate guidelines for the relations of states.4 Presumably, a treaty
3. Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Custom-
ary International Law, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 71 (1996).
4. See, e.g., G. SCHWARZEWNBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-33 (5th
ed. 1967). For the most influential treatise on the formation of customary law see
D'AMATO, supra note 1.
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relation between a large number of states could be based upon the same
conviction. When this is the case, there is no need to suppose that
treaty requirements must "harden" or "ripen into" customary interna-
tional law.5 The significance which a large segment of the international
community attaches to the provisions of the treaty is evidenced by the
treaty itself. There is, so to speak, nothing that needs to harden; things
are hard enough already.
Nevertheless, one cannot decide abstractly which multilateral trea-
ties qualify as sufficiently "hard"; this requires the establishment of
some criteria capable of guiding judgment on the matter. The three
conditions introduced at the outset are designed to meet this objective
with some degree of specificity. As we shall see, however, these condi-
tions contain an inescapable generality and this means that we cannot
hope to achieve perfect clarity on the question of which multilateral en-
vironmental treaties actually create customary international law. This
problem, however, can be overcome by appeal to the obligatory nature of
international law. We take it as a principle of law that its obligatory
character must be clear. That is, if Treaty X creates a legal obligation,
those subject to Treaty X must be able to understand that they have an
obligation to obey it. If there is some question about Treaty X's status
as law, there is also some question about whether it is obligatory.
Where we cannot say with surety that an obligation exists, there is no
such obligation. So, hard or troublesome cases, we will conclude, do not
make customary international law under our conditions.
The three conditions introduced above are relatively straightfor-
ward. For a multilateral treaty to generate customary international
law upon coming into force, a sufficient number of states must accept it,
a significant number of pertinent states must accept it, and it must not
allow reservations.6 Perhaps the best way to make these conditions
clear is to apply them to a specific area of international concern, like the
environment, with a reasonable number of multilateral treaties that es-
tablish a foundation for international law. Before we turn to the more
applied discussion, however, a few general remarks about our three
conditions are in order.
A. The Number of Parties to the Treaty
The notion of customary international law derives from the general
belief that the shared customary practices of numerous states provide
5. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 1, at 139.
6. Article 2 of The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines "reservation" in
the following manner: " 'reservation' means a unilateral statement, however phrased or
named, made by a state, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of
the treaty in their application to that state .. " Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. AJCONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969 reprinted
in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).
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reason to suppose that such widely accepted practices deserve to be re-
spected as lawful.7 They meet the criterion of general propriety since
they already regulate the relations of a great many states. Presumably,
the officials of those states adhering to these customary practices have
found them to be appropriate regulations. The condition of general pro-
priety can also be met, however, by numerous states accepting a par-
ticular treaty regulation. Here, too, it is possible to conclude that a
large number of states-in this case the parties to the treaty--consider
the regulations associated with the treaty appropriate for the govern-
ance of inter-state relations. The numerical condition, then, seems a
necessary requirement for any inter-state practice to qualify as custom-
ary international law.8
Nevertheless, the condition is obviously imprecise; how many states
must ratify a multilateral treaty before it can be said to establish cus-
tomary international law?9 It hardly seems reasonable to think that a
modest number of states should be able to bring into force a treaty that
would then obligate the remaining states of the world. On the other
hand, if the number of required states is too large, there is little point to
thinking that multilateral treaties can generate customary interna-
tional law. Few such treaties could hope to receive the general support
required to establish instant custom, and the point would quickly be-
come moot.
Perhaps it is worth noting that the numerical condition raises
problems even in more traditional areas of customary international law
formation. Here, too, we need to consider how many states must adhere
to a custom before it receives the general allegiance required to create
international law. For its part, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
has demonstrated an inclination to measure state involvement as perti-
nent to the formation of customary international law without any fur-
ther need to identify a magic number that brings such law into being. 10
If, however, we are to use our conditions as a guide to thinking about
when multilateral treaties form customary international law, we must
do better than this.
Nevertheless, the abstract assertion of a specific number is sure to
seem arbitrary. Moreover, the number of states that are parties to a
particular treaty may not indicate either efficacy or pertinent support.
For example, at this writing only eighty-three states have ratified the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Treaty Convention)." Al-
7. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 1, at 99 passim. See also, Michael
Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law from an In-
terdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109 (1995).
8. For additional discussion of this point, see Baxter, supra note 1, at 285; D'AMATO,
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, passim.
9. See Scott & Carr, supra note 3, at 86-87.
10. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J.
3, Nos. 51 & 52, at 42 (Feb. 20).
11. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 6..
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though this is a sizeable number, it remains less than half of the states
of the world.1 2 However, this may be less important than the fact that
the world's major treaty making states (including the United States
which accounts for 7% of the world's treaties) are not included in this
number. 13 When it comes to the identification of a magic number dem-
onstrating significant support for certain treaty provisions, then, the
question of how many parties there are to the treaty may be less impor-
tant than the question of who these parties are. If all the major treaty
making states ratified the Treaty Convention, the case for thinking it
establishes customary international law would presumably be greater
than it now is.
B. Pertinent States
This point suggests that treaty ratification by certain pertinent
states is a more significant determiner of instant custom than the sheer
number of ratifications. We understand pertinent states to be those
states whose participation in a treaty is required if the treaty is to have
real meaning and a real chance of achieving its intended objective. 14 In
the case of the Treaty Convention, for example, pertinent states would
be the major treaty making states. Absent their involvement, it seems
pointless to insist that the Treaty Convention establishes customary
international law governing the treaty process.
Another apt illustration of the pertinent state requirement is the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL).'1 By 1990, parties to MARPOL accounted for 85% of gross
merchant tonnage. 16 At present, however, fewer than half of the world's
states have ratified MARPOL, and yet 85% of the world's significant
shipping states are included among those parties.' 7 The number of per-
tinent state parties thus looks more than sufficient to conclude that
IARPOL establishes customary international law.
The number of identifiable pertinent states will vary according to
the treaty and the issue in question. Depending upon the issue, some
multilateral treaties may have few pertinent state parties, but if the
number is sufficient to demonstrate a clear consensus among pertinent
states, and if our first condition is satisfied, then there is reason to
12. POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD (Arthur S. Banks & Thomas C. Muller eds.,
1998) (listing 193 sovereign states currently in existence).
13. 1 PETER H. ROHN, WORLD TREATY INDEX 111-17 (2d ed. 1984).
14. See Scott & Carr, supra note 3, at 90.
15. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973,
I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONF/WP.35, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973) [hereinafter
MARPOL].
16. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A
SURVEY OF EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 161 (Peter H. Sand ed. 1992).
17. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, MERCHANT FLEETS OF THE
WORLD: OCEANGOING STEAM AND MOTOR SHIPS OR 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER AS OF
JANUARY 1, 1987 (1988).
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think the treaty establishes customary international law. In other
cases, of course, there may be a great many pertinent states, and this
raises another numbers problem. How many pertinent states are re-
quired to ratify a multilateral treaty before it establishes customary in-
ternational law? Once again, it seems foolish to suppose we can identify
a magic number. One must examine individual treaties to get some
sense of the significance of the involvement of pertinent states. In cer-
tain instances we may be unable to make a clear determination of that
involvement. In those situations we can only say that multilateral
treaty formation of instant custom is presently doubtful. However,
doubtfulness is a form of exactness; such treaties cannot be said to cre-
ate instant custom.
One might object that, by placing such great weight on pertinent
states in determining whether multilateral treaties create instant cus-
tom, we turn efficacy into a condition of lawfulness. If enough pertinent
states adhere to some regulation, by virtue of treaty agreement, then
the fact that the treaty proves efficacious determines its lawfulness.
One might wonder, however, about the significance of thinking that an
efficacious treaty should obligate states whose people have less at stake
with regard to the regulations in question. One might also wonder why
efficacy should count as a condition of lawfulness.
We are not arguing, however, that efficacy does imply lawfulness.
Efficacy is a test of the viability of a particular multilateral treaty. In
the event a significant number of pertinent states regulate themselves
by means of a common treaty agreement, we can suppose that the
regulation demonstrates established practice among those states com-
monly involved in such matters. That is, we can suppose that the
treaty indicates what has become the perceived proper mode of associa-
tion in the area in question. It is in this sense that the treaty generates
customary international law. For it is now easy to see that the treaty
provisions codify, so to speak, the regulations that the most relevant
states think appropriate for the inter-state system. The treaty yields
the same results that would be achieved by the evolution of custom un-
der more traditional standards of customary international law.
Efficacy, then, is an indication of significant general acceptance.
And it escapes the danger of inter-state tyranny by establishing that a
majority of uninterested states cannot legally impose unwanted regula-
tions on states with a stake in some regulatory field. Moreover, since
not all pertinent states may be parties to the treaty making instant cus-
tom, the force of the law remains significant. In the event a pertinent
state refused to ratify a multilateral treaty that managed, nevertheless,
to create instant custom, this state would still be obligated under inter-
national law to adhere to the terms of the treaty. The multilateral
treaty process thus becomes an important mechanism for the self-
regulation of pertinent states in issue areas that matter to them.
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C. Reservations
Our third condition will be familiar enough to those who have con-
sidered the question of whether multilateral treaties create instant cus-
tom. It has been noted by Richard Baxter, and subsequently formalized
by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. There, the Court
stated that any treaty provision subject to state reservations could not
create customary international law.18
Of the three conditions, the reservation condition is by far the most
stringent and will no doubt severely limit the number of multilateral
treaties that generate instant custom. However, the reason for insist-
ing upon this condition is clear. Treaties allowing reservations permit
parties to exempt themselves from those provisions they prefer not to
accept. Any provision that a party to the treaty can treat as not apply-
ing to itself can hardly become customary international law that obli-
gates states which do not have a similar opportunity to reject. It is
hardly appropriate to suppose that non-parties should be obligated to
adhere to provisions of a treaty that the parties themselves are not ob-
ligated to obey. It is also unreasonable to suppose that a party to a
treaty incurs an obligation to obey a provision that it exempts itself
from through the reservation process because the treaty has created in-
stant custom. To insist that multilateral treaties that allow reserva-
tions can still make instant custom, then, seems both unfair to non-
parties and contradictory. It is contradictory because it encourages us
to assert that a party to a treaty may have an obligation to obey a
treaty provision from which it has formally and permissibly exempted
itself.
III. TREATY PROVISIONS AND THE FORMATION OF INSTANT CUSTOM
Before we begin to measure instant customary environmental law
by our standards, two preliminary comments are in order. First, it is
important to be clear about what kinds of customary international law
can be derived from multilateral treaty provisions. There are several
hundred multilateral treaties in force that are relevant to the interna-
tional environmental legal regime. These treaties are both global and
regional in scope. However, by our count only forty-one of these envi-
ronmental treaties, presently in force, are global in scope; the remain-
der are regional. For purposes of our analysis then, we will focus only
on these forty-one global multilateral treaties that have the potential of
sufficiently wide participation to become part of customary interna-
tional law. We will not address, at this time, the ancillary question of
whether regional treaties can create regional customary international
law.
Admittedly this omits many important regional multilateral trea-
18. Baxter, supra note 1, at 284; North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 10, at 42.
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ties and overlooks the possibility of the formation of a regional custom-
ary international law. It also overlooks the possibility of groupings of
similar bilateral treaties forming the basis for customary international
law, particularly on a regional basis. 19 The question of regional cus-
tomary law formation, however, involves the necessity of a theoretical
discussion of a different sort and is beyond the purview of the present
research. 20
Secondly, it is necessary to emphasize that before a treaty provision
can become part of customary international law, it must be of a gener-
alizable nature. 21 Thus, for example, a treaty provision generally de-
signed to protect endangered species by discouraging trade would be
generalizable, 22 while a specific provision, say, to require an import
permit for Loxodonta Africana may not.23
Treaty provisions may also be part of the process 24 of the formation
of customary international law by providing further evidence for the
existence of certain provisions which may qualify as customary interna-
tional law, but which have, prior to their incorporation into a general
multilateral treaty, not had much supporting evidence as proof of their
existence. Provisions, such as the sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedus
principle and the precautionary principle in environmental law, 25 may
require the backing of multilateral treaties to further solidify their ba-
sis as accepted customary international law. These questions, however,
are also beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we examine the issue
of customary international law formation or "instant custom" as a result
of a multilateral treaty coming into force.
19. D'Amato points out that by sheer numbers alone bilateral treaties must be taken
as evidence of customary international law. He states, "[y]et, as I argued in my book on
custom in 1971, if we look at the matter mathematically, a multilateral convention among
ten states is the equivalent of forty-five similarly worded bilateral treaties among the
same ten states." D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 1, at 99. On regional or
"special custom," see, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Special Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTHOLOGY 157-61 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994).
20. For a discussion on regional law in the Americas see, Donna Lee Van Cott, Re-
gional Environmental Law in the Americas: Assessing the Contractual Environment, 26 U.
MIAMI INT'L AM. L. REV. 489 (1995).
21. See, e.g., Baxter, Multilateral Treaties, supra note 1; D'AMATO, supra note 1.
22. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 1976 UNTS 244, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S 8249, U.K.T.S. No. 101
(1976), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973); [hereinafter CITES].
23. Id. at Appendix I.
24. While it is traditional to view customary international law and treaties as
sources" of international law, we think it more useful for our discussion to adopt George
Schwarzenberger's terminology of "law creating processes." See SCHWARZENBERGER, su-
pra note 4, at 28-35.
25. The precautionary principle requires states to act with caution toward potentially
environmentally damaging practices, i.e. to err on the side of caution.
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We are interested, then, in the extent to which certain multilateral
treaties can be said to be formative of customary international law on
their own, rather than through a contribution to the normal processes
of opinio juris and state practice.
IV. THE FORMATION OF INSTANT CUSTOM: A CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
For purposes of our analysis we will divide the relevant universe
of global multilateral treaties into three categories. Category I will be
those treaties that definitely do not meet our three part test for the
formation of customary international law. Category II will include
those treaties that seem quite clearly to meet our test and Category III
will consist of those treaties about which some doubt may still remain
even after applying our test. This latter category is the most interest-
ing because it illustrates the difficulty, even with the application of a
strict test, of being certain that a treaty creates customary interna-
tional law.
A. Category I
Most of the treaties in our Category I have failed to meet the most
onerous condition of our three conditions set out above, that the treaty
not allow reservations to its substantive provisions. We consider that
all treaties not specifically prohibiting reservations allow them to take
place. In this line of reasoning we are following the stipulations of Arti-
cle 19 of the Treaty Convention.26 Moreover, the ICJ in its advisory
opinion in, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide,27 upheld the notion that reservations,
not specifically prohibited, are allowable so long as the reservation is
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.28
26. Vienna Convention, supra note 6. Article 19 states,
A state may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless: (a) the res-
ervation is prohibited by the treaty; (b) the treaty provides that
only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation
in question, may be made; or (c) in cases not falling under sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty.
Id.
27. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28). For a similar opinion directly relevant to the Ameri-
cas see, Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, The Effect of Reservations on the
Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 37
(1983). For a discussion of reservations to multilateral treaties see generally, Catherine
Redgwell, Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to General Multi-
lateral Treaties, 64 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L. L. 245 (1994).
28. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, supra note 27, at 29.
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Although the "no reservations provision" is quite restrictive, 29 the
Court has indicated that the derivation of customary law from treaty
law is a result, "not lightly to be regarded as having been attained."30
Even so, some may object that we have excluded treaties that many
think have become part of customary international law, but, for reasons
to be discussed below, we think that most of this customary law may
have come about, not through the treaty process itself, but rather
through the more traditional formative processes of customary interna-
tional law, i.e., opiniojuris and state practice.
One such treaty is MARPOL.31 MARPOL's 1978 revision has a to-
tal of 106 Parties. 32 While this represents only slightly fewer than half
of the world's states, as noted above, it represents 85% of the world's
significant shipping states and over 93% of the world's gross merchant
tonnage. 33 This wide acceptance among shipping states has caused
Birnie and Boyle to proclaim, "It is thus beyond question that it is now
included in the 'generally accepted international rules and standards'
prescribed by Article 211 of the 1982 UNCLOS as the minimum content
of the flag state's duty to exercise diligent control of its vessels in the
prevention of marine pollution."34 In spite of such.claims, we have in-
cluded MARPOL in our Category I because it does not prohibit reserva-
tions to its provisions. While no reservations have been made to date,
the treaty, nonetheless, offers the possibility of a state opting out of or
modifying certain provisions through reservation. While we do not dis-
agree that MARPOL's provisions may have come to be regarded as cus-
tomary international law, they have done so because of the normal pro-
cesses included in the creation of customary international law, state
practice and opinio juris. As Birnie and Boyle point out, "Moreover,
quite apart from their incorporation by treaty, such international stan-
dards may acquire customary force, if international support is suffi-
ciently widespread and representative. The MARPOL Convention may
be one example of this transformation process."35
Another environmental treaty that may have evolved into custom-
ary law, but which we also include in Category I because it does not
prohibit reservations, is The International Convention for the Regula-
tion of Whaling ("Whaling Convention"), done originally in 1946 and
amended nine times between 1975 and 1992.36 Since 1979, this conven-
29. The no reservations test eliminates 31 of the 41 global environmental treaties un-
der consideration for this study.
30. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 10, at 41
31. MARPOL, supra note 15.
32. See Llloyd's Register of ShippingfWorld Fleet statistics, Dec.31, 1997 (noting 106
parties to MARPOL).
33. Sand, supra note 16, at 161.
34. PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 267 (1992).
35. Id. at 94.
36. International Convention for the Regulation of. Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161
U.N.T.S. 72, 62 STAT. 1716, T.I.A.S. 1849 [hereinafter Whaling Convention].
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tion, which had only eight original parties, and which added only eight
more in the succeeding three decades, has gained thirty additional par-
ties in the past two decades.37
Participation in the Whaling Convention has certainly gained mo-
mentum during a period of heightened environmental consciousness.
This momentum has caused some writers to assert that the generaliz-
able provisions of this treaty, e.g., the protection of whales in general,
have become part of customary international law. 38 D'Amato and
Chopra argue that customary law regarding whales has evolved so far
that whales can be seen as having an emerging "entitlement to life."39
We do not consider the Whaling Convention itself, however, to be
formative of customary international law, because, as noted above, it
does not prohibit reservations. Further, states may opt out of the
regular amendments to the Schedule to the Convention which establish
specific conservation regulations on whaling.40 Moreover, it should be
noted that participation in the Whaling Convention, while growing, still
does not include nearly two-thirds of the world's coastal states. 41 To
what extent this limits the treaty from constituting customary interna-
tional law under our test is a moot point, since the treaty fails our no-
reservations test. It would become an issue only if the treaty did pro-
hibit reservations.
The Whaling Convention, then, may have evolved into customary
international law through the normal practices of the expression of
opinio juris and state practice. Indeed, D'Amato and Chopra argue that
there has been, "... a broadening international consciousness about
whaling amounting to an opinio juris - the psychological component of
international customary law."42 And further, "When this component is
added to the evolving practices of states toward whaling, the combina-
tion of psychological and material elements arguably constitutes bind-
ing customary law."43 We do not dispute this claim, nor would we argue
that the Whaling Convention has not contributed to the formation of
this law in subtle ways. Rather, we argue that the Whaling Convention
itself did not create the customary law on the subject of whaling. Fur-
ther evidence that the Whaling Convention and MARPOL became cus-
tomary international law through non-treaty processes is the length of
time that passed before these customary law principles gained their
present widespread acceptance. The Whaling Convention, in particu-
37. Treaty data from the UNTS website (last modified November 10, 1997)
<http://www.un.orgDeptsTreaty>.
38. Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales, Their Emerging Right to Life, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 49 (1991). See also, Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Toward a Developing
Right of Survival as Part of an Ecosystem, 17 DENy. J. INT'L L. & PoLy 255 (1989).
39. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 38, at 49.
40. Whaling Convention, supra note 36, at art. V(3). See also, Sand, supra note 16.
41. Sand, supra note 16, at 258.
42. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 38, at 22.
43. Id. at 22-23.
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lar, languished in relative obscurity for nearly thirty years before the
rise in environmental consciousness of the past two decades.
These are but two examples of environmental treaties often seen as
having "hardened into" customary international law, even though they
do not meet the requirements of our three part test. They illustrate the
distinction between treaties which create customary international law
and those which merely contribute to its formation by aiding the proc-
esses of opinio juris and state practice. Treaties in our next category
are examples of the former, that is, they meet the standards of our
three part test. Thus, we think that they are formative of customary
international law in the form of "instant custom."
B. Category H
There are only ten global multilateral environmental treaties pres-
ently in force which do not allow reservations to their provisions, all of
which are discussed below. Of these, eight belong to our second cate-
gory, i.e., they seem rather clearly to meet our three part test. The fol-
lowing brief discussion of each of these treaties should make this clear.
The Convention on Biological Diversity came into force on Decem-
ber 29, 1993. 4 4 Its purpose is to slow the reduction of biological diver-
sity caused by human activities. 45 The means to do this described in the
Convention include ".... the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources,... transfer of rele-
vant technologies.... and by appropriate funding."46 There are 175
parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. 47 Thus, 90% of the
world's states subscribe to the principles contained therein. While bio-
logical diversity concerns all states of the world, the treaty provisions
for sharing technology 48 and providing funding to the developing
states49 suggest that the pertinent states are the major industrialized
and technologically developed states. All major developed states, except
the United States, are parties to this convention.50 The United States
signed the treaty in 1993, but has yet to ratify it. s 1 We do not consider
the absence of a US ratification of this particular convention to consti-
tute sufficient reason to deny the formation of customary international
44. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div./N7-INC.5/4, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter Biological Diversity Convention].
45. Id.
46. Id. at art. 1.
47. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, United Nations, New
York, ST/LEG/SER.E (visited Feb. 25, 1999), <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty>.
48. Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 44, at art. 16.
49. Id. at art. 20.
50. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
See also List of Signatories, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1004 (1992). (as of June 29, 1992, 157
states and the European Economic Community had signed the treaty).
51. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
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law by this treaty on the basis of our pertinent states test. The US sig-
nature constitutes an interim acceptance of the principles contained in
the treaty, so one could argue that the US is, in one sense, agreeable to
laws formulated by this treaty. This line of reasoning, however, is
probably unnecessary. The issue of biodiversity is sufficiently broad
based so that the absence of a single large and wealthy state should not
hinder customary law formation. With 170 parties, including most of
the world's technologically developed states, and most of its developing
states, this treaty meets both the sufficient numbers and pertinent
states conditions. We believe this convention is an important step in
the establishment of customary international law on the matter of bio-
logical diversity and that the remaining non-parties should consider its
provisions as definitive in this area.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change ("Climate Change
Convention") came into force on March 21, 199452 and at present it has
177 members. As in many of the environmental treaties, the developed
states are the pertinent states in the Climate Change Convention.
Those states which contribute the most to anthropogenic emissions re-
sponsible for global climate change, must naturally be "on board" for
any solutions to global climate change problems. In recognition of this
there are several provisions in the Convention calling for special contri-
butions from developed states. Article 3.1 calls for developed countries
to ".... take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse ef-
fects thereof."53 Article 4.4 requires the developed countries to ".. . as-
sist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those
adverse effects."5 4 Article 4.5 further requires developed states to "...
take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appro-
priate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies
and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Par-
ties. . .."55
Most of the world's developed states are parties to the Climate
Change Convention, including The United States, Japan, The Russian
Federation and The European Union states.56 It can be said then that
the Framework Convention on Climate Change meets both our wide ac-
ceptance test and our pertinent states test and thus forms instant cus-
tom.
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer which
entered into force in September of 198857 and the subsequent Montreal
52. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 237/18 (Part II) Add.1 and
Corr.1, reprinted in 31 LL.M. 849 (1992) [hereinafter Climate Change Convention].
53. Id. at art. 3.1
54. Id. at art. 4.4.
55. Id. at art. 4.5.
56. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
57. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513
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Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which entered
into force in January 1989,58 both received widespread acceptance
rather rapidly. This was probably due to the urgency felt on the part of
most states once a hole was discovered in the ozone layer by British sci-
entists.59 The Vienna Convention presently has 169 parties 60 and the
Montreal Protocol has 163 parties.6 1 These parties include all of the
major industrial states and the major producers and consumers of ozone
depleting substances, primarily Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Thus, the
pertinent states are all parties to these two treaties that aim to limit
the emissions of stratospheric ozone depleting chemicals. These two
treaties on ozone depletion exemplify the theory that multilateral trea-
ties can create instant customary international law.
The International Convention to combat Desertification in those
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, par-
ticularly in Africa, 62 came into force on December 26, 1996.63 While the
focus is on African areas, primarily because of the severe problems ex-
perienced there, it is, nonetheless, of interest on a more global basis.
There are a total of 146 parties to this convention, 64 giving it reasonably
widespread acceptance. The pertinent states to this treaty are those
states most experiencing desertification problems, and the developed
states, because of the special provisions in the treaty calling for them to
aid states experiencing desertification. 65 In regard to pertinent state
participation, most of the states with drought or desertification prob-
lems are parties to the treaty. For example, the states of the Sahelian
region of Africa, which consists mostly of drylands, are all parties to the
treaty.66 The developed states are well represented as parties to the
Convention as well. 67 Given the relatively widespread participation in
the Convention and the high percentage of participation of the perti-
U.N.T.S. 293, 324, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
58. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, reprinted in
26 I.L.M. 1541 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
59. See Gary L. Scott et. Al., Success and Failure Components of Global Environ-
mental Cooperation: The Making of International Environmental Law, 2 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 23, 46-58 (1995).
60. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
61. See id.
62. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experi-
encing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa, Oct. 14, 1994, U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 241/15/Rev.7, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1328 (1994) [hereinafter The Desertifica-
tion Convention].
63. U.N. Doc. A/AC.241/15/Rev.3 (Sept. 12, 1994).
64. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
65. The Desertification Convention, supra note 47, at art. 6.
66. See Kyle W. Danish, International Environmental Law and the "Bottom-Up" Ap-
proach: A Review of the Desertification Convention, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL. STUD. 133,
136 (1995). The states are Cape Verde, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger,
Chad, and Sudan. See id.
67. The authors note that most of the European Union States have ratified the Con-
vention. Two notable absentees from the developed state parties are the United States
and Japan. Both states, however, are signatories.
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nent states, it can be said that the Desertification Convention meets
each of our tests for becoming customary international law.
This brings us to The International Tropical Timber Agreement of
198368 and its successor agreement, the International Tropical Timber
Agreement of 1994.69 For purposes of our discussion, we will treat them
as a single agreement, focusing primarily on the successor agreement.
While these agreements are more commodities agreements than envi-
ronmental agreements, they are, nonetheless, concerned with the pres-
ervation of tropical forests and thus can be classed as falling within the
purview of the international environment. They have been generally
treated as environmental treaties in the relevant literature.7 0 Moreo-
ver, they are the only international agreements focused on forests, and
the 1994 successor agreement does have more of an "environmental fla-
vor" than the 1983 Agreement. 71 Presently there are 54 parties to the
1983 agreement and 54 parties to the 1994.agreement.7 2
While it may seem questionable whether these agreements have
achieved sufficient participation worldwide such that they have created
instant customary international law, they present a somewhat different
problem in this area. Rather than taking the participation in the trea-
ties as a percentage of all of the world's states, it should be noted that
only a small percentage of the world's states are concerned with the ex-
port of tropical timber and only a slightly larger percentage with its im-
port. Because most of the timber producing states and also a large per-
centage of the major timber consumers are parties,73 the treaties
contain sufficient breadth of participation and sufficient pertinent state
participation to warrant consideration as formative of customary inter-
national law regarding the conservation of tropical forests. Therefore,
since these treaties allow no reservations, have sufficient pertinent
state participation, and arguably meet the breadth of participation re-
quirement as well, these treaties must be considered as formative of
customary international environmental law according to our three part
68. International Tropical Timber Agreement, Nov. 18, 1983, U.N. Doc.
TD/TIMBEI11I/Rev.1 (1984), reprinted in 1393 U.N.T.S. 67 (1985).
69. International Tropical Timber Agreement, Jan. 10, 1994, UNCTAD:
Doc.TDITIMBER. 2/Misc. 7/GE. 94_50830 reprinted in 33 IL.M. 1014 (1994).
70. See, e.g., Nicholas Guppy, International Governance and Regimes Dealing with
Land Resources from the Perspective of the North, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 169, 177-80 (Oran R. Young et. al. eds., 1992); Rodolfo
Rendon, Regimes Dealing with Biological Diversity from the Perspective of the South, in
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 141-42 (Oran R.
Young et. al. eds., 1992); Ann Hooker, The International Law of Forests, 34 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 823, 849 (1994).
71. The 1983 Agreement contains only one paragraph among its "Objectives" which
relates to environmental concerns. International Tropical Timber Agreement, supra note
53, ch. 1, art.1. The 1994 Agreement contains 6 paragraphs which refer to various envi-
ronmental concerns such as sustainable development, conservation, and enhancement of
resources. Id..
72. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
73. Id.
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test.
These agreements, however, offer an excellent example of why one
should not be sanguine about an environmental issue, even though one
can see that customary law has been formed regarding that issue.
What is troublesome about these agreements is the way in which they
have been structured and the results that this has had for the regula-
tion of the destruction of tropical forests. Because of the weighted vot-
ing scheme within the International Tropical Timber Organization,
which gives the most votes to the largest timber producing and con-
suming states, 74 the results have not been as many environmentalists
had hoped. According to Nicholas Guppy, "In practice, therefore, the
destruction of tropical forests is promoted by both sides, while the tropi-
cal timber market continues in a state of uncertainty and is manipu-
lated by the main buyers - especially Japan - to keep prices low." 75
Therefore, while the clauses in these treaties relating to the conserva-
tion of tropical forests may have become part of customary international
law, in practice the treaties and their parties are doing relatively little
to preserve this resource that is so important to global environmental
health. Simply knowing that customary international law has been
created on this matter may breed false optimism concerning the future
of tropical forests. 76
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)77
presents another interesting study. While there is no doubt that
UNCLOS incorporates many heretofore accepted principles of custom-
ary international law, such as the freedom of the high seas, coastal
state sovereignty over territorial waters, etc., it also represents a sig-
nificant departure from some of the older concepts of the traditional law
of the sea. For example, UNCLOS was the first treaty to give legal
credibility to the shift from res nullius to res communis regarding the
resources of the seas.78
Many authors have proclaimed that UNCLOS is formative of cus-
74. Guppy, supra note 70, at 141.
75. Id.
76. Id. See also, Hooker, supra note 70; Tom Rudel & Jill Roper, The Paths to Rain
Forest Destruction: Crossnational Patterns of Tropical Deforestation, 1975-1990, 25
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 53 (1997); Emmanuel Kasimbazi, Sustainable Development in In-
ternational Tropical Timber Agreements, 14 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 137 (1997);
Phillip E. Wilson Jr., Barking up the Right Tree: Proposals for Enhancing the Effective-
ness of the International Tropical Timber Agreement, 10 Temp. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 229
(1996).
77. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. AICONF.621122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
78. See, e.g., the Preamble to UNCLOS which states, inter alia, "...that the area of
the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion, as well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind, the exploration and
exploitation of which shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole .... Id
See also UNCLOS, part XI, art. 140.
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tomary international law and that res communis is now the accepted
view of the international community.7 9 When this question is viewed
against the background supplied by our instant custom test, this under-
standing of UNCLOS seems justified. Let us explain.
It should be noted, first, that UNCLOS meets our "no reservations"
test. Further, UNCLOS has gained rather widespread acceptance
among the world's states. At present there are 130 parties to the Con-
vention.80
The pertinent states test is the issue that may make UNCLOS
somewhat questionable regarding its formation of customary interna-
tional law. It seems reasonable to regard those states with the largest
blue water navies and those states with the world's largest gross ton-
nage of shipping as our pertinent states. Though nearly all states have
an interest in UNCLOS, particularly with its res communis principle
regarding the high seas and the adjacent subsoil, those states most af-
fected will be the major shipping and naval powers.
Considering UNCLOS as a candidate for the formation of custom-
ary law in 1994, the year of the Agreement on the implementation of
Part XI of UNCLOS, the prospects were not good. 81 At that time only
one of the top ten naval powers 82 and only three of the top ten mer-
chant shipping states83 had ratified the treaty. Part XI of UNCLOS be-
came the most controversial part of the Convention. In an effort to
make this part of the treaty more palatable to the major maritime
states, and thus to achieve universal participation in UNCLOS, the
79. For a discussion of the historical progress from res nullius to res communis see,
e.g., W. Frank Newton, Inexhaustibility as a Law of the Sea Determinant, 16 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 369 (1981). See also, A. L. Morgan, The New Law of the Sea: Rethinking the Implica-
tions for Sovereign Jurisdiction and Freedom of Action, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L. L. 5, 19
(1996); Christopher C. Joyner & Elizabeth A. Martell, Looking Back to See Ahead:
UNCLOS III and Lessons for Global Commons Law, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 73 (1996);
David L. Larson, Conventional, Customary, and Consensual Law in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 75 (1994), Philip Allott, Mare
Nostrum: A New International Law of the Sea, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 764 (1992).
80. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
81. Part XI of UNCLOS deals with the establishment of the deep seabed authority.
Article 136 of Part XI establishes that the seabed and its resources are the "common heri-
tage of mankind." UNCLOS, supra note, 77, at art. 136. Part XI was not well received
among those states that had the seabed. The supplemental agreement which modified
certain parts of Part XI seems to have assuaged most of the concerns of these states. See
GERHARD VON LAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 399-403 (7th ed. 1996) (for a discussion of the particular objections and the modifica-
tions to Part Xl).
82. The top ten naval powers are extrapolated from the INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
AND DEFENSE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 1941 and passim (Trevor N. Dupuy ed., 1993). They are 1.
USA, 2. Russia, 3. UK, 4. France, 5. Japan, 6. Argentina, 7. Brazil, 8. India, 9. Spain, 10.
China. Only Brazil had ratified UNCLOS by 1994.
83. The top ten shipping states by gross tonnage are taken from Dupuy: These states
are 1. Liberia, 2. Panama, 3. Japan, 4. Greece, 5. Cyprus, 6. USA, 7. Russia, 8. China, 9.
Philippines, 10. Bahamas. Of these states only Cyprus, Philippines, and Bahamas had
ratified UNCLOS. Id. at 1729.
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General Assembly adopted the Agreement on the implementation of
Part XI and put it forward for signature and ratification.84 That it has
largely achieved its desired effect is evidenced by the fact that 63 states
have become parties to UNCLOS since the implementation of this sup-
plemental agreement in 1994.85
In the wake of the supplemental agreement, all of the naval powers
with the exception of the United States, and all of the major shipping
states with the exception of the United States and Liberia, have become
parties to UNCLOS. 86 Does this constitute sufficient participation by
the pertinent states to declare that UNCLOS formulates customary in-
ternational law and that its provisions therefore govern all states with
respect to the sea?
The significance of the non-participation of the United States and
Liberia cannot be minimized in considering this question. The United
States is, by a considerable degree, the largest naval presence in the
world.87 Further, Liberia is the number one shipping state in the world
by a large margin.88 Liberia's absence from UNCLOS, coupled with the
absence of the United States (not only the largest naval power, but a
significant shipping power as well) at least raises some doubt about the
ultimate effectiveness of the treaty or the customary international law
formulated by the treaty.
It is necessary to clarify, then, whether the point behind our second
condition is efficacy or general consensus. There is little doubt that the
participation of pertinent states in a multilateral treaty is necessary if
the treaty is to prove effective. However, effectiveness is a poor condi-
tion of lawfulness. As UNCLOS demonstrates, even in the category of
pertinent states, some states may be more pertinent than others. To
conclude that it is doubtful that UNCLOS establishes instant custom is
to allow the most pertinent states on a question of treaty law to have a
de facto veto over the issue of instant custom. This seems inconsistent,
however, with the traditional view that customary practice can harden
into international law because it demonstrates a general consensus that
some regulation ought to be respected by all states. After all, custom-
ary international law is supposed to hold against all states and not
permit the claim of res inter alios acta by any single actor.
Our pertinent state category does not deviate from this view; in-
stead, it effectuates this view by adding a degree requirement to the is-
sue of customary practice. Consensus on the propriety of a regulation,
among states with a heightened involvement in a particular practice,
supports the regulation in ways relevant to the formation of customary
84. G.A. Res. 48/263, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 36, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/263 (1994).
85. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
86. Id.
87. Dupuy, supra note 82.
88. Id. at 1729.
VOL. 27:2
1999 A CASE STUDY IN THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW 331
international law. When it comes to instant custom, this means that a
high degree of consensus among pertinent states is required for a find-
ing of instant custom.
A high degree of consensus, however, can fall short of unanimity. If
enough pertinent states participate in a multilateral treaty, the non-
participation of one or two should not affect the formation of instant
.custom, regardless of what this might do to the treaty's efficacy. Given
the involvement of other pertinent states, then, we think the non-
participation of the United States and Liberia does not stop UNCLOS
from formulating customary international law. The United States,
however, has signed the Agreement relating to the implementation of
Part XI of the Convention and continues to be a provisional member of
the International Seabed Authority. 89
C. Category III
We now turn to those treaties that present difficulty in determining
their qualifications as customary international law makers, even when
viewed through our three part test. We have included only two treaties
in this category.
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal ("Basel Convention") came into
force on May 5, 1992.90 Presently there are 122 parties to this treaty,91
a significant, but not overwhelming, percentage of the world's states.
The purposes of the Basel Convention are first, to limit and control the
transboundary movement of those materials set for disposal that are
deemed by the convention to be of a hazardous nature, and second, to
transfer technology to the lesser developed countries so that they may
better be able to minimize the production of such hazardous waste and
to minimize the handling and disposal problems of those wastes that
are generated. 92
Since most of these hazardous materials are the result of industrial
and manufacturing processes, and since the technology transfers de-
89. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, U.N. Doc. A/RES.481263 (1994). The
United States signed the Agreement on July 29, 1994. The effect of the initial signature
was to become a provisional member of the ISBA until November 16, 1996. In accordance
with Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Agreement and by its own request, the US provisional
membership in the ISBA has been extended to November 16, 1998. (Doc. ISBA/C/9).
90. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEPIWG.190/4, reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 657 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention]. For a discussion of the Basel Conven-
tion specific to Latin America see, Gonzalo Biggs, Latin America and the Basel Convention
on Hazardous Wastes, 5 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 333 (1994).
91. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
92. Basel Convention, supra note 90, preamble.
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pend upon the technologically developed states, it would seem that the
pertinent states in this particular convention must be the most ad-
vanced industrial states of the world. The Basel Convention has been
quite successful in attracting members from this category of states. All
members of the EU, along with Japan, Peoples' Republic of China, the
Russian Federation and several other highly industrialized states are
parties to the treaty.93
The one notable absentee from the major industrialized parties to
the treaty is the United States, which has signed, but not ratified the
treaty.94 (The US Senate consented to the ratification of the Basel Con-
vention in August 1992; however, the Congress has not yet passed the
domestic legislation necessary to comply with the treaty obligations.) 95
As noted already, the non-participation of a single pertinent state is not
sufficient to conclude that a treaty fails to make instant custom. Once
again, however, the absence of the United States raises questions of ef-
ficacy. The United States is the largest producer and one of the largest
transporters of hazardous waste materials. 96 Of course, the signature
of the United States on this document does indicate interim approval of
its provisions, and given the often slow legislative process in the United
States, ratification may yet be forthcoming. Still, the present status of
this treaty with the US missing from the parties raises serious doubts
about its general efficacy.
Nevertheless, the absence of the US alone does not disqualify the
treaty from establishing instant custom, for the same reasons presented
in our discussion of UNCLOS. 97 There is, however, another relevant is-
sue here. With the participation of only about 60% of the world's states
in the Basel Convention, 98 there is reason to question whether our first
93. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
94. Presently, the United States is the only member of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (hereinafter OECD) that has failed to become a party to
the Basel Convention. See, e.g., <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/fin> (last modified Nov.
10, 1997).
95. Biggs, supra note 90, at 357.
96. See, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRANSFRONTIER MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES: 1992-93 STATISTICS 10-11 (1997).
According to the OECD Report, "[d]ue to differences in national definitions of hazardous
wastes, great caution should be exercised when using these figures." For example, "[t]he
difference between the waste generation figures for US and Europe arises largely because
the US defines large quantities of dilute wastewaters as hazardous wastes while in
Europe, these materials are managed under water protection regulations." Id. A further
difficulty in comparing the statistics is that the reporting year for the various OECD
states varies considerably, with Austria reporting 1995 waste generation statistics and
Spain reporting them from 1985. All other states fall somewhere in between. The United
States waste generation statistics are for 1993. Even with all of the difficulties of com-
parison, however, the fact that the United States hazardous waste generation is nearly
80% of the total OECD waste generation surely makes the United States the largest pro-
ducer of hazardous waste materials.
97. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
98. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
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condition is satisfied. Unlike the Convention on Biological Diversity,9 9
where 90% of the world's states are parties,100 the 60% participation in
the Basel Convention seems too slight to conclude that the treaty cre-
ates instant custom. Here too we might note that the absence of a ma-
jor pertinent state may be considered more significant in cases where
general participation involves only a modest majority of states. We
cannot say, however, that the 60% participation is an insignificant
number, particularly when a considerable percentage of pertinent
states participate in the treaty.
This is a close call; if the United States does pass the necessary
domestic legislation and become a party to the treaty, the strong stand
taken by the pertinent states might then be sufficient to conclude that
the Basel Convention formulates instant custom. Similarly, if the per-
centage of states ratifying the treaty increases, there would again be
reason to suspect that the treaty formulates instant custom. At pres-
ent, however, the issue seems too close to conclude safely that the con-
sensus required to generate customary law is in evidence. Conse-
quently, we will leave this treaty in the doubtful category. In any
event, it is a relatively new treaty and seems to be well on its way to
meeting our three part test for inclusion into Category II.
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES") came into force on July 1, 1975.101
There are 145 Parties worldwide to CITES.102 We have not included
CITES among those treaties not allowing reservations because while
reservations to the general provisions of the Convention are prohibited,
allowance is made for reservations pertaining to specific species of wild
fauna and flora as listed in the Appendices to the Convention. 103 It is
difficult to say if this provision should disqualify this treaty from being
formative of customary international law, or whether the reservation
provision is sufficiently specific to call for a relaxation of our no reserva-
tions test. One could argue for the latter, because it is highly unlikely
that the specific species lists in the appendices are sufficiently gener-
alizable to formulate customary international law.104 On the other
hand, states have made rather extensive use of the reservations to the
99. Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 44.
100. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
101. CITES, supra note 22.
102. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
103. CITES, supra note 22. Article XXIII, paragraph 1 of CITES states, inter alia,
"[t]he provisions of the present Convention shall not be subject to general reservations.
Specific reservations may be entered in accordance with the provisions of this Article and
Articles XV and XVI." Id. at art. XXIII, para 1. Paragraph 3 goes on to state that "[u]ntil
a Party withdraws its reservation entered under the provisions of this Article, it shall be
treated as a State not a Party to the present Convention with respect to trade in the par-
ticular species or parts or derivatives specified in such reservation." Id. at para. 3.
104. According to Article XXIII, paragraph 3, a party having as reservation will be
treated as not being a party to the treaty with respect to that particular species until such
time as the reservation is withdrawn. Id. at art. XXIII, para. 3.
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Appendices, and it could be argued that, therefore, the provision is suf-
ficiently broad so as to possibly negate the effects of the entire treaty.
10 5
As the name of the Convention indicates, its purpose is to insure
that certain species are protected from exploitation as a result of their
market value. Regulations throughout the Convention cover both the
exporting states and importing states. That the Convention itself in-
tends to develop customary international law on this subject is evi-
denced by the inclusion of regulations covering non-party states. Arti-
cle X of CITES, "Trade with States Not Party to the Convention,"
requires that trade with non-party states ". . . substantially conform
with the requirements of the present Convention. .". "106 With over 70%
of the world's states as parties to CITES,107 sufficient numbers are pre-
sent to fulfill our criterion of widespread acceptance.
Analyzing the "pertinent states" condition under CITES is some-
what more difficult. Obviously in the case of trade in endangered spe-
cies, both importing and exporting states fill the role of pertinent states.
Although not all potential importing and exporting states are parties to
the treaty there would seem to be sufficient numbers of both developing
states and developed states to satisfy our pertinent states condition.
Moreover, CITES continues to gain parties, perhaps partly because its
provisions are extended even to non-parties and also because of global
pressure regarding the trade in endangered species.10 8 Between April
1996 and February 1999, an additional fifteen states became parties to
CITES.109 Thus the question regarding the no reservations test would
seem to provide the greatest difficulty in determining with certainty if
CITES qualifies as a treaty that is formative of customary international
law.
V. CONCLUSION
An examination of the 41 global multilateral environmental trea-
ties that are included in our study reveals that only ten of them meet
our no-reservations test. Of these ten, we judged that eight definitely
105. By 1992, reservations had been made by 17 states regarding 17 taxa in Appen-
dix I, by 4 states regarding 23 taxa in Appendix II, and by 11 states regarding 12 taxa in
Appendix III. Sand, supra note 16, at 80.
106. CITES, supra, note 22, at 251.
107. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
108. "A major factor influencing the decision of many countries to become parties to
CITES is the pressure that stems from adverse publicity about illegal or harmful wildlife
trade and about the mortality of animals in the large-scale pet trade." Sand, supra note
16, at 81.
109. The sixteen states with their dates of ratification are: Mongolia, April 4, 1996;
Saudi Arabia, June 10, 1996; Georgia, Dec. 12, 1996; Turkey, Dec. 22, 1996; Latvia, May
12, 1997; Swaziland, May 27, 1997; Jamaica, June 22, 1997; Yemen, Aug. 3, 1997;
Myanmar, Sept. 11, 1997; Cambodia, Oct. 2, 1997; Antigua and Barbuda, Oct. 6, 1997;
Uzbekistan, Oct. 8, 1997; Fiji, Dec. 29, 1997; Mauritania, June 11, 1998; Azerbaijan, Feb.
21, 1999.
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satisfied our three part test. We determined that the remaining two
treaties were in the doubtful category. This means, then, that only
eight of the 41 relevant multilateral treaties can be considered to create
instant customary international law binding on all states, regardless of
their non-participation in them.'1 0
It might be argued that the record of compliance with this instant
customary international law is not good. Some of the treaties that we
have included in our Category II do not have good records of compliance
either from the parties or the non-parties. But, this is not the question
that has concerned us here. Rather, we have explored the issue of obli-
gations created for states on the basis of the formation of instant cus-
tom. Our three part test has taken a rather conservative view of the
formation of customary international environmental law through the
treaty process as evidenced by the exceedingly small number of treaties
that we think qualify as customary law creating instruments. Our test
merely points to those customary environmental law principles by
which states should consider themselves bound. Whether they comply
with these principles is a different question entirely. Attempting to add
some certainty to the nature of customary legal obligations in interna-
tional environmental law, nonetheless, should prove valuable in clari-
fying the network of binding legal obligations that exist in this issue
area.
110. Oscar Schachter took an opposite view in 1991 when he wrote, "[e]nvironmental
treaties, though numerous, are limited in scope and in participation. On the whole, they
are not accepted as expressions of customary law and are regarded as binding for the par-
ties alone." Schachter, supra note 1, at 462.. Participation in certain of these treaties,
however, has grown considerably since 1991 and, as our discussions above indicate, the
scope covered by these environmental treaties has grown as well.

